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To the Members
of the Society for Buddhist Lore.

In publishing the first Year-Book of the Society I beg to excuse that only a part of the materials destined for the first issue are herewith presented. No other way was available, as it was not possible to get the proof-sheets of Dr. Obermiller's translation of Bu-ston's History of Buddhism in India and Tibet, with copious notes, back from Leningrad during the past eight months, in cause of the long absence of the author in Trans-Baikalia. It is to be hoped that this rather compendious work will fill the second Year-Book which is to follow the first one in a short time.

The publication of this volume has been favoured by the generous assistance of M. Okura, Tokio.

The annual subscription for which the Year-Book will be delivered post free has been fixed at 12 marks (12s) to be paid in before April 1st on the account of the Society at the „Deutsche Bank und Diskonto-Gesellschaft“* Filiale Heidelberg (Postscheckkonto 519).

Heidelberg, January 1930.

M. Walleser

CONTENTS OF THE YEARBOOK FOR 1930.

- I. G. TUCCI. The *Nyāyamukha* of Dignāga.
- II. Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS. The Man and the Word.
- III. V. GOKHALE. The *Aksaraçataka* of *Aryadeva*.
- IV. M. WALLESER. Zur Errichtung eines Instituts für Buddhismus-Forschung.

The Nyāyamukha

by

Giuseppe Tucci.

Introduction.

I do not need to insist upon the importance of Diñnāga and the place that he occupies in the history of Indian logic. Yet unfortunately no work of this master is preserved in the sanscrit original; in fact, as I hope to have shown, in my paper: "Is the Nyāyapraveśa by Diñnāga?"¹⁾, we can hardly believe that the Nyāyapraveśa was written by him. On the other hand, he exercised such an influence upon the development of Indian logic that without a direct knowledge of his thought many problems connected with the early aspects of nyāya must remain obscure. So, to quote only an example, many a criticism contained in such a work as the Nyāyavārttika can only be understood, having regard to the theories of Diñnāga, to which Uddyotakara refers more often than it is generally supposed. It is therefore with the purpose of contributing to a better knowledge of the logical theories of the great ācārya and indirectly of early Indian nyāya, that I have translated into English one of the works of Diñnāga, viz. the Nyāyamukha. This work is certainly anterior to the Pramāṇasamuccaya and the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti written by the same author, since it is quoted in the latter text. It contains, so to say, the *sāra* itself of what is expounded in the larger work with more detail. But the purely epistemological side, which is developed

¹⁾ JRAS, 1927, pag. 7.

Walliser.

there and, so far as we know, for the first time in India, occupies in the Nyāyamukha a small place. This fact represents therefore the natural process of his thinking which took place between his composition of the two works. In fact the Nyāyamukha is chiefly concerned with *vāda* and the theory of syllogism, i. e. with formal logic¹).

As he had little or nothing to change, he inserted very often complete passages of the N. M. in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and the *ṛtti* thereon; the correspondence of many passages is absolutely literal.

My translation is based upon the Chinese version made by Yuen Chwang; but, wherever I found a correspondence between the Pramāṇasamuccaya and the Nyāyamukha, I have given, in the foot-notes, the Tibetan text of the former, with that of the *ṛtti*²).

The treatise, small as it is, is one of the most difficult books that we have in the Chinese canon; the difficulty is even increased by the fact that we do not know the exact equivalents in Chinese of the original technical nyāya terms³), and by the extreme conciseness of the text.

My translation is literal; but I have tried my very best to explain all the passages, that do not seem to be very easy, and given references from the classical nyāya texts, whenever I thought

¹) But the Nyāyamukha is certainly not the first book that he wrote. Cfr. lower down, n. 42,

²) According to the copy (Narthang edition) of the University of Calcutta, very kindly put, for some months, at my disposal. The Chinese text that I have used is that published in the new edition of the canon (Taisho edition, vol. 32. pag. 1). There is, as it is known, another translation by I Tsing (same vol. pag. 6) which does not differ from the first one. It is only preceded by a short discussion on the *abhidheya*, *prayojana* and *sambandha*, a theory that is not yet in Dīnāga, but which was elaborated by Dharmakīrti and his school and then accepted by other sects. I used also an edition containing the commentary of Shen T'ai (three chapters only) and published in China in 1923 (no indication of place).

³) A complete list of the Chinese equivalents of the Nyāya terms, as it may be gathered from the extant texts, is published in my book: *Predīnāga Buddhist logic from Chinese sources*, to appear shortly in the "Baroda Oriental Series".

they could contribute to a better understanding of our treatise. We have a commentary upon the Nyāyamukha written by Shen T'ai, a disciple of Yuen Chwang. But unfortunately it is incomplete. K'uei Chi, the other great Chinese commentator, wrote, as it is known, a big commentary upon the Nyāyapraveśa, which by the by has been studied by me in another paper. In this commentary he refers very often to the Nyāyamukha, and therefore I have used his notes, when required. I have spared neither time nor work in my attempt to translate such a difficult text, because I realize the great importance that this small book of Dinnāga has for the study of ancient Indian logic. I shall feel recompensed, if this translation prove useful to scholars who are working in the same field of research. —

My thanks are due, besides to Prof. M. Walleser, to Dr. Vasudev Gokhale for kind assistance in reading the proof-sheets of the present work.

Dacca (Eastern Bengal), October 1927.

Giuseppe Tucci.

List of abbreviations.

- N. B. Nyāyabindu, edit. by Peterson. Calc. 1889.
N. B. . Nyāyabinduṭīkā.
N. M. Nyāyamañjarī, by Jayanta. Viz. S. S. 1895.
N. P. Nyāyapraveśa. Baroda Oriental Series. N. XXXIX.
NP. C. Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa by K'uei Chi (in Chinese).
N. S. Nyāyasūtras in Nyāyadarśana with the Bhāṣya, Khadyota by Gaṇ-
gānātha Jhā and Bhāṣyacandra by Raghūttama. Chowkh. S.
S. 1925.
NS. B. Vātsyāyana's commentary on the N. S. (same edition).
N. V. Nyāyavārttika by Uddyotakara (ed. by Vindhyeśvarīprasāda
Dvivedin. Kāshī S. S. 1915).
NVT. Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭīkā by Vācaspati Miśra, edit. by Śrī Rā-
jēśvara Shāstrī Draviḍa). Kāshī S. S. 1926.
PKM. Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa of Prabhācandra (Nirṇaya Sāgara ed.).
P. M. Pramāṇamīmāṃsā by Hemacandra (Poona ed.).
P. S. Pramāṇasamuccaya, Narthang edition (Calcutta University copy).
P.S.V. ID. vṛtti (id.) (a and b indicate the two different Tib. translations
of P S V, which do not always agree with each other).

The Nyāyamukha.

1) I have compiled this book, because I desire to ascertain what is the real nature of the arguments meant to prove [a thesis as well] as to refute it.

I. The proposition and the other terms are called the proof (*sādhana*). Here is called "proposition" only that particular argument that we want to prove in accordance with our own opinion. It must be such as no argument contradictory [to it] can exclude [it]²).

"The proposition etc."; this means that through the formulation of a proposition, a reason and an example, an argument, which has not yet been understood by another [man], is made evident to him³). That many terms represent the *sādhana*, syllogism, was already asserted by Vasubandhu in his *Vādaavidhī* etc.⁴),

1) The commentary is regularly introduced by the expression: *lun yue* "the *śāstra* says"; but this is an explanatory addition of the chinese translators. Therefore I have left it out.

2) This *kārikā* can be restored in the following way:

*pakṣādivacanānīti sādhanam; tatra hi svayaṃ
sādhyaatvenepsitāḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtāḥ*

Cfr. Nyāyapraveśa 1, 4: *tatrā pakṣādivacanāni sādhanam; pakṣaḥ... svayaṃ sādhyaatvenepsitāḥ*. This stanza is also quoted by Uddyotakara, Nyāyavārttika, pag. 116: *sādhyaatvenepsitāḥ pakṣaḥ* (1. 7) *viruddhārthānirākṛtāḥ* (1. 8, cfr. Nyāyāvatāra, 14 *pratyākṣādyanirākṛtāḥ*), but later on (1.9) *pakṣo yaḥ sādhyatvenepsitāḥ* and (1. 16) *svayaṃ sādhyaatvenepsitāḥ*.

3) This passage corresponds to Nyāyapraveśa 1, 4: *pakṣahetudrṣṭāntavacanair hi parair apraīto 'rthāḥ pratipādyate*; the translation by I Tsing seems to be more correct.

4) The other treatises referred to by Diñnāga with the word: "etc." are, according to Shen T'ai, *Vādaavidhāna*, and *Vādahṛdaya*. See my paper on: "*Buddhist logic before Diñnāga*" (Oriental Congress of Oxford.)

but they are called here: "the *sādhana*", in the singular, in order to show that they have, as a whole, the nature of a syllogism. Therefore we must acknowledge that when [some terms] are defective there is an error of the syllogism⁵). The word "here" (*atra*) is meant either to introduce the beginning (*ārambha*) of the *śāstra*, or has the meaning of restriction (*avadhāraṇa*); that is: among these terms, such as: "proposition etc." Therefore [the author] uses the word: "*atra*, here". "Only" is used in order to distinguish [the proposition from the other members of a syllogism].

"In accordance with our opinion"⁶) is used here in order to express that the proposition is independent of the *śāstra*, but is established in accordance with one's own opinion. "That we want to prove" means that we do not want as a proposition [a sentence] having the nature of the proof (*sādhana*). Were not the *probandum* defined in this way, that is as a proposition that "one wants to prove", then even a fallacious reason or a fallacious example (*hetv-ābhāsa*, *dr̥ṣṭānta-ābhāsa*) could be called a proposition⁷).

In order to show that it must be devoid of any fallacy, (such as those admitted by) other schools, (the author) says: "it must be such as no argument contradictory (to it) can exclude (it)".

⁵) The members of a syllogism can be too many (*adhika*) or too few (*nyūna*). In this case, according to Vasubandhu, we have seven possibilities, while, according to Dinnāga, six cases only are possible, as shown in the following scheme.

	<i>pratijñā</i>	<i>hetu</i>	<i>dr̥ṣṭānta</i>
1.	present	absent	absent
2.	absent	present	absent
3.	absent	absent	present
4.	present	present	absent
5.	present	absent	present
6.	absent	present	present
7.	absent	absent	absent.

The 7th item is not accepted by Dinnāga, as it is in fact impossible.

⁶) Pramāṇa S. V. a. fol. 44, l. 3 rañ · dañ · ḥdod · ḥgyur · žes · smos · pa · ḥdis · yin · rañ · gi · bstan · bcos · la · bltos · nas · k'as · blañs · par · bstan · pa · yin · no · de · yañ · ma · bsal · ba'o. (the *kārikā* (III, 2 b, c.) has: rañ · gi · no · bo · k'o · na · bstan · bdag · ḥdod · rañ · gi · c'os · can · la.)

⁷) P. S. V. ā, 44 b, l. 2; rañ · gi · no · bo · k'o · na · žes · bya · ba · ni · bsgrub · par · bya · bai · no · bos · yin · gyi · grub · pa · las · sgrub · pai · no · bos · ni · ma · yin · no · de · bžin · tu · rtags · ma · grub · pa · dañ · dpe · ltar · snañ · ba · dag · kyañ · yoñs · su · sbañs · par · brjod · do · ste ·

[This can mean] also that it is not excluded by a sentence having a contradictory meaning.

[A proposition is called a fallacious proposition] when one of the [five] following cases happens to be⁸⁾:

1. [If it is self-contradictory]: e. g. if one says: "all words are false".

2. If it is contradictory to the proposition that one has already assumed as the *probandum*; e. g. if a Vaiśeṣika says: "sound is eternal".

3. If it is excluded by a statement generally accepted as true (*prasiddha*), when the proposition is concerned with some notion that cannot be the object of inference, because there is no other homogeneous thing, which can be referred to as a positive instance (*sapakṣa*)⁹⁾; e. g. if one says: "śaśī (an epitheton of the moon) is not the moon, because it exists"¹⁰⁾.

4. If [the particular attribute] of the subject (*dharmin*), that one wants to prove, is contradicted either by an inference or by direct perception, the validity of which is generally admitted. E. g., if one says: "sound cannot be heard", this proposition is contradicted by the evidence of direct perception. [If on the other hand somebody says]; "the pot is eternal", this proposition is contradicted by inference.

⁸⁾ Diñnāga knows only five *pakṣa-ābhāsas* instead of 9 as in the N. P. Cfr. also the criticism of Uddyotakara, N. V. p. 113.

⁹⁾ P. S. V. a.; fol. 44 f. l. 4 fll.: gañ · sgrub · par · ḥdod · pai · c'os · kyis · k'yad · par · du · byas · pai · c'os · can · de · la · bsgrub · par · bya · ba · ni · c'os · dañ · ḥgal · bai · mñon · sum · dañ · rjes · su · dpag · pa · dañ · luñ · dañ · grags · pa · rnams · te · c'os · gžan · gyis · ma · bsal · ba'o · /de · ltar · na · bsgrub · par · bya · ba · k'a · na · ma · t'o · ba · med · par · bstan · pa · yin · no · /de · lta · ma · yin · na · ni · de · ltar · snañ · ba · ste / dper · na · sgra · mñan · du · mi · ruñ · ño / bum · pa · rtag · go · ts'ad · mas · gžal · (b—xyl. gžag) · bar · byai · don · sgrub · par · mi · byed · do · žes · pa · lta · bu · dam · bca' · ba · tsam · dañ · ḥgal · ba · dañ · gañ · yañ · t'un · moñ · ma · yin · pai · p'yir · rjes · su · dpag · pa · ni · yod · pa · ma · yin · na · de · (?) sgrar · grags · pa · dañ · ḥgal · bai · don · sbyor · ba · ni / ri · bon · can · ni · zla · ba · ma · yin · te / yod · pai · p'yir · ro · šes · bya · ba · lta · bu · 'o.

¹⁰⁾ The moon cannot be an object of inference, because there is no other object of the same class, to which it may be compared; no affirmative instance can, therefore, be adduced; so that it is impossible to formulate a syllogism in order to prove its existence. Availing himself of this fact a sophist might argue in this way: śaśī is not the moon, because it exists (reason), as the sun etc. (example).

[Now the Naiyāyikas] say, that the contradiction of the reason and the proposition [represents another fallacy of the proposition that] is called *pratijñāvirodha*¹¹).

But [according to me], this is not a fallacy of the proposition, (for the following reasons). The example of this fallacy, as given (by them), is: "sound is eternal, because all (things) are non-eternal"¹²). [First of all what is supposed to be a reason is not a reason, as it is used in the function of an example.] But [even] the formulation (*prayoga*) of this example is incorrect as regards the negative instance. In fact if we apply this example to the proposition (*upanaya*), we must assume that the reason is: "because it is not all (things)". But this reason is non-existent, because „not all (things)“ cannot be taken as an attribute of the subject of the proposition, since sound also is included in "all things"¹³). Or it incurs the other fallacy, which is called (presence) in a part only of the *probandum*. The argument is therefore invalid, and it constitutes a fallacy of the reason, (not of the proposition)¹⁴).

Moreover the example also is erroneous. In fact the negative instance first shows the non-existence of the *probandum* (*pakṣa*). [If the *probandum* is: "sound is eternal", the negative instance is: "the non-eternal"]; and then it expresses the non-existence of the reason (viz.: not not-all (things)), [when the *sādhya* is absent]. That is, one must formulate it in this way: "the non-eternal is all (things)"; this means that it is not not-all

¹¹) Nyāyasūtras V, II, 4. *pratijñāhetvor virodhaḥ pratijñāvirodhaḥ*.

¹²) This thesis is attributed to the Śābdikas.

¹³) In fact, if: „because all (things) are non-eternal“ is the negative instance, when we express it in the proper way we should have: "that which has the attribute of being non-eternal is all (things)". So, from this we infer that the positive instance is: "what is not all (things) is eternal." From both the instances we deduce that the reason of the proposition, already referred to, must be: "because it is not all (things)". The syllogism therefore would be: sound is eternal; because it is not all (things); what is not all (things) is eternal; what is non-eternal is all (things). But the reason is *ubhayāsiddhaḥ*.

¹⁴) That is, in order to avoid the objection raised by Dinnāga, the opponent is supposed to say that "sound" is the only thing eternal, because it is the only thing except all things non-eternal. But if it be so, the reason expresses a propriety, already inherent, by definition, in S and therefore it is invalid: in fact it comes to this: S is P because it is S. If on the other hand the opponent's view is that sound, being eternal is distinct from all things non-eternal then the reason would be inherent in P only: S is P, because it is P.

(things). On the contrary you said that all things are non-eternal. Therefore in your syllogism the example also is fallacious. In this way I have indicated [the characteristics] of the proposition and of the fallacies of the proposition)¹⁵.

¹⁵) For this discussion meant to refute the theory of the Naiyāyikas: cfr. PSV. a. fol. 46, a, l. 1.

rīgs . pa . can . rñams . na . re .
dam . bca' . ba . gtan . ts'igs . dañ .
ḡgal . ba . dañ*) . dam . bca' . dañ .
ḡgal . ba . zes . bya . ba . de . dag .
dam . bca' . bai . skyon . yin . te /
dper . na . sgra . rtag . pa . ste / t'ams
· cad . mi . rtag . pai . p'yir . ro . zes .
bya . ba . lta . bu'o . zes . zer . ro /
dam . bca' . gtan . ts'igs . dañ . ḡgal . ba /
dam . bcas . skyon . zes . rīgs . pa . min //

(P.S. III, 6)

ḡdir . ni . dam . bca' . ba . dañ . gtan .
ts'igs . su . ḡgal . lo . zes . pa . ḡñis .
pa . rīgs . pa . ma . yin . te / ji . ltar .
že . na /

legs . par . ma . bslabs . pa . rñams .
kyis /

ḡdi . ni . c'os . (mi)** . mt'un . dpes .
brjod //

gañ . gtan . ts'igs . kyi . sbyor . ba .
ḡdi . dam . bca' . ba . dañ . ḡgal . bar
· brjod . pa . ni . rīgs . pa . ma . yin .
te . / ḡdi . ltar . c'os . mi . mt'un .
dpei . sbyor . ba . ñid . kyis . yin .
pas . na'o / der . ni . ḡdi . ltar . sbyor .
ba . byas . nas . mdses . par . ḡgyur .
ro / / sgra . rtag . ste . t'ams . cad .
mi . rtag . pai . p'yir . zes . pa . ni .
t'ams . cad . ma . yin . pai . med .
pai . p'yir . zes . pai . don . no / de .
ltar . na . ni . c'os . mi . mt'un . pai .
dpes . bsgrub . bya . med . pa . las .
gtan . ts'igs . med . par . bstan . pa .
yin . no / rtag . ñer . ḡjal . gyis . ḡdir .
bsgrub . bya . ma . yin / ñe . bar . ḡjal .

PSV, b., fol. 128. a. l. 1.

rīgs . pa . can . rñams . ni . dam .
bca' . ba . dañ . gtan . ts'igs . ḡgal .
ba . ni . dam . bca' . ba . dañ . ḡgal .
ba . 'o . zes . bya . ba . ḡdii . dam .
bca' . bai . skyon . yin . te / dper . na .
sgra . rtag . ste . t'ams . cad . ni .
rtag . pai . p'yir . zes . zer . ro /
gtan . ts'igs . dam . bca' . la . gnod . pa /
dam . bca' . i . skyon . zes . bya . ba .
med /

ḡdir . ni . dam . bca' . ba . dañ . gtan .
ts'igs . ḡgal . ba . dañ / dam . bca' .
bai . skyon . zes . bya . ba . ḡñi . ga
yañ . yod . pa . ma . yin . no / ci .
ltar . že . na /

mi . mt'un . p'yogs . las . legs . bslab .
pas /

dpe . de . ñid . du . brjod . pa . yin / /
gañ . las . dam . bca' . ba . dañ .
ḡgal . ba . zes . brjod . pa . ḡdi . gtan .
ts'igs . sbyor . ba . ni . ma . yin
te . 'on . kyañ . c'os . mi . mt'un . pai
dpe . sbyor . ba . yin . te / de . la .
yañ . ḡdi . ltar . sbyar . bar . bya .
ba . yin . te / sgra . rtag . ste . t'ams .
cad . mi . rtag . pai . p'yir . ste .
t'ams . cad . ma . yin . pa . ñid . du .
med . pai . p'yir . ro . zes . bya . bai .
don . te / de . ltar . c'os . mi . mt'un .
pai . (dpes)* . gtan . ts'igs . bsgrub .
bya . med . pa . la . med . pa . ñe . bar .
bstan . pa . yin . no / ḡdir . ni . gtan .
ts'igs . ñe . sbyar . bas / bsgrub . bya
sgra . la . t'ams . cad . ma . yin . no .
zes . bya . ba . ni . ñe . bar . sbyor .
bas . yin . no / / ḡdir . t'ams . cad .
ma . yin . pa . ñid . pa . gtan . ts'igs .

*) Sic xyl.: corr. *ni*.

**) deest in xyl.

*) deest in xyl.

The [validity] of the reason and the fallacies of the reason

pas . ni . ḥdir . sgra . la . t'ams . cad .
 ces . bya . bas . t'ams . cad . ma . yin .
 pa . ṇid . rtags . su . brjod . pa . ni .
 ma . yin . no / de . ni . ma . grub . pa .
 ste . t'ams . cad . kyi . k'oṅs . su .
 sgra . yaṅ . ḥdus . pai . p'yir . ram /
 dam . bca' . bai . p'yogs . gcig . yin .
 pai . p'yir . ro / gal . te . t'ams . cad .
 mi . rtag . ces . pa . la . t'ams . cad .
 kyi . sgras . sgra . daṅ . bcas . te .
 brjod . na . ni . de . ltar . na . t'ams .
 cad . kyi . k'oṅs . su . sgra . yaṅ .
 ḥdus . pai . p'yir . t'ams . cad . ma .
 yin . pa . ṇid . ni . med . do / ji . ltar .
 med . do / gaṅ . gi . ts'e . ḥdi . p'yogs
 . gcig . yin . pai . p'yir . t'ams . cad .
 ma . yin . pa'o . ze . na / de . ltar . na
 . ni . gzan . la . yaṅ . p'yogs . gcig .
 yin . pa . ṇid . do / t'ams . cad . ma .
 yin . pas . so / de . ltar . na . ni .
 t'ams . cad . ma . yin . pa . mi . ḥdod .
 pa . ḥgyur / ci . ste . de . ltar . na . yaṅ
 . dam . bca' . bai . skyon . ṇid . du .
 ḥgyur . te / mi . rtag . pa . ṇid . kyis .
 rtag . pa . ṇid . bsal . bai . p'yir . ze .
 na / sgra . la . yod . pa . ṇid . sel . bar
 . ḥgyur . ba . ni . ma . yin . pai .
 p'yir . sgra . la . yod . par . brjod .
 pa . yin . pas . ni . c'os . mi . mt'un
 pai . dpei . sbyor . ba . ṇid . du .
 sbyar . bar . bya'o / ci . ste . sgra .
 daṅ . bral . ba . t'ams . cad . de .
 sgra . ṇid . t'ams . cad . ma . yin .
 pa'o . ze . na / de . yaṅ . dam . bca' .
 bai . don . gyis . p'yogs . gcig . yin .
 pai . p'yir . ma . grub . pa . ste . dper
 . na . mi . rtag . ste / mi . rtag .
 pai . p'yir . zes . pa . bzin . no /
 sgra . zes . pa . ma . grub . pai . don .
 ṇid . yin . pa . de . bzin . du . t'ams .
 cad . yod . pa . ma . yin . pai . p'yir .
 zes . pai . gtan . ts'igs . kyaṅ . ṇo /
 ci . ste . ḥdus . pa . rnams . gzan .
 gyi . don . byed . de / ḥdus . pa . yin .
 pai . p'yir . zes . bya . ba . daṅ / de .
 bzin . du . ḥdus . byas . mi . rtag .

su . brjod . na . de . ma . grub . pa .
 yin . te . sgra . ni . t'ams . cad . kyi .
 naṅ . du . ḥdus . pai . p'yir . ro / yaṅ .
 na . dam . bca' . bai . p'yogs . gcig .
 yin . pai . p'yir . ro / gal . te . t'ams .
 cad . mi . rtag . pai . p'yir . zes . bya .
 ba . la . sgra . daṅ . lhan . cig . pai .
 t'ams . cad . brjod . par . byed . pa .
 des . na . t'ams . cad . kyi . naṅ . du .
 ḥdus . pai . p'yir . sgra . t'ams . cad .
 ma . yin . pa . med . do / ci . ltar .
 med . do . gaṅ . gi . ts'e . ḥdi . p'yogs
 . gcig . yin . pai . p'yir . t'ams . cad .
 ma . yin . no . ze . na / de . lta . ni .
 yin . na . gzan . yaṅ . p'yogs . gcig .
 yin . pas . t'ams . cad . ma . yin . pai
 p'yir . t'ams . cad . med . par . ḥgyur .
 na . de . yaṅ . ḥdod . pa . ma . yin .
 no / 'on . te . de . lta . na . yaṅ .
 dam . bca' . bai . skyon . ṇid . du .
 ḥgyur . te . rtag . pa . ni . mi . rtag .
 pa . ṇid . kyis . bsal . bai . p'yir . ro .
 ze . na / gal . te . sgra . la . gnas . pa .
 ṇid . sel . bar . byed . na . gyur . pa .
 yin . na . t'ams . cad . la . gnas . pa .
 brjod . pa . ni . ḥdi . c'os . mi . mt'un
 . pai . dpe . sbyor . ba . ṇid . yin . par
 . rigs . so / ci . ste . sgra . ma . gtos . pa
 . ni . t'ams . cad . yin . la . sgra .
 ṇid . t'ams . cad . ma . yin . no . ze .
 na / de . yaṅ . dam . bca' . bai . p'yogs .
 gcig . yin . pai . p'yir . *) grub . pa .
 ma . yin . te / dper . na . sgra . mi .
 rtag . ste . mi . rtag . pai . p'yir . ro .
 zes . bya . ba . ni . ma . grub . pai .
 don . gyis . **) gtan . ts'igs . ma . yin
 . no / de . bzin . du . sgra . ṇid . yin .
 pai . p'yir . ro . zes . bya . ba . yin .
 no / 'on . te . yaṅ . ḥdus . pa . rnams .
 ni . ḥdus . pa . gzan . gyi . don . byed
 . pa . yin . te / ḥdus . pa . yin . pai .
 p'yir . zes . bya . ba . dam . bca' .
 bai . don . gyi . p'yogs . gcig . gtan .

*) Here the xyl. has: *ma*.**) Here the xyl. has: *ma*.

chiefly depend on the *pakṣadharmā* (residence of M. in S.);¹⁶⁾ therefore I shall now indicate the various characteristics of this *pakṣadharmā*.

II. The middle term [as resident in the subject of the inference] is threefold, according as it does, or does not reside in the affirmative instance and according as it does or does not reside at the same time in the negative instance; this residence can be in either case of two kinds [that is in all, or in some of the *sapakṣas* and the *vipakṣas*]¹⁷⁾.

ste · ḥdus · pas · yin · pai · p'yir · zes
· bya · ba · de · dag · la · yañ · dam ·
bca' · bai · don · gyi · p'yogs · gcig.
gtan · ts'igs · su · ḥgyur · ba · mt'oñ ·
ño · ze · na / ḥdir · ḥdus · pa · yañ ·
ḥdus · byas · t'ams · cad · ni · dam ·
bca' · bai · don · ma · yin · te · dpe ·
med · par · ḥgyur · bai · p'yir · ro / 'on
· kyañ · ḥdi · ltar · mig · la · sogs ·
pa · dañ · ḥdus · byas · kyi · p'yogs ·
gcig · yin · no / ci · ste · yañ · sgra ·
ñid · t'un · moñ · ma · yin · par ·
ḥgyur · ro · ze · na · de · ltar · ḥgyur ·
bai · nus · pa · ni · med · do / dam ·
bca' · c'os · kyi · don · ni · t'un · moñ
· ma · yin · pa · ste / mñan · par ·
byas · pa · ñid · t'un · moñ · ma · yin
· par · rigs · kyi · sgra · de · ni · sgra ·
gžan · med · pai · p'yir · de · ltar ·
ma · yin · pas · ma · grub · pa · ñid ·
ces · bya · bai · gtan · ts'igs · kyi ·
skyon · yin · no · dpei · skyon · yañ ·
dam · bca' · bai · skyon · ma · yin ·
no /

ts'igs · yin · pa · mt'oñ · ño / de · bžin
· du · ḥdus · byas · ni · mi · rtag · te ·
ḥdus · byas · ñid · kyi · p'yir · zes ·
bya · ba · lta · bu'o · ze · nā / ḥdir ·
ḥdus · pa · dañ · ḥdus · byas · t'ams ·
cad · dam · bca' · ḥdi · don · ni · yin*)
te / dpe · med · par · t'al · bar · ḥgyur
· bai · p'yir · ro / mig · la · sogs · pa ·
dañ · p'yogs · gcig · yin · no / ci · ste ·
sgra · t'un · moñ · ma · yañ · pa · ñid
· c'os · can · du · ḥgyur · ro · ze · na /
dam · bca' · bai · don · t'un · moñ ·
ma · yin · pa · ñid · c'os · can · du ·
ḥgyur · ro · ze · na / dam · bca' · bai ·
don · t'un · moñ · ma · yin · pai · c'os
· mñan · par · bya · ba · ñid · de ·
t'un · moñ · ma · yin · par · rigs ·
kyi / sgra · la · sgra · gžan · ñid · yod ·
do · zes · de · ltar · bya · ba · ni · mi ·
nus · pai · p'yir · ma · grub · pai · don ·
ñid · kyi · gtan · t'sigs · kyi · skyon ·
dañ · / dpei · skyon · yin · gyi · dam /
bca' · bai · skyon · can · ni · ma · yin ·
no · /

*) Sic xyl.; corr.: *min te*.

¹⁶⁾ This same idea occurs in P. S. III, 7:

gañ · p'yir · gtan · ts'igs · bsgrub · byai · c'os
p'al · c'er · der · snañ · ba · yin · te.
de · p'yir · de · rgyas · pa · ni · śnar....

This is quoted in the NVT. pag. 290 (cfr. N. V. p. 129)

sādhadharma yato hetus tadābhāsāś ca bhūyasā.

See Randle p. 34; this verse comes before the other cited at pag. 29 sapakṣe etc.

¹⁷⁾ This *kārikā* is quoted in the NVT p. 289:

*sapakṣe sann asan dvedhā pakṣadharmāḥ punas tridhā
pratyekam asapakṣe ca sadasad dvividhatvataḥ.*

Now somebody may object: "You have already, with a synthetic expression, defined the *pakṣa* as "that which somebody wants to prove"¹⁸. How is it, that in this [*kārikā*], you give to the same word: "*pakṣa*" the (different) meaning of subject of the proposition only?". [I reply that I do not commit the mistake of using one and the same expression in two different meanings], because a collective term can be used as well to express a single

Cfr. Randle pag. 29.

It corresponds also verbatim to P. S. III, 8:

p'yogs . c'os . mt'un . p'yogs . yod . med . dan /

rnam . gñis . re . re . dag . la . yañ //

rnam . gsum . mi . mt'un . p'yogs . la'n /

yod . med . rnam . pa . gñis . p'yir . ro //

As we have seen, in the first *kārikā* and in the commentary upon it, Dinnāga has shortly defined the proposition, showing that it consists only in formulating, in a coherent way, the argument that one wants to prove in arguing with an opponent. It cannot be considered as a real part of the proof, *sādhana*. Then he has indicated the various fallacies of the proposition; this was necessary, because, when a proposition is wrong, no discussion can be based upon it. Now he passes to the first of the two real members of the syllogism, I mean the reason, *hetu*. The reason, in order to be valid, must possess three characteristics: that is it must a) reside in the subject *pakṣadharmatā*; b) be present in all or in some of the affirmative instances, *sapakṣe sattva*; c) and must never be found in the negative instances *vipakṣe 'sattva*. This constitutes the *trairūpya*-theory of the reason (on the history of which see "Buddhist logic before Dinnāga"); cfr. Uddyotakara's N. V. pag. 125. — It is evident that these three characteristics must be coexistent at one and the same time. If only one of the characteristics is found to be absent, the reason is invalid; in fact when these three conditions are not observed, three errors are possible a) *asiddha*, unproved, absence of M in S; b) *aniścita*, inconclusive, M is in the affirmative instance, as well as in the negative, c) *viruddha*, contradictory, when M is only in the negative instance, but not in the affirmative. In all, seven cases: six wrong, one exact. See Uddyotakara N. V. pag. 56 and 128 and Randle pag. 24. — In this second *kārikā*, Dinnāga presupposes as granted that the reason possesses the first characteristic: *pakṣadharmatā*, without which it would be meaningless, and as such object neither of discussion nor of refutation. He himself points out this fact in the commentary upon the *kārikā*, in the PS. and in the PSV. Therefore the so called „wheel of the reason“ is quite different from the table of the seven cases already referred to, as it expresses only the possible relations of the *pakṣadharma*, (that is of the middle term as resident in the subject), with the affirmative and negative instances. The table of the nine possible cases can be seen in Vidyābhūṣaṇa's HIL. n Randle's book p. 31 and in my note on the fragments from Dinnāga JRAS 1928.

¹⁸⁾ See preceding *kārikā*.

part; e. g. when we say "the cloth is burning" [while in fact only a part of it is really burning]. [I may say also that] there are cases in which the word "*pakṣa*" is used to express only the predicate¹⁹).

Now we can choose as *pakṣadharmā* only that particular attribute that the speaker as well as the opponent recognise beyond any doubt, to be resident in the subject. The same is to be said concerning the other rules referred to, that is: residence and non-residence in the affirmative [and in the negative] instances [respectively]²⁰. Why? Because [the validity of an argument] depends upon the apprehension [of the validity] of [any particular] cause [aiming at producing in our mind a definite] notion (*upalabdhi-hetu*). [In fact] it is only through the faculty of understanding that we perceive the meaning of [a proposition], as it is expressed (in words). Therefore there is no analogy with the efficient cause (*kāraṇahetu*), as this brings out its effect through its mere capacity of producing it, [and it remains therefore quite independent of our knowledge of its being a cause]. [At this point somebody may object]: "If it be so, then [you assume implicitly] that the understanding only is the cause of the notion, and therefore the syllogism would lose its character of being a proof". But this objection is out of place, [because the reason, as it is formulated] is meant to remind the opponent [of a relation] which is already sure and proved to him also²¹). Therefore my statement viz. that here [viz. in the reason] we must choose a middle term, the meaning of which is beyond any doubt both for the opponent and the disputant, is valid.

¹⁹) Same argument in the PSV. a. fol. 47a, l. 3 and b. fol. a. 129 l. 4. l.

²⁰) E. g. "non eternal" as an attribute of sound is not equally accepted by the *vādin* and the *prativādin*, disputant and opponent, but "because it is a product" is recognized as valid by both. Either of them knows not only that "product" is a predicate of the subject, but that it is resident in the affirmative instances, and absent in the negative.

²¹) The cause through which we can realize the validity of a proposition is, according to Shen T'ai, threefold. First the meaning of the sentence in itself; then our mental activity that we call understanding; thirdly the verbal formulation of this proposition. As soon as this is expressed, the opponent is reminded of the fact that the condition of "being a product" is present in "sound", and is accepted as an indisputable predicate of all the positive instances such as pot etc., while it is recognized as absent in all negative instances.

Therefore that predicate, which is not equally admitted by the speaker and his opponent, cannot be called a *paksadharmā*, middle term as resident in the subject²²); e. g. if somebody says: "sound is non-eternal, because it is perceived by the eyes²³)" Nor is it a *paksadharmā*, if it is not recognized as resident in the subject by the opponent only. An example of this kind would be, if somebody, discussing with a philosopher [who believes in the eternity of sound] and that this [sound] is manifested by the agency of a cause, but not created, argues [that sound is non-eternal], because it is a product²⁴). Nor is it a *paksadharmā* if doubtful: e. g. when a doubt arises concerning smoke [that has been seen, yet one infers that there is fire derived from the material elements, because smoke has been seen²⁵).

[Nor is it a *paksadharmā*] when the subject is not proved; e. g. [if somebody discussing with an opponent who does not admit the existence of the *ātman*, such as a Buddhist] argues that the *ātman* is all-pervading, because it produces (in every individual feelings) of joy etc.²⁶). Reasons of the same kind as those referred to here cannot be considered as a proof²⁷).

²²) Dinnaga here begins by showing that first of all a reason must be devoid of the: *asiddha hetv-abhasa*. In fact when M does not reside in S, it is impossible to speak of a reason; therefore the *asiddha* is not taken into consideration in the *hetucakra* cfr. note 17. Then he enumerates the four varieties of *asiddha* which correspond to those referred to in the N. P. pag. 5, cfr. *Prasastapāda-bhāṣya*. p. 341. cfr. N.B. p. 89 fil.

²³) This is the *ubhaya-asiddha-hetv-ābhāsa* which happens to be, when neither the disputant nor the opponent are supposed to accept a given reason. Same example as in the N. P. l. c.

²⁴) This is the *anyatara-asiddha-hetv-abhasa*; in the example given in the text the opponent is supposed to believe only in the manifestation (*abhi-vyakti*) of sound, but not in its creation or production from a previous non-existence; therefore the reason: "because it is product", cannot be considered by him as resident in the subject. Same example as in the N. P. and in *Prasastapada* l. c.

²⁵) This is the *sandigdha-asiddha-hetv-abhasa*. Same example in the N. P. and in *Prasastapada* l. c. where it is called *tadbhavasiddha*. Cfr. N.B. and N.B.T. pag. 91, *Pramananirnaya*, pag. 51. If we are not sure that smoke is really smoke, but we doubt whether it is vapour, smoke cannot be taken as a reason.

²⁶) This is the *as'raya-asiddha* of N. P. or *asiddhadharmin* of P. S. Same example in the N.P. and in N.B. 92.

²⁷) These four *asiddhas* are so referred to in the P.S.V.:

Concerning the (other characteristics of the reasons), that is residence or non-residence of the propriety to be proved in the positive instances etc., the same rules [as those already stated] must be applied.

When we refer, later on, to the (valid) reason, to the contradictory or to the inconclusive, we can speak respectively of a proof or of a refutation, only if the sentence, as it is formulated, is equally accepted as sure by either disputant, but not if it is [merely] unproved or doubtful, because, in this case it would be necessary to take up the proof of it [before using it as a proof]²⁸⁾.

a. fol. 47, a, 1 . 5

gñis . ka . la . grub . c'os . de . las . /
t'a . sñad . yin . p'yir . gñis . ka .
la . 'm . /
gañ . yañ . ruñ . ba . la . bzlog .
pa . 'm . /
t'e . ts'om . c'os . grub . ḥdod . ma . yin /
ḥdir . gñis . ka . la . p'yin . ci .
log . tu . grub . pa . ni / don . gyi .
šugs . kyis . gtan . ts'igs . ñid . du .
mi . ḥdod . do / dper . na . sgra .
mi . rtag . ste . mig . gi[s] . gzuñ .
bya . yin . pai . p'yir . žes . bya .
ba . lta . buo / gañ . yañ . ruñ .
ba . la . ste . gcig . tu . p'yin . ci .
log . tu . grub . pa . ni . dper . na .
mñon . par . gsal . bar . smra . ba .
la . byas . pa . ñid . lta . bu 'o /
gñis . ka 'm . gañ . yañ . ruñ . ba .
la . t'e . ts'om . du . gyur . pa .
ni . dper . na . dud . pa . ñid . du .
t'e . ts'om . za . ba . las . me .
sgrub . pa . lta . bu'o / c'os . grub .
pa . ni . dper . na . bde . ḥa . la .
sogs . pa . t'ams . cad . yod . pai .
p'yir . bdag . k'yab . par . yod . do
žes . bya . ba . lta . bu 'o /

b., fol. 129, a, 1 . 9

gñi . ga . la . grub . c'os . kyis . ni . /
t'a . sñad . bya . p'yir . gñi . ga .
dañ . /
gcig . la . dogs . dañ . t'e . ts'om .
dañ /
gži . ma . grub . la . mi . ḥdod . do . /
ḥdir . šugs . kyis . gñi . ga . la .
zlog . pa . ni . gtan . ts'igs . ñid .
du . mi . ḥdod . do . dper . na . sgra .
mi . rtag . ste . mig . gis . gzuñ .
bar . bya . bar . yin . pai . p'yir .
žes . bya . ba . lta . bu'o / gcig . la
yañ . bzlog . pa . ni . mñon . par .
gsal . bar . smra . ba . la . byas .
pa . ñid . lta . bu 'o / gñi . ga 'm
gcig . la . t'e . ts'om . za . ba .
ni . dper . na . me . bsgrub . par .
bya . la . du . ba . ñid . la . t'e .
ts'om . za . ba . lta . bu 'o / c'os
can . ma . grub . pa . ni . dper .
na . bdag . k'yab . pa . yin . te . bde
ba . la . sogs . pa . t'ams . cad .
na . yod . pai . p'yir . ro . žes . byas
lta . bu 'o . /

²⁸⁾ In other words, no refutation is logically possible, if the non-residence of M in S is not equally admitted by either disputant. PSVa, fol. 49 b., l. 2: gañ . žig . gñis . ka . la . rab . tu . grub . pai . p'yogs . kyī . c'os . ma . yin . pa . ni . dper . na . mig . gi . (sic; corr: gis) gzuñ . bya . ñid . lta . bu . ste . de . ni . sun . ḥbyin . pa'o / PSV b. 129. b., 1 . 3 gañ . yañ . p'yogs . kyī . c'os . ma . yin . par . gñi . ga . la . rab . tu . grub . pa . ni . dper . na . mig . gis . gzuñ . bya . ñid . lta . bu . ste . de . ni . sun . ḥbyin . pa . yin . no .

(Now, somebody may ask)²⁹⁾: “this rule for establishing a *pakṣadharmā* (M as residing in S) holds good when with the help of another predicate (expressed by the) reason you wish to prove the predicate of the subject (as formulated in the proposition). But suppose that we are to prove that the subject itself is existent or is non-existent; e. g. if we argue that the primeval matter (*pradhāna* postulated by the Sāṅkhyas) is existent, because we see that the various things have a character of general analogy, or if we assume that this primeval matter does not exist, because it is not perceived, then how can the rule expounded by you hold good”?³⁰⁾ [I reply that there is no place for such an objection], because here [viz. in the first example] they do not prove [the existence] of the primeval matter, as, in fact, the proposition runs: “the various things certainly have a sole cause”. Therefore

²⁹⁾ Here begins a very important discussion in which Dīnnāga not only precises the function of the *pakṣadharmā* as a fundamental element in the syllogism, but expounds again his theory about the *probandum* in the inference. According to him the *probandum* is neither the *dharmin*, S, nor the *dharma*, P; but P as related to S. This relation between P and S is just expressed by the *pakṣa*, and it is demonstrated as valid by the *pakṣadharmā*, that is by M as residing in S, which shows the connection between P and S. (His view, as it is known, was criticised by Uddyotakara, N.V. pag. 108. Having expounded his theory, the summary of which is contained in the 3rd *kārikā*, Dīnnāga refutes three different views, and he maintains that it is not true: a) that a *dharmin* is proved by another *dharmin*, b) that a *dharma* is proved by a *dharmin*, c) that a *dharmin* is proved by the (*pakṣa*) *dharma*.)

³⁰⁾ This is the third of the three theories referred to in the preceding note. Dīnnāga shows that in this case the (*pakṣa*) *dharma* does not prove the *dharmin*, because the syllogism must be formulated in another way.

For this passage cfr.:

PSV a. fol. 48 a, l. 3

gañ . dag . c'os . kyis . c'os . mi
 . sgrub . ciñ . c'os . can . yañ . mi .
 bsgrub . po . žes . smra . ba . ni /
 dper . na . gtso . bo . gcig . yod .
 do . t'a . daḍ . rnams . dañ . rjes .
 ḥgro . mt'oñ . bai . p'yir . žes . zer .
 ba . lta . bu . 'o / der . ni . t'a . dad
 . ñid . rgyu . gcig . pa . ñid . du .
 bsgrub . par . hya . ba . ste / ḥdi .
 ltar . gyo . dum . la . sogs . pa . rgyu
 . gcig . pa . ñid . du . dper . brjod .
 pa . bžin . no .

PSV. b fol. 130 a, l. 6.

c'os . kyi . c'os . can . yañ .
 bsgrub . pa . ma . yin . te . dper .
 na . gtso . bo . gcig . yod . pa . yin
 . te / k'yad . par . rnams . las . rjes
 . su . ḥgro . ba . mt'oñ . bai . p'yir
 . ro . žes . bya . ba . lta . bu . 'o /
 de . ni . k'yad . par . rnams . k'o . na
 . rgyu . gcig . pa . ñid . du . bsgrub
 . par . bya . ba . yin . te / der . yañ
 . gyo . mo . la . sogs . pai . rgyu .
 gcig . pa . ñid . dper . byed . pa .
 yin . no /

the error alluded to is non-existent. If, [on the other hand, I say that the primeval matter] does not exist, the term: "non perceivable" is attributed to it in a figurative sense (*upacāra*) and therefore I do not commit the fallacy of admitting the existence of a subject (that I do not accept)³¹).

[Somebody may ask] "is it not possible to prove a subject, *dharmīn*, by another *dharmīn*, or to prove the predicate (through the subject to which it belongs)? E. g. can we not prove fire through smoke (*dharmīn* proved by *dharmīn*)³²) or the quality of being warm to touch through fire (*dharma* proved by *dharmīn*)?"³³)

[This question is meaningless], because we do not establish such a proposition in order to prove either fire or its being hot to touch, but only in order to prove that a particular object is connected with them³⁴). Were this not the case and were we to prove fire on the basis of smoke, or the sensation of heat on the basis of fire, then we should commit the fallacy of using as reason a term of the proposition. Nor, in the example referred to, do we wish to prove the existence of fire and heat, because their existence is a fact generally admitted by everybody³⁵).

Moreover here subject and predicate are established only having regard to the [notion] to be proved³⁶), and therefore their

³¹) Another explanation is also possible: that is it is only necessary to specify the subject in this way: "the *pradhāna* in which you believe". On this theory cfr. K'uei Chi's commentary on the N.P.

³²) The syllogism in this case would be: "smoke is possessed with fire, (*agnimān dhūmah*), because it is smoke, as it happens in the case of any other smoke."

³³) The syllogism would be: "this fire is hot to touch, because it is fire, as it happens in the case of any other fire". In this and in the preceding example, fire and smoke are equally two *dharmin*s.

³⁴) That is the syllogism is: a) "here there is fire, because here there is smoke, as we know that it happens in all places where there is smoke, as in the kitchen;" b) "this furnace is hot, because there is fire, as we know that it happens to be in all places where there is fire."

³⁵) And therefore we should commit the fallacy of proving a notion already proved, *siddhasādhana*.

³⁶) We must not forget that the *pakṣa* is *sādhyatvenepsita*, a notion to be proved. But in the cases referred to in the text, a doubt concerning the existence or the non-existence of fire where there is smoke, is impossible; therefore no proposition could be formulated.

relation is not [like that which is supposed to exist between] the quality and the substance possessing the quality [and by which we infer the quality from the substance;] thus there is no fault in my argument³⁷).

³⁷) P. S. V. a fol. 47, b, l. 4.

c'os . can . c'os . can . gyis . sgrub
· min . /

c'os . des . c'os . kyañ . ma . yin . gyi //
ḥdi . lta . c'os . kyis . c'os . sgrub
· ciñ /

sgrub . p'yir . c'os . can . yañ . de
bžin // (P. S. III, 12)

de . la . re . žig . gañ . dag . ḥdi
· skad . du . dud . pas . me . sgrub
· pa . ni . c'os . can . gyis . c'os .
can . sgrub . pa 'o . žes . zer . ro /
de . yañ . rigs . pa . ma . yin . te /
de . la . mei . yod . pa . rtogs . pa
· ni . ma . yin . gyi . ḥdi . la 'o .
žes . brjod . par . byed . do / gal .
te . der . dud . pa . dañ . ḥbrel . ba .
bsgrub . byar . byed . na . ni . dam
· bca' . bai . don . gyi . p'yogs . gcig
· gtan . ts'igs . su . ḥgyur . ro / rjes
· su . dpag . par . bya . ba . du .
ba . la . me . mt'oñ . bar . yañ . rigs
· pa . ma . yin . te / rjes . su . dpag
· pa . med . par . t'al . bar . ḥgyur
· bai . p'yir . ro / dei . p'yir . ḥdi .
la 'o . žes . gdon . mi . za . bar .
sa . p'yogs . k'as . blañ . bar . bya
ste / de . yañ . c'os . can . ñid . yin
· no / ḥdir . yon . tan . dañ . yon .
tan . can . ñid . kyi . ts'ul . nas .
c'os . can . gyi . rnam . par . bžag .
pa . byed . pa . ni . ma . yin . no /
de . lta . na . re . žig . c'os . can .
gyis . c'os . can . bsgrub . par . bya
· ba . yañ . ma . yin . no / c'os .
can . gyis . c'os . bsgrub . par . bya .
ba . yañ . ma . yin . no . žes . brjod
· par . bya . ste . / de . la . gañ . dag
· mes . reg . bya . bsgrub . par .
byed . do / žes . zer . ro . de . ni .

P. S. V. b, fol. 129 b, l. 6.

c'os . can . c'os . can . yi [s] . bsgrub
· min /

c'os . yin . c'os . can . yañ . des . min //
c'os . kyis . c'os . sgrub . pa . yañ . no /
de . la . re . žig . c'os . can .

gyis . c'os . can . bsgrub . par . bya
· ba . ni . dper . na . du . bas . me
· lta . bu 'o . žes . gañ . smras .
pa . de . ni . mi . rigs . te / de . la
· me . yod . pa . ma . rtogs . pa .
ni . ma . yin . no / ḥdi . la . žes .
brjod . pa . de . la . gal . te . du .
ba . dañ . ḥbrel . pa . yin . na . dam
· bca' . bai . p'yogs . gcig . gtan
· ts'igs . su . ḥgyur . ro / rjes . su .
dpag . par . bya . ba . me . la
· du . ba . mt'oñ . ba . ni . rigs . pa .
ma . yin . te / rjes . su . dpag . pa .
med . par . t'al . bai . p'yir . ro /
dei . p'yir . ḥdi . ni . žes . bya .
ba . ni . gdon . mi . za . bar . p'yogs
· yin . par . k'as . blañ . bar . bya 'o /
de . yañ . de . dag . gis . c'os .
can . p'yogs . ñid . yin . no / ḥdir .
yon . tan . dañ . yon . tan . can .
ñid . kyis . c'os . can . dañ . c'os .
rnam . par . bžag . na . mi . yin .
gyi / 'on . kyañ . bsgrub . bya .
bsgrub . byed . ñid . kyis . yin .
pai . p'yir . ñes . pa . med . do /
de . lta . re . žig . c'os . can . gyis
· c'os . can . bsgrub . pa . ni . ma .
yin . no / c'os . min . c'os . can .
gyi[s] . bsgrub . pa . žes . sbyar .
ro / de . la . gañ . žig . mes . reg .
bya . bsgrub . par . byed . do . žes
· zer . ba . de . yañ . mi . rigs . te /
sña . ma . bžin . du . ḥdi . žes . brjod
rigs . pa . ma . yin . te / ḥdi . la 'o .

In order to reinforce [what I have already said], I have composed the [following] *kārikā*:

III. A subject cannot prove either another subject or a predicate, (viz.: a) smoke cannot prove fire; b) fire cannot prove the quality of being hot); nor does the predicate prove the subject, [as in the example of the primeval matter, referred to above]. But only the predicate [as resident in M and in S] proves that predicate [to be proved, as it is expressed in the proposition] and, as such, it proves also the subject [because of the connection between S and P expressed by the *pakṣa*]³⁸).

If a [Vaiśeṣika] establishes the following proposition: "sound is non-eternal, because the other categories like action (*karma*) etc. would be equally eternal", or: "because [if it were eternal], it would be eternally perceivable", how can these reasons be called *pakṣadharmas*? This [syllogism] is not intended to prove

žes · brjod · pai · p'yir · sñar · bžin
 · no / gal · te · re · žig · rigs · pa
 · ñid · yin · te / du · ba · t'ams · cad ·
 že · mi · mt'oñ · bai · p'yir · ro /
 sa · p'yogs · kyī · bsgrub · bya ·
 ñid · yin · par · mei · bye ·
 brag · dro · ba · bsgrub · bya · yin ·
 pai · p'yir · sa · p'yogs · brtags · pa ·
 don · med · do / dam · bca' · bai
 · p'yogs · gcig · gi · gtan · ts'igs ·
 ma · yin · te / mei · bye · brag ·
 bsgrub · bya · yin · pai · p'yir · dañ /
 spyi · gtan · ts'igs · yin · pai · p'yir
 · ro · že · na / mei · bye · brag ·
 bsgrub · bya · yin · no · žes · bya
 · ba · ni · sa · p'yogs · kyis · k'yad
 · par · byas · pai · du · bai · bsgrub ·
 bya · ñid · du · k'as · blañ · bar ·
 bya 'o / der · sa · p'yogs · kyī ·
 bye · brag · la · cii · p'yir · že ·
 sdañ · mei · bye · brag · la · gañ ·
 gis · na · ño · sruñ · bar · byed.

· pai · p'yir · ro / gal · te · re · žig
 · du · ba · t'ams · cad · la · me · ma
 · mt'oñ · bai · p'yir · p'yogs · la ·
 bsgrub · pa · la · ni · rigs · mod ·
 kyī / mei · k'yad · par · la*) · dro ·
 ba · bsgrub · pai · p'yir · p'yogs ·
 brtags · pa · don · med · bcan(?) ·
 yin · no / dam · bca' · bai · don ·
 gyi · p'yogs · gcig · gtan · ts'igs ·
 kyañ · ma · yin · te / mei · k'yad ·
 par · bsgrub · byar · yin · pai ·
 p'yir · spyi · gtan · ts'igs · yin
 · pai · p'yir · ro · že · na / mei ·
 k'yad · par · bsgrub · bya · ñid ·
 yin · yañ · p'yogs · k'yad · par ·
 can · du · me · sgrub · par · bya ·
 ba · ñid · du · k'as · blañ · bar ·
 bya · ste / de · la · p'yogs · kyī ·
 k'yad · par · la · sdañ · ba · dañ ·
 mei · k'yad · par · las · no · dogs(?)
 ci · žig · bya · c'os · can · yañ · des
 · min.

*) doubtful.

³⁸) P.S. III. 12

C'os · can · c'os · can · gyis · sgrub · min. /
 c'os · min · c'os · can · yañ · des · min. //
 c'os · kyis · de · ltar · sgrub · pai · p'yir. /

For the translation of the same passage, as inserted in the PSV, cfr. note 37.

a thesis of the Vaiṣeṣika, but only to show the fallacies in the argument of the opponent (viz. the *Śābdika*). In fact in that way they show the necessary implication that would follow (*abhyupagama*), if the *probandum* were proved. As the opponent had established that [sound] is eternal, because it is incorporeal, [the Vaiṣeṣika] formulates his proposition only in order to refute the fallacy of the reason³⁹⁾ [of the opponent].

If it be so, if one says "sound is non-eternal, because a product is non-eternal", or: "because the eternal is not a product", then is there any objection [against this argument]? [My reply is that these supposed reasons are in fact nothing else but] the affirmative and the negative cases [as shown by] the formulation of the example; they must respectively declare that the reason (viz. product) is followed by the *probandum* (P viz. non-eternal), and that, if the *probandum* is absent (viz. not-non-

³⁹⁾ This syllogism cannot be considered as a proof, but only as an argument meant to show the implication that will necessarily follow, if the thesis of the opponent be proved. The first example, given by the author, shows the implication that follows from the reason advanced by the *Śābdika*: If "sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, as ether", then you must admit that the third category, postulated by the Vaiṣeṣikas, viz. action, is also eternal, because it is incorporeal. On the other hand from the proposition itself: "sound is eternal", it follows that it should be always perceivable by the ear.

PSV. a. fol. 148, 1. 6.

dam . bca' . rtags . kyi . ñag . gis
 . gañ /

mi . ḥdod . pa . la . t'al . ba . ts'om . //
 de . ni . lan . žes . šes . bya ste . /
 de . yi . sgo . nas . sbyor . p'yir . ro . //

* (PS. III, 13.)

dper na . sgra . rtag . pa . ma . yin .
 te / las . rtag . par . t'al . bar .
 ḥgyur . bai . p'yir . ram / rtag . tu
 dmigs . par . t'all . bar . ḥgyur .
 bai . p'yir . ro / (the rest *deest*).

PSV. b. fol. 130-b. 12.

dam . bca' . gtan . ts'igs . sgo . nas . ni/
 gañ . žig . mi . ḥdod . t'al . ḥgyur .
 bai //

de . sgo . ñid . nas . t'al . bai . p'yir /
 de . ni . lan . žes . šes . par . bya //
 dper . na . sgra . ni . rtag . pa
 . ma . yin . te / las . la . sogs . pa .
 rtag . par . t'al . bai . p'yir . ram .
 rtag . tu . dmigs . par . t'al . bai .
 . p'yir . žes . bya . ba . ḥdi . ni .
 lan . yin . te / gtan . ts'igs . dañ .
 dam . bca' . bai . sgo . nas . k'as .
 blañs . pa . yod . na . t'al . ba .
 bsgrub . pai . p'yir . ro / sñar . ni .
 lus . can . ma . yin . pai . p'yir .
 rtag . pa . ñid . k'as . blañs . nas .
 lan . brjod . pa . yin . la / ḥdir . ni .
 dam . bca' . ba . tsam . gyis .
 yin . no .

eternal), the reason also is absent (viz, non-product). In the present case, through the application, one shows that the reason: "because it is a product" [is resident in the subject], that is: "so this sound is certainly a product, but not a non-product." Thus this predicate: "being a product" is certainly a *pakṣadharma*⁴⁰). In order to reinforce this argument I say this *kārikā*:

IV. It expresses that the reason is followed (by the existence) of the *probandum* (P), and that wherever the *probandum* (P) is absent, the reason also must be absent. The fifth case (=ablative) expresses the example. By the application (*upanaya*) we know that the reason is really a reason⁴¹).

Therefore we have implicitly explained [also our idea about] the formulation of a merely negative reason (*avita*), as postulated by the Sāṅkhyas. An example of this is the following]: "since the quality of being a product is seen in the non-eternal, while it is not seen in the eternal, therefore it is proved that sound is non-eternal, because [if we did not think so] we should necessarily admit (*prasaṅga*) that it is not a product." There-

⁴⁰) PSV. a, fol. 48 b, S. 1.

ḥdi . lta . ste . dper . na .
sgra . mi . rtag . te / byas . pa . mi
. rtag . pai . p'yir . žes . pa 'm /
rtag . ste . ma . byas . pai . p'yir .
žes . bya . ba . lta . bu 'o / ḥdi .
la . p'yogs . kyi . c'os . ñid . du .
na . yod . pa . ma . yin . gyi / dpei
. mts'an . ñid . du . yod . pa . ma .
yin . pas . ni .
rtags . ni . ñe . bar . sbyor . las . ḥdod /

P. S. III, 14.

ḥdir . p'yogs . kyi . c'os . ni .
ñe . bar . sbyor . ba . las . bstan .
par . bya . ste .

PSV. b. fol. 130 b, l. 4.

dper . na . sgra . rtag . pa . ma
. yin . te . byas . pa . mi . rtag . pai
. p'yir . ram / rtag* . pa . ni . ma .
byas . pai . p'yir . ro / žes . bya .
ba . lta . bu . 'o / ḥdi . la . p'yogs .
kyi . c'os . ñid . yod . pa . ma . yin
. gyi . dpei . mts'an . ñid . ni . yod
. pai . p'yir . ro /
gtan . ts'igs . ñe . bar . sbyor . las
. ḥdod .

ḥdir . p'yogs . kyi . c'os . ni .
ñe . bar . sbyor . bas . bstan . pa .
yin . te / de . ltar . yañ . sgra . ni .
ma . yin . no . žes . bya . ba . lta .
bu . 'o .

⁴¹) P. S. III, 14

bsgrub . bya . gañ . la . rtags . rjes . ḥgro .
med . pa . med . par . brjod . par . bya .
der . ni . lña . pa . dpe . yin . no .
gtan . ts'igs . ñe . bar . sbyor . las . ḥdod .

*) xyl.: rtags

The first half of this *kārikā* is quoted by Uddyotakara, NV. pag. 137:

sādhyaenānugamo hetoḥ sādhyābhāve ca nāstītā.

I do not find this verse in Randle's Fragments. Cfr. below *kārikā* 10.

fore it is evident that the formulation of the *avīta* does not represent a *different cause* of knowledge.

This I have explained at length in my refutation of the Sāṅkhya system, and therefore there is no need to discuss [again] in detail these wrong doctrines⁴²⁾.

This *pakṣadharmā* [as I have already said in the *kārikā*] can be of three kinds, that is it may be either resident or non-resident or resident and non-resident in the affirmative instances. „In the *kārikā* [the word.] “or” has been left out [*metri causa*].

There (viz. in the *kārikā*) “positive instance” (*sapakṣa*) is called that particular instance [only], which is analogous to the predicate to be proved; in fact every object can be an instance. On the other hand the absence of the *probandum* (non-P) is called: “negative instance” *vipakṣa*⁴³⁾. But this *vipakṣa* is neither

⁴²⁾ On the *avīta*, see Vācaspatimiśra on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5, and Uddyotakara NV. pag. 123. On this passage of Uddyotakara, cfr. Jacobi: *Vīta und avīta* in: *Ans Indiens Kultur*, Festgabe Richard von Garbe, 1927, pag. 8 fil.

We know from this passage that Diñnāga devoted a *śāstra* to the refutation of the Sāṅkhya system; of this work I cannot find any mention in other sources. This book must have been one of the first written by him, as it is anterior to the Nyāyamukha, which is quoted in the Pramāṇasamuccaya. According to Shen T'ai this work consisted of 6000 śloka.

On the criticism of the *avīta* cfr.

PSV. a fol. 48 b, l. 2.

gañ . du . bsal . 'oñs . kyis . brjod
 . la /

gtan . ts'igs . med . par . ḥgyur .
 ba . ni //

dpe . gñis . las . de . grub . p'yir . ro /

gañ . yañ . bsal . te . 'oñs . pas
 . brjod . na . ni . gtan . ts'igs . med
 par . t'al . bar . ḥgyur . bar . brjod
 . par . bya . 'o / de . bsal . ba . las
 . skye . ba . ni . ma . yin . te / rgyu
 . la . med . pas . na . t'a . dad . du
 . t'al . bar . ḥgyur . bai . p'yir . ro /

PSV. b. fol. 130 b, l. 6.

rtaḡs . med . par . ni . t'al . ba . gañ /
 bsal . te . 'oñs . pas . brjod . na . ni //
 de . ni . dpe . gñis . las . grub .

p'yir /

'ga' . žig . bsal . te . 'oñs . par .

gtan . ts'igs . med . par . t'al . bar

. brjod . par . byed . pa . ni . gsal .

ba . ni . med . pa . skye . ba . ma

yin . de- / t'a . dad . par . t'al . ba .

. p'yir . ro /

Then follows a detailed discussion on the *avīta* theory, which has been studied by me in another paper.

⁴³⁾ PSV. a. fol. 49 a, l. 7

de . la . yod . pa . grub . pa .
 ni . bsgrub . par . bya . c'os . kyi .
 spyis . p'yogs . dañ . mt'un . pai .
 p'yogs / mts'unis . pai . don . t'ams

PSV. b. fol. 131 b, l. 4

don . t'ams . cad . p'yogs . su .
 byas . pas . ñe . bai . p'yir . bsgrub
 . par . bya . bai . c'os . kyis . spyis
 . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . so / ci

contradictory to, nor what is simply different from the *sapakṣa*. In fact if it were contradictory to the positive instance, it would necessarily represent the mere exclusion of that⁴⁴). If, on the other hand, the negative instance is considered as what is simply different⁴⁵), then the necessary consequence is, that there would be no reason. But if we follow [our] logical rule, then (the reason): “because it is a product” can prove, [not only] the predicate: “non-eternal”, [but also the predicate]: “anātman”, because there is no contradiction⁴⁶). If a reason can prove a *probandum* contra-

· cad · p'yogs · zes · bya · ba · ste ·
de · yañ · bsgrub · bya · c'os · so /
..... 'on · mi · mt'un · pai · p'yogs
· gañ · yin · ze · na · rnam · pa ·
gžan · du · gyur · pa · ñid · ni · yod
· pa · yin · te · bsod · nams · ma ·
yin · pa · zes · brjod · pa · bžin · no /
yod · pa · bkag · pa · tsam · med ·
pa · yin · no · zes · bya · ba · ni ·
yod · pa · ma · yin · te /

· ste · mi · mt'un · pai · p'yogs ·
gañ · yin · srog · c'ags · kyi · rigs ·
ma · yin · no · zes · bya · ba · gžan
· la · hjug · pa · dañ / mi · mt'un ·
pai · p'yogs · la · bsod · nams · kyi
· med · do · zes · bya · dañ / dños ·
po · bkag · tsam · la · med · do ·
zes · bya · ba · de · lta · bui · rnam
· pa · mod · pa · yin · no /

⁴⁴) That is, if somebody understands the negative instance as an instance contradictory to the positive one, then this would imply that the *probandum* is present in those cases in which this negative instance has been excluded. Thus the reason proves to be inconclusive, because it fails to indicate that the reason is necessarily followed by the probandum. If we take the example: “this place is hot, because there is fire, as a kitchen, what is cold is without fire, as the Himālaya”; if the negative instance is considered as merely contradictory to the positive, then all the temperate places ought to be considered as fiery, since they are not cold.

⁴⁵) Now the author replies to the second view which has been advanced concerning the nature of the negative instance. If this expresses what is merely different from the affirmative instance, then there would be no reason; since this would not possess those characteristics expounded in the definition already referred to. In fact when we say: “sound is non-eternal”, this quality of being non-eternal, which is predicated of sound, is different from the predicate *anātman*, that can be equally well applied to sound. Thus, if the opponent's theory be true, *anātman* should be the negative instance of: “non-eternal”. But the reason holds good for either; therefore it could not be considered as a reason, because we have seen that M is M, only when it is absolutely non-resident in all non-P.

⁴⁶) For these theories cfr. Buddhist logic before Dinnāga.

PSV. a. fol. 49 b, l. 4

PSV. b. fol. 132 a, l. 1

de · la · re · žig / de* · [las] ·
gžan · dañ · de · ḡgal · te /
mi · mt'un · p'yogs · rnam · gñis ·
pa · yañ //

de · la · re · žig ·
de · las · gžan · dañ · de · ḡgal · ba /
gñis · po · yañ · mi · mt'un ·
p'yogs · [ma ·] yin /
gtan · ts'igs ·

*) deest in xyl.

dictory to it, then we have the logical error known as the contradictory, that is a fallacy of the reason (*hetvābhāsa*).

[In fact], the contradictory predicate is just like the non-contradictory, in the sense that it is certainly absent wherever the predicate to be proved is absent. — [The reason, as explained by me] is not [inconclusive], like the (merely apodictic) reason: “as a pot”. This in fact proves to be doubtful, because the reason is (also) present where there is no presence of that [pot.]⁴⁷). — In fact we evidently perceive that the quality of being a product is present in objects other than the pot as cloth etc., but we do

rtaḡs . med . pas . ni . ḡgal . ba . ste /
nam . par . dpyad . pa . las . ḡgyur
· yin //

gal . te . yañ . mt'un . pai .
p'yogs . la . sogs . pa . las . gzan .
de . mi . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . yod .
pa . des . na . gtan . ts'igs . med . par
· ḡgyur . ro / ḡdi . ltar . yañ . mt'un
· pañ . p'yogs . la . yod . pai . byas
· pa . ñid . la . sogs . pa . de . ni .
mi . rtag . pa . la . sogs . pa . las .
gzan . du . sdug . bsñal . la . sogs .
pa . la . yañ . yod . pa . yin . no /
mt'un . pai . p'yogs . dañ . ḡgal .
ba . mi . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . yin .
mod . kyis . kyañ . des . gañ . de .
la . med . pa . ñid . rnam . par .
dpyad . nas . bsgrub . bya . go . bar
· byed . do / de . ltar . na . yañ . ḡdi
· ni . mei . dro . ba . yod . do . zes
· pas . grañ . reg . med . par . mei .
reg . pa . las . go . bar . byed . do /
de . ni . dro . reg . ma . yin . pa .
la . grañ . reg . ma . yin . pa . med .
pa . yañ . ma . yin . no .

med . dañ . ḡgal . ba . las /
rnam . par . gcod . par . t'al . bar
ḡgyur //

gal . te . mt'un . pai . p'yogs .
las . gzan . pa . gañ . yin . pa . de .
mi . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . yin . na
dei . p'yir . gtan . ts'igs . med . pa .
ñid . t'ob . ste / byas . pa . ñid . la
· sogs . pai . mt'un . pai . p'yogs .
la . yod . pa . gañ . yin . pa / sdug .
bsñal . la . sogs . pai . mi . rtag . pa
· la . sogs . pa . gzan . la . yañ . yod .
pa . yin . no / gal . te . yañ . mt'un
· pai . p'yogs . dañ . ḡgal . ba . de
· mi . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . yin .
no . ze . na / dei . p'yir . gañ . k'o
· na . la . med . pa . de . bsgrub .
bya . la . rnam . par . bcad . pa . de
· rtogs . par . ḡgyur . te / de . ltar .
yañ . me . ḡdi . la . dro . ba . yod
· do . zes . bya . ba . la . mei . yul
· du . grañ . ba . med . pa . rtogs
· par . byed . kyī / dro . ba . dañ .
grañ . ba . med . par . yañ . ma
yin . no .

⁴⁷) That is the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa* must have the characteristics already referred to. In fact if we were to consider as a *sapakṣa* the mere instance as given in the apodictic example: “as a pot”, then, whatever is not a pot, could be considered a *vipakṣa*. In this case cloth etc. would be the *vipakṣa* of pot. But as in cloth the cause: “because it is a product” is also present, the reason, being present in the positive as well as in the negative instance, would prove inconclusive. But according to Dīnāga the notion of *sapakṣa* is determined by the fact that it is a product, a quality that is common to the subject, as well as to all the analogous instances, while the *vipakṣa* is not the mere absence of the *sapakṣa*, but it is the absolute absence of P.

not see that this reason is resident in the *anātman* as something distinct from the non-eternal.

Now somebody may ask: "how can a predicate of a different subject ("pot") be resident in a different place ("sound")?" The reply is that, since they are analogous⁴⁸), the two predicates cannot be called different. [Moreover] we said that (the predicate as shown by the reason "viz.: product, as a pot" is just that (of the subject: sound = product) and therefore there is

⁴⁸) Since sound as well as pot are equally a product.

PSV. a. fol. 49 b. l. 7.

mt'un . p'yogs . la . med . min . pa .
ñid /
mts'an . ñid . gcig . ñid . yin . mod .
kyañ //
don . du . ma . la . hjug . pai .
rigs / gañ . hdi . ltar . mt'un . pai .
p'yogs . su . med . ni . mt'un .
p'yogs . la . med . pa . ñid . do .
žes . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . la . med
pa . ma . yin . pa . ni . mt'un .
pai . p'yogs . la . yod . pa . ste / de
gtan . ts'igs . yin . pas . na . byas
pa . ñid . ni / ji . ltar . mi . rtag .
pa . ñid . du . rtags . yin . pa . bžin
du . bdag . med . pa . la . sogs .
pa . la . yañ . sbyar(?) . par . bya
'o / hdi . ltar . de . bdag . med .
pa . la . sogs . pa . la . med . pa .
ma . yin . pa . yañ . bdag . med .
la . yod . pa . yin . no / ci . ste .
yañ . hdi . ni . spyi . las . t'e . ts'om
du . hgyur . ba . yin . no . že . na /
byas . pa . ñid . spyi . yin . yañ .
rtag . pa . dañ . bdag . med . pa .
la . sogs . pa . rnams . la . bñi . pa
la . sogs . bžin . du . t'e . ts'om .
du . hgyur . ba . ni . ma . yin . na /
spyi . las . rjes . hgro . blun . po . min /
spyi . t'ams . cad . t'e . ts'om
gyi . rgyu . ma . yin . te / bum .
pa . ni . byas . na . ñid . yin . la
bum . pa . ma . yin . pa . la . yañ
mt'on . ba . yin . no / byas . pa .
ñid . mi . rtag . pa . la . sogs . pa .
la . yañ . med . par . mt'on . ba .
ni . ma . yin . te / t'ams . cad . du .

PSV. b. fol. 132 a. l. 4.

dei . p'yir . mt'un . p'yogs . med .
pa . ñid /
de . ltar . mts'an . ñid . las . gcig .
kyañ //
du . mai . don . ni . rtogs . par . rigs /
gal . te . mt'un . pai . p'yogs .
med . pa . ni . mt'un . pai . p'yogs .
yin . pa . des . ni . mi . mt'un .
p'yogs . la . med . do . žes . bya .
ba . ni / gañ . mt'un . p'yogs . med
pa . la . med . pa . dañ . mt'un .
pai . p'yogs . la . yod . pa . de .
gtan . ts'igs . yin . pai . p'yir . ji
ltar . byas . pa . ñid . mi . rtag
pa . la . gtan . ts'igs . yin . pa .
de . bžin . du / bdag . med . pa .
la . sogs . pa . rnams . la . yañ .
rigs . pa . yin . te / de . ltar . na .
de . bdag . med . pa . la . sogs .
pa . med . pa . la . yañ . med /
bdag . med . pa . rnams . la . yañ
yod . pa . yin . no / 'on . te . spyi
la . t'e . ts'om . du . hgyur . ba
de . yañ . yod . pa . yin . te /
byas . pa . ñid . ni . mi . rtag . pa
dañ . bdag . med . pa . la . sogs .
pa . rnams . kyi . spyi . yin . te /
bum . pa . la . sogs . pa . rnams .
la . ltar . t'e . ts'om . ñid . du . hgyur
že . na /
rjes . hgro . spyi . las . blun . po . min /
spyi . t'ams . cad . ni . t'e .
ts'om . gyi . rgyu . ma . yin . te /
snam . bu . la . sogs . pa . med .
par . bum . pa . byas . pa . ñid . du
mt'on . ba . yin . la / mi . rtag .

not such a mistake [as supposed by you]. Nor can you object: "if the two [predicates, that is "product" as resident in the pot, and "product" as resident in sound] are not considered as being different, how then, is it possible to call this reason a predicate resident in the subject (*pakṣadharmā*)"? In fact as regards the *pakṣadharmā*, we say that it is certainly a predicate of the subject, but we do not want to say that it is only (*eva*) the predicate of the subject. If you insist on saying that if it be so, the positive instance also could be called *pakṣa* I reply that this objection is invalid, because a different notion, [such as "pot" which is different from "sound"] declares the *probandum* [viz. "non-eternal", since the disputant as well as the opponent agree about the non-eternity of "pot"]. About the reason [viz. "because it is a product"] there is no difference [of opinion between the disputants]. Therefore it can prove the inference. Thus there is no fallacy in it.

Each [of the three characteristics referred to above] presents three aspects [according as the predicate does or does not reside in the positive instances etc.]⁴⁹).

[I. aspect or first triad]: resident in the positive instance, but: either

- a) resident in the negative instance,
- or b) non-resident in the negative instance,
- or c) resident and non-resident in the negative instance.

[II. aspect or triad]: non-resident in the positive instance, [but: either.

- a) resident in the negative instance,
- or b) non-resident in the negative instance,
- or c) resident and non-resident in the negative instance]⁵⁰).

gtan . ts'igs . kyi . mts'an . ñid .
dañ . ldan . pai . p'yir . rnam . par
bcad . pa . la . gtan . ts'igs . yin . no .

pa . dañ . bdag . med . pa . la .
sogs . pa . la . med . pa . la . ni .
byas . pa . ñid . mt'oñ . bas . t'ams
· cad . la . gtan . ts'igs . kyi . mt'san
· ñid . dañ . ldan . pai . p'yir . rnam
· par . gcod . pai . gtan . ts'igs
yin . no /

⁴⁹) Cfr. *kārikā* II.

⁵⁰) The text has only: "and in either way".

[III. aspect, or triad] resident and non-resident in the positive instance, but:

- a) either resident in the negative instance,
- or b) non-resident in the negative instance,
- or c) resident and non-resident in the negative instance⁵¹).

Suppose that [a Vaiśeṣika establishes] the proposition that [sound] is non-eternal, and that no negative instance at all [is admitted by the opponent, as it happens when] he argues [against an opponent] who does not accept the existence [of any negative instance, such as] ether etc., how then would it be possible to show that this [reason] is non-resident in that [negative instance?]. [The reply is that] if that [negative instance] does not exist, [it is evident that the predicate] does not reside in it; then, since there is no possibility of doubt, such a fallacy [as pointed out] is non-existent⁵²).

⁵¹) The text has: "each has the same three aspects".

PSV. a, fol. 50. a. l. 4.

PSV. b. fol. 132 b. l. 2.

p'yogs . kyi . c'os . de . ñid .
rnam . pa . gsum . du . dbye . ste /
mt'un . pai . p'yogs . la . yod . pa .
dañ . med . pa . gñis . kar . ro / dañ
. zes . pa . ni . p'yi . bcug . pa'o /
de . lta . ma . yin . na . de . gñis .
ñid . slar . bzlas . par . hgyur . ro /
yañ . de . dag . re . re . la . yañ .
gsum*) . du . dbye . bar . bya . ste /
gañ . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . la . yod .
pa . de . ñid . mi . mt'un . pai .
p'yogs . la . yod . pa . dañ . med .
pa . dañ . yod . med . gñis . kar .
ro / de . bzin . du . mt'un . pai .
p'yogs . la . med . pa . dañ . gñis .
ka . la . yañ . dbye . ba . de . ñid .
do .

p'yogs . kyi . c'os . de . ñid .
gañ . mt'un . p'yogs . la . yod . med
. gñi . ga . dañ . zes . rnam . pa .
gsum . du . dbye . bar . bya . ste /
dañ . sgra . ni . p'yi . pai . p'yir .
ro / gzan . du . hdi . dag . k'o . na .
gñi . gar . brjod . par . rtogs . par
. hgyur . ro / yañ . hdi . dag . re .
re . rnam . pa . gsum . du . dbye .
bar . bya . ste . gañ . mt'un . pai .
p'yogs . la . yod . pa . de . mi .
mt'un . pai . p'yogs . la . yod . pa .
dañ . med . pa . dañ . yod . med .
gñi . ga . zes . bya . bas . so / de .
bzin . du . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . la
. med . pa . dañ . gñi . ga . la . yañ
. rnam . par . dbye . ba . de . ñid .
du . bya'o .

*) twice in the xyl.

⁵²) P.S.V. a, just after the passage quoted in the preceding note.

gañ . gi . ts'e . hdi . ltar . mi
. rtag . pa . ñid . nam mk'a' . la . sogs
. pai . p'yogs . la . yod . par . k'as
. mi . len . pa / dei . ts'e . mi . mt'un
. pai . p'yogs . la . med . pa . ñid .

P.S.V. b. (id.)

de . ltar . ni . gañ . gi . mt'un .
pai . p'yogs . ñid . med . par . hgyur
. te / mi . rtag . pa . ñid . p'yogs .
yin . pa . na . nam . mk'a' . la . sogs
. pa . k'as . mi . len . pai . p'yir .
dei . ts'e . ji . ltar . de . la . med .
ces . brjod . par . bya . ste / dei .

Thus we have nine types of *pakṣadharmā*. I shall briefly indicate their characteristics according to the order already referred to:

- I. {
 - 1) Sound is eternal, because knowable (inconclusive);
 - 2) sound is non-eternal, because a product (valid);
 - 3) sound is the effect of some exertion, because non-eternal (inconclusive);
- II. {
 - 4) sound is eternal, because a product (contradictory);
 - 5) sound is eternal, because audible (inconclusive);
 - 6) sound is eternal, because the effect of some exertion (contradictory);
- III. {
 - 7) sound is not the effect of some exertion, because non-eternal (inconclusive);
 - 8) sound is non-eternal, because the effect of some exertion (valid);
 - 9) sound is eternal, because intangible (inconclusive)⁵³.

de . dañ . mi . ḥbrel . bar . ji . ltar
 . brjod . ce . na / dei . ts'e . yañ . t'e
 . ts'om . pa . ñid . de . de . med .
 pa . yin . pai . p'yir . de . la . ḥjug
 . pa . med . pas . skyon . de . med
 . pa . ñid . do .

ts'e . t'e . ts'om . ñid . yod . pa .
 ma . yin . te . de . med . pai . p'yir
 . de . la . mi . ḥjugs . pas . ñes . pa
 . ḥdi . med . do .

⁵³) This is the *hetucakra* referred to above. Cfr. note 17.

Ibid.

p'yogs . kyi . c'os . dgu . po .
 de . dag . gi . dper . brjod . pa . rim .
 pa . bžin . du . bstan . par . byas .
 te / dgu . po . ḥdi 'ñ . mig . dgu .
 la . rim . pa . bžin . bris . nas .
 p'reñ . gis . gyen . mt'ur . la .
 mt'un . p'yogs . gi . gsum . mo /
 ḥp'reñ . la . ni . mi . mt'un . p'yogs .
 kyi . gsum . mo / p'yogs . bžis .
 rañ . bžin . dañ . ḥbras . bu . la .
 sogs . par . šes . par . bya . 'o /
 sgra . rtag . ste . gžal . bya . yin .
 pai . p'yir . ro / mi . rtag . ste . byas .
 pai . p'yir . ro / mi . rtag . pai .
 p'yir . rtsol . ba . las . byuñ . ba'o
 / byas . pai . p'yir . rtag . pa'o / rtag .
 ste . mñan . bya . yin . pai . p'yir .
 ro / rtag . ste . rtsol . ba . las . byuñ .
 bai . p'yir . ro / mi . rtag . pai .
 p'yir . rtsol . ba . las . ma . byuñ .

Ibid.

p'yogs . kyi . c'os . dgu . po .
 ḥdi . dag . go . rims . ci . lta . ba;
 . bžin . du . dpe . dañ . sbyar .
 bar . bya . ste / gžal . bya . yin .
 pai . p'yir . rtag . go / byas . pai .
 p'yir . mi . rtag . go / mi . rtag .
 pai . p'yir . rtsol . ba . las . byuñ .
 ba 'o / byas . pai . p'yir . rtag .
 go / mñan . bya . yin . pai . p'yir .
 rtag . go / rtsol . ba . las . byuñ .
 bai . p'yir . rtag . go / mi . rtag .
 pai . p'yir . rtsol . ba . las . byuñ .
 ba . ma . yin . no / rtsol . ba . las .
 byuñ . bai . p'yir . mi . rtag . go / [rtag
 . ste] . reg . par . bya . ma . yin
 . pai . p'yir . ro / žes . bya . ba .
 de . rñams . bsdu . bai . ts'igs . su .
 bcad . pa . ni .

I have included these nine varieties of the *pakṣadharmā* in the two following *kārikās*:

V. The majors, which have: “knowable and so on” for their middle terms, are: eternal, non-eternal, effect of some exertion; [in the middle triad] (nos. 4—6 of the table); eternal; and [in the last triad]: not the effect of some effort, non-eternal, eternal.

VI. The nine middle terms used to prove eternality and the other majors are: knowable, product, non eternal, product, audible, effect of some exertion, non eternal, effect of some exertion, intangible⁵⁴).

Reasons such as those specified [in these two *kārikās*] are either [valid] or contradictory or inconclusive reasons; therefore a *kārikā* says⁵⁵):

VII. Among these, [a middle term] which is present in either of the two [possible] ways in the positive instance and is absent in the negative instance is a valid reason. [A reason]

ba 'o / rtsol . ba . las . byuñ . bai .
p'yir . mi . rtag . pa 'o / rtag .
ste . reg . par . byas . pa . ma . yin .
pai . p'yir . ro / žes . bya . ba .
rnams . te / de . dag . gi . bsdu . bai .
ts'igs . su . bcad . pa . ni /

⁵⁴) I have adapted here the translation by Randle, p. 21. The two stanzas are quoted in the NVTT. pag. 290:

nityānitya-prayatnottha-madhyamatrika-śāśvatāḥ
ayatnānityanityaś ca prameyatvādisādhanaḥ
prameyakṛtakānityakṛtaśrāvaṇayatnajāḥ
anityayatnajāsparsā nityātvādiṣu te nava.

The second *kārikā* only can be found in

P.S. II. 20:

gžal . bya . byas . dañ . mi . rtag . dañ .
byas . dañ . mñan . ruñ . rtsol . las . byuñ .
mi . rtag . rtsol . byuñ . reg . bya . min .
rtag . sogs . rnams . la . de . dgu . 'o.

⁵⁵) P.S.V. a. 50. b. 1. 4.

P S.V. b. fol. 133. a. 1. 1.

de . ltar . bye . ba . rnams . de . ltar . bye . pas . gtan . ts'igs
gtan . ts'igs . ḡgal . ba . dañ . ma . dañ . ḡgal . ba . dañ . / ma . nes
nes . pa . nid . du . brjod . par . bya . pa . rnams . brjod . par . byas . te .
ste .

which differs from this is either contradictory or inconclusive⁵⁶).

Among these [nine possible reasons] only two are called "valid [reasons]", that is that which is present in all positive instances and absent in all negative instances, and that which is present in some, and absent in other positive instances, but absent in all negative instances.

They correspond to the middle [item] in the first and the last triad. [Viz.: "sound is non-eternal, because a product"; "sound is non-eternal because the effect of some exertion"]. [We add] again: Two [reasons] only are called contradictory, because they prove the opposite. This means that the reason is present either in all or in some of the negative instances, but absolutely absent in the positive. They correspond to the first and the third [items] of the second triad. The other five reasons, [beside the two valid and the two contradictory ones], are called inconclusive, since they can be valid reasons as well as contradictory; thus they convey a doubt.⁵

⁵⁶) NVT pag. 289:

tatra yaḥ san saḥātiye dvedhā cāsaṃs tad atyaye
sa hetur viparīto 'smād viruddho 'nyas tv anīścitaḥ.

PS³II, 21: der . gañ . mt'un . p'yogs . la . yod . dañ .
rnam . gñis . de . med . la . med . pa .
de . rtags . de . las . bzlog . pa . ni .
ḥgal . ba . gzan . ni . ma . nes . ñid.

Ibid. l. 3. 4.

gañ . žig . mt'un . p'yogs . la .
yod . pa . de . bsgrub . bya . med .
pas . te / gañ . yañ . mt'un . pai .
p'yogs . la . med . de . gñis . bsgrub .
bya . med . pa . la . med . pa .
ñid . ni . dañ . po . dañ . t'a . gsum .
poi . dbus . na . mod / ḥdi . las .
bzlog . na . ni . ḥgal . ba . ste /
p'yin . ci . log . tu . sgrub . par .
byed . pa 'o / de . lta . bui . ḥgal .
ba . mi . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . la .
yod . pa . gñis . po . ni / mt'un .
pai . p'yogs . la . med . pa . ste /
gñis . pa . gsum . poi . šar . dañ .
nub . na . mod / ḥgal . ba . gzan .
gañ . yod . do . / gañ . bsgrub .
bya . la . gnod . pa . sgrub . par .

Ibid. l. 1.

gañ . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . la .
yod . la . bsgrub . bya . med . pa .
la . med . pa . dañ . gañ . mt'un .
pai . p'yogs . la . rnam . pa . gñis .
yin . la / bsgrub . bya . med . pa .
la . med . pa . ñid . kyi . gtan .
ts'igs . ni . gñis . k'o . na . yin .
te / dañ . po . dañ . mt'a . mai .
gsum . pai . bar . ma . dag . yin .
no / de . las . bzlog . pa . ni . ḥgal .
ba . yin / p'yin . ci . log . tu .
bsgrub . pai . p'yir . ḥgal . ba . ni .
rnam . pa . gñis . k'o . na . yin . te .
bsgrub . bya . med . pa . la . yod .
pa . dañ . gñis . ka . yin . la / mt'un .
pai . p'yogs . la . ni . med . pa .
k'o . na . te . gsum . pa . gñis . pai

Moreover, in the above definition of the characteristics of the valid reason etc., I have always used the singular case, in order to show that each of the notions [thus defined] belongs to one single class. But I do not refer to [two reasons] having two characteristics and which prove to be contradictory when applied [in a discussion] to the same subject, although, [if separately taken], they are a valid reason; nor do I refer to [inconclusive reasons] which are *avyāpaka* (too-narrow), since they are equally used as regards one single propriety⁵⁸).

byed . pa'o / dper . na . t'a . dad .
 rnams . kyi . ḥdus . pa . ñid . gzan .
 gyi . don . sgrub . par . byed . pa .
 ñid . la . ḥdus . pa . yin . pai . p'yir .
 gzan . gyi . don . sgrub . po . zes .
 bya . ba . lta . bu . ste / de . ni .
 du . ma . don . sgrub . pa . yin .
 pai . p'yir . rtags . gñis . poi . k'oñs .
 su . ḥdus . pa . ñid . yin . pas .
 na . dgu . po . las . p'yi . rol . tu .
 gžag . pa . ma . yin . no / gzan .
 rnams . ma . ñes . pa 'o / lhag .
 ma . rnams . lña . pa . ni . gtan .
 ts'igs . sam / ḥgal . ba . ñid . du .
 ma . ñes . pa . ste / t'e . ts'om . gyi .
 rgyu 'o . zes . pai . t'a . ts'ig . go .

gyas . dañ . gyon . pa . dag . go /
 gañ . bsgrub . bya . la . gnod . par .
 byed . pa . bsgrub . pai . ḥgal .
 ba . gzan . yañ . yod . pa . yñ . te /
 dper . na . k'yad . par . rnams . lus .
 pa . yin . na . gzan . gyi . don .
 sgrub . par . byed . pa . ñid . yin .
 la . ḥdus . pa . gzan . yañ . bsgrub .
 par . byed' . pa . a'n . yin / de .
 ni . don . du . ma . bsgrub . par .
 byed . pas . gtan . ts'igs . ñid . du .
 ḥdus . pai . p'yir . dgu . po . las .
 p'yi . rol . du . gnas . pa . ma .
 yin . no / gzan . ni . ma . ñes .
 ñid / lhag . ma . rnam . pa . lña .
 po . ni . gtan . ts'igs . dañ . ḥgal .
 ba . ñid . du . ma . ñes . pas . t'e .
 ts'om . gyi . rgyu . yin . no . zes .
 bya . bai . don . to .

For the definition of the *viruddha* as given in N. M and in P. S: viparīta-sādhanaṭ, cfr.: Praśastapādabhāṣya: yo hy anumeye 'vidyamāne 'pi tat-samānajātiye sarvasmin nāsti tad-viparīte cāsti, sa viparītasādhanaḍ viruddhaḥ (pag. 341). On the classification of the *viruddha* cfr. N. P. pag. 5; N.B. and NBT. The *iṣṭavighātakṛt* accepted by Dīnnāga is criticised by Dharmakīrti.

⁵⁸) Here Dīnnāga explains how there are, for him, six *anaikāntika*, since he considers as such the *viruddha-avyabhicārin* and the *aśādhāraṇa*. The following paragraphs are meant to give the reasons for such a view. The passage referring to the *viruddha avyabhicārin* is of a very great importance as regards the problem of the chronological relation between Dīnnāga and Praśastapāda. In fact it is almost *verbatim* quoted and refuted in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya: ekasmiṃś ca dvayor hetvor yathoktalakṣaṇayor viruddhayor sannipāte sati samśayadarśanād ayam anyañ sandigdha iti kecit* (pag. 342).

P.S.V. a, fol. 51. a. 1. 1.

P.S.V. b. fol. 133 a. 1. 6.

gtan . ts'igs . la . sogs . pa . ḥdi .
 dag . t'ams . cad . la . yañ . brjod .

ḥdir . yañ . gtan . ts'igs . la
 sogs . pai . mts'an . ñid . t'ams . cad

Some say: "It is logical to admit only four kinds of reasons called inconclusive, because they are in both ways in the affirmative as well as in the negative instances. But how can the cause: because [sound] is audible, be an inconclusive one?"⁵⁹⁾.

par . ḥdod . pai . graṇs . gcig . ṇid /
rigs . dañ . rdsas . las . šes . par .
bya 'o / žes . pai . ts'ig . gi . lha .
ma 'o / gañ . yañ . graṇs . gcig .
ces . pa . ni . ḥdir . gañ . rigs . dañ .
mt'un . par . yod . pa'o . žes .
bya . ba . la . sogs . pa . de . brjod .
par . ḥdod . pa . ste / ci . p'yir .
že . na /
ḥgal . ba . dag . la . t'e . ts'om . p'yir /
gal . te . gañ . p'yir . ḥgal . ba .
mts'an . ṇid . gñis . su . brjod .
pa . dag . las . graṇs . gcig . par .
ni . mt'oñ . ba . ṇid . de / dper .
na . sgra . la . byas . pa . ṇid . dañ .
mñan . bya . dag . la . rtag . dañ .
mi . rtag . pa . ṇid . du . t'e . ts'om .
za . ba . yin . no . žes /
de . bžin . t'e . ts'om . rtags . ṇid . las .
gcig . tu . nes . par . mt'oñ . ba*) . yin //
dper . na . sgra . la . mig . gis /
gzuñ . bya . ma . yin . pa . dañ .
mñon . sum . pa . ṇid . dag . las .
sgra . ni . rdsas . kyañ . ma . yin .
la . las . kyañ . ma . yin . no . žes .
nes . pa . yin . no / dei . p'yir .
brjod . par . ḥdod . gcig . ṇid . do /

la / graṇs . gcig . la . ni . rigs . pa .
yin . no / dños . poi . rigs . la .
šes . par . bya 'o . žes . bya . ba .
ni . ts'ig . gi . lhag . ma 'o / ḥdir .
yañ . graṇs . gcig . pa . der . gañ .
mt'un . p'yogs . la . yod . dañ /
žes . bya . ba . de . lta . bu . sogs .
pa . rnam . la . de . rigs . pa . yin .
no / cii . p'yir . že . na .
ḥgal . ba . dag . la . t'e . ts'om . p'yir
gañ . gi . p'yir . bśad . pai .
mts'an . ṇid . can . gyi . ḥgal . ba /
dag . gcig . la . t'e . ts'om . bskyed .
pa . dag . mt'oñ . ste . dper . na .
byas . pa . dañ . mñan . par . bya .
ba . dag . las . sgra . la . rtag . pa .
dañ . mi . rtag . pa . dag . ṇid . la .
t'e . ts'om . za . ba . bžin . no .
de . bžin . t'e . ts'om . gtan . ts'igs
dag /
gcig . la . nes . pa . mt'oñ . ba . yin //
dper . na . mig . gis **) . gzuñ
bar . bya . ba . ma . yin . pa .
ṇid . dañ . mñon . sum . dag . gi .
sgra . la . rdsas . dañ . sgra . las .
ma . yin . pa . ṇid . dus . nes . pa .
žes . bya . ba' . lta . bu 'o / dei .
p'yir . gcig . ṇid . rigs . pa . yin . no .

*) xyl . ma .

**) xyl . gi

⁵⁹⁾ Cfr. for this objection the passage of *Prāśastapāda* already referred to.

P.S.V. a, fol. 51 b. l. 5.

gal . te . rnam . pa . bži . po .
t'e . ts'om . gyi . gtan . ts'igs . su .
ḥgyur . ba . ni . gñis . ka . la .
yod . pai . p'yir . yin . na / 'on .
mñan . par . bya . ba . ṇid . ji .
ltar . že . na . t'un . moñ . ma . yin .
pai . p'yir . ro / gañ . t'un . moñ .
ma . yin . pai . bsgrub . par . byai
c'os . dañ . cig . šos . des . t'a .

P.S.V. b. fol. 134. a. l. 4.

re . žig . rnam . pa . bži . po .
ni . gñi . ga . la . yod . pai . p'yir .
t'e . ts'om . gyi . rgyu . ṇid . du .
rigs . pa . yin . na . t'un . moñ .
ma' . yin . pa . yin . pai . p'yir .
mñan . par . bya . ba . ṇid . ji .
ltar . že . na / gañ . bsgrub . byai .
c'os . t'un . moñ . ma . yin . pa .
des . k'yad . par . ji . srid . pa . de

[I reply]: "because it is too-narrow (*asādhāraṇa*).” When [the predicate of the middle term] is too narrow it includes all the possible varieties of the predicate to be proved. Therefore it is absolutely a doubtful reason. In fact it is merely included in the subject, as possessing that particular nature; thus it is deprived of one of the [necessary] aspects of the reason, [that is, it does not reside in any positive instance.]

A reason too-general is a reason indefinite. It is only that reason which is not contradictory in either aspect [that is the positive and the negative one]; this fact represents its nature of being a doubtful reason⁶⁰.

[Moreover], as regards those [other inconclusive reasons], they can be also valid reasons in either [of the two possible ways,

dad . pai . dños . po . t'ams . cad	t'ams . cad . bsdus . pa . de . la .
. bsdus . pai . p'yir . de . la . t'e .	t'e . ts'om . gyi . rgyu . yin . te . de
ts'om . gyi . gtan . ts'igs . te / de .	srid . c'os . bsdus . pai . p'yir . dan
dan . ldan . pa . des . bsdus . pai .	. mt'a' . gcig . tu . ldog . pai .
p'yir . ro . gañ . mt'a' . gcig . las .	p'yir . ro .
kyañ . ma . log . pa . ste .	

The meaning is that the *asādhāraṇa* is also an inconclusive reason, because it expresses a peculiarity of the subject inherent in it, and, as such is accepted by all disputants, whatever opinion they may have concerning the predicate of the subject as expressed in the proposition e. g. eternal or non-eternal.

⁶⁰) This paragraph is meant to show the difference between the *asādhāraṇa* and the *sādhāraṇa* and to prove therefore that the author is right in formulating the *asādhāraṇa* as an independent inconclusive reason. The fundamental difference is that the *asādhāraṇa* is neither in the *sapakṣa* nor in the *vipakṣa*, while the *sādhāraṇa* is in both:

P.S.V.a *ibid.*

t'un . moñ . du . rnam . par .
bcad . (corr. . mi . bcad) . pai . gtan
. ts'igs . de . ni . de . dag . ñid . la
'o . žes . bya . gñis . ka . dan .
mi . hgal . bas . na . t'e . ts'om .
gyi . gtan . ts'igs . ñid . do .

P.S.V.b. *ibid.*

t'un . moñ . pa . gañ . yin .
pa . de . de . k'o . na . la . žes .
rnam . par . gnas . pa . med . pai .
p'yir . gtan . ts'igs . ma . yin . te .
gñis . la . mi . hgal . ba . ni . t'e .
ts'om . gyi . rgyu . ñid . yin . no .

According to Shen T'ai a proposition as well as a reason can be of two kinds. a) large *pratiññā* e. g.: "*antaḥśarīra* of the Sāṅkhyas is not the *ātman*"; in fact, according to the Buddhists, nothing has an *ātman*; b) narrow *pratiññā* e. g. "sound is non-eternal", since there are things eternal; c) large reason e. g.: "because it is knowable"; this is in the *sapakṣa* as well as in the *vipakṣa*; d) narrow reason; e. g.: "because it is a product". A large reason is valid for a large prop. but it becomes *asādhāraṇa* when used to prove a narrow prop. The narrow reason is valid for a large proposition as well as for a narrow one.

that is in the negative as well as in the positive instances]. Therefore, [since the reason too general cannot be conclusive in any way] we consider it as a different [kind of inconclusive reason] in order to distinguish it from the others⁶¹].

Some object: "the reason: "because it is audible", is not *asādhāraṇa*, as you assume but it must be a valid reason when we discuss against a [Vaiśeṣika who] thinks that soundness is eternal." [My⁶²) reply is] that this argument can be valid until the op-

⁶¹) If we say: "sound is eternal, because it is immaterial (*amūrta*); what is immaterial is eternal, like the sky; what is non-eternal is material, like a pot", the reason is valid in so far as such *sapakṣas* as ether are concerned, but becomes *viruddha* as regards other *vipakṣas*, as the mental conditions (*caittadharma*s) which are immaterial, but are non-eternal. Thus, a reason like this is in fact inconclusive, contradictory, and valid. Then one could reply: "sound is non-eternal, because it is immaterial; what is immaterial is non-eternal, like the mental conditions; what is material is eternal like the atoms." For the *asādhāraṇa* all these cases cannot take place.

P.S.V.a. Ibid.

gañ . ḥdir . gñis . ka . ḥc'a .
nes . par . gtan . ts'igs . de . gžan
las . log . pa 'o . žes . pa . ḥdi .
ni . k'yad . par . ro .

P.S.V. b. ibid.

gañ . yañ . gñi . ga . la . brten
pa . de . gžan . las . ldog . pai . gtan .
ts'igs . kyañ . yin . no . žes . bya
ba . ḥdi . ni . k'yad . par . yin . no .

⁶²) The objection is evidently raised by the Śābdikas.

P.S.V. a. fol 52 a. l. 1.

gal . te . gañ . gi . ts'e . sgra .
rtag . par . k'as . blañ . len . pa .
dei . ts'e . ḥdi . gtan . ts'igs . ñid .
du . ḥgyur . ro . že . na . / gal . te
ḥdi . la . byas . pai . p'yir . žes .
pa . la . sogs . pa . mi . rtag . pa .
ñid . kyi . gtan . ts'igs . su . nam
yañ . mi . ston . na 'o . / gñis
ka . dmigs . pai . ltar . na . ni .
ḥgal . bai . don . yin . pai . p'yir .
t'e . ts'om . gyi . gtan . ts'igs .
so / ḥdi . yañ . de . ñid . nes . pa .
ni . rjes . su . ts'ol . ba . po . rnams
kyi . mñon . sum . dañ . ldan .
pai . p'yir . ro .

P.S.V. b. fol 134 b. l. 7.

de . lta . na . gañ . gi . ts'e .
sgra . ñid . rtag . par . k'as . len .
par . byed . pa . dei . ts'e . ḥdi .
gtan . ts'igs . ñid . du . ḥgyur . ro . že .
na / gal . te . ḥdi . la . yañ . ma .
rtag . pa . ñid . kyi . gtan . ts'igs .
byas . pa . ñid . la . sogs . pa . ḥba
žig . ston . par . mi . byed . na .
ni . ḥgyur . na / gñi . ga . dmigs .
pa . na . ḥgal . ba . dag . don . gcig
la . ṇi . srid . pai . p'yir . t'e .
t'som . gyi . rgyu . yin . no / ḥdi .
la . yañ . mñon . sum . dañ . luñ .
stobs . dañ . ldan . pai . p'yir . de
k'o . na . las . nes . pa . btsal .
bar . bya 'o .

That is: through direct perception and through the authority of the words of the Buddha himself we know that sound is non-eternal.

Thus Dinnāga has proved that there are six *sandigdhas* or *anaikāntikas*. They are: *sādhāraṇa*, *asādhāraṇa*, *sapakṣaikaśaṅkadeśavṛttivipakṣavyāpin*, *vipakṣaikaśaṅkadeśavṛttisapakṣavyāpin*, *ubhayapakṣaikaśaṅkadeśavṛtti*, *viruddhavyābhicārin*.

ponent has not indicated that the reason of non-eternity is the fact of being a product etc. But if validity can be reached in either way, since contradiction regarding one and the same object is inadmissible, this kind of reason proves to be a doubtful reason. Moreover in this world the force of direct perception and of authority of the scripture (*āgama*) is stronger than any argument and therefore we must search after truth on the basis of these [two means of knowledge]. In the following *kārikās* I summarise [what I have said]:

VIII. If the predicate [as expressed by the reason] is either too narrow (*asādhāraṇa*) or too general (*sādhāraṇa*) or antinomic (*viruddha-avyabhicārin*), in every case [of this kind] the nature of a doubtful reason is inherent⁶³).

IX. The contradictory reason is that which proves the opposite of the nature itself or of the peculiar aspects, either of the subject or of the predicate, if there is no incompatibility with the proposition⁶⁴).

For examples cfr. N.P. pag. 3.

The *viruddha-avyabhicārin* is not accepted by Dharmakīrti NB. (cfr. NBT.) pag. 111. Cfr. also Uddyotakara's N.V. pag. 169.

⁶³) P.S. III 24, (P.S.V. b, 134 d, l. 2)

t'un . moñ . min . dañ . spyi . dañ . ni
ḥgal . ba . ḥk'rul . ba . med . pa . can
c'os . rnam . kun . la . gañ . yin . pa
de . la . t'e . ts'om . gtan . ts'igs . yin

P.S.V, a, fol. 52 a, l. 2:

gañ . dag . t'un . moñ . min . pa . dañ
spyi . dañ . ḥgal . ba . min . ḥk'rul . bai
c'os . rnam . t'ams . cad . du . de . la
t'e . ts'om . bskyed . pai . rtags . rnam . yin

⁶⁴) P.S. III 26

c'os . dañ . c'os . can . rañ . ño . bo
yañ . na . de . y' . k'yad . par . rnam
p'yin . ci . log . tu . sgrub . pai . p'yir
gnod . med . pa . la . ḥgal . ba . yin

Cfr. P.S.V. a, 52 b, l. 6.

c'os . dañ . c'os . can . rañ . ño . 'm
de . yi . bye . brag . yin . yañ . ruñ
p'yin . ci . log . tu . sgrub . pai . p'yir
de . la . gnod . pas . ḥgal . ba . yin

P.S.V, b, 135 a. l. 6.

c'os . dañ . c'os . can . rañ . ño . bo
yañ . na . de . yi . *) k'yad . par . rnam

xyl. has: dei.

X. [If the opponent] on examining the proposition [finds that it is open to] investigation, or that it is incompatible with the notion that one wants to prove, this means that [the said] reason is respectively inconclusive or contradictory. There is no other fallacy of the reason different from these two⁶⁵).

Thus I have explained the reason and the fallacies of the reason. Now I shall speak of the example and of the fallacies of the example.

XI. It (viz. the example) expresses that the reason is followed by the *probandum*, and that, wherever the *probandum* is absent,

p'yin . ci . log . tu . bsgrub . pai . p'yir
gnod . pa . la . med . la . ḡgal . ba . yin

"if there is no incompatibility with the proposition" means that for Dīnāga the hetupratijñāvirodha is not another kind of contradictory reason. If the proposition is self-contradictory, no reason can prove it. Cfr. note 11. The P.S.V. gives two examples of this kind: "sound is non-existent, because the effect of some exertion", "sound is inaudible, because the effect of some exertion".

⁶⁵) P.S III, 25.

gañ . yañ . p'yogs . c'os . mt'oñ . ba . las
śes . rañ . ḡdod . la . bzlog . pa . yis
gnod . pa . byed . dañ . dpyod . t'ob . pa
de . las . gžan . pa . brtag . mts'uñs . med

Cfr. P.S.V a, fol. 52 a, 13:

p'yogs . kyi . c'os . dañ . ldan . gañ . la
śes . ḡdod . bzlog . pas . gnod . pa . dañ
t'e . ts'om . ñid . du . gyur . las . gžan
gtan . ts'igs . ltar . snañ . yod . ma . yin

P.S.V b, fol. 134 b. l. 2.

gañ . yañ . p'yogs . c'os . mt' oñ . ba . las
śes . par . ḡdod . pa . la . bzleg . pa . yin
gnod . pa . byed . dañ . dpyod . t'ob . pa
de . las . gžan . brtags . mts'uñs . med.

The reason incompatible with the thesis that one wants to prove is the *iṣṭavighātakṛt*. One example of this is the following: *parārthās caksurādayaḥ saṅghātātvaḥ chayanāsanādyañgavat* (from Sāṅkhyakārikā, 17). Cfr. N.P. pag. 5. The *iṣṭavighātakṛt* is not accepted as a separate kind of *viruddha* by *Dharma-kīrti*; NB. and NBT. pag. 103.

In this kārikā Dīnāga states that the real fallacies of the reason must be reduced to two only: the *anaikāntika* and the *viruddha*, because, as we saw, the *asiddha* cannot be considered as a reason at all, as it is devoid of the first characteristic of a *hetu* viz. the *pakṣadharmatā*. Cfr. note 17.

the reason [also] is absent. Other examples, different from these [two], must be considered as fallacies of the example⁶⁶).

This example is of two kinds: homogeneous and heterogeneous. A homogeneous example is like the following: "sound is non-eternal, because the effect of some effort; whatever is the effect of some effort is non-eternal, as a pot etc." A heterogeneous example is like the following: "we see that things eternal are not the effect of some effort, such as the ether". The first example is negative and affirmative, the second is merely exclusive⁶⁷). In fact either of them makes us reach the wanted notion, the first through positive application (*anvaya*), the second through an exclusive one (*vyatireka*). Therefore even if the opponent does not admit the existence [of a negative instance such as the] ether, as a real substance, still the heterogeneous example [is sufficient to] show that, were the *probandum* absent, the absence of the reason would be necessarily proved⁶⁸).

⁶⁶) Half of this *kārikā* is quoted, as we saw, by Uddyotakara. Cfr. above note 41.

P.S. IV, 2. gtan · ts'igs · bsgrub · byai · rjes · ḥgro · ba
 bsgrub · bya · med · la · med · pa · ṇid
 dpe · gañ · la · ni · bstan · bya · ba
 de · c'os · mt'un · dañ · cig · šos · gñis.

⁶⁷) Shen T'ai refers here to the *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* theory which had a very great importance in the idealistic schools of Buddhism and is strictly connected with that of the *abhidhāna* and *abhidheya* (Cfr. *Yogācāryabhūmiśāstra*, chp. 81, *Mādhyamikakārikā*, pag. 59. *Stcherbatsky, The conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, pag. 141 fl. K'uei Ch'i's glosses on *Vijñapti-mātratā* Chp. III etc.). Every dharma is twofold, that is it is possessed with two characteristics a) *svalakṣaṇa* or *svarūpa*, which corresponds to the thing in itself and is immediately apprehended by sense perception (*pratyakṣa*) viz. by the five *indriyaviññānas*, without any activity of mind. The second is the b) *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, which is the object of *manoviññāna*, and corresponds to *kalpanā*, that is *nāma*, *jāti* etc. *Nāma* is the *abhidhāna*, and the object or *dharma* is the *abhidheya*. Now this name can express only the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, and as such it distinguishes that particular *dhārma* from all the other *dharmas* belonging to a different class. When we say *nīla*, blue, this word affirms the presence of that particular colour, but excludes as well the presence of other colours, such as yellow etc. Now the positive example is both affirmative and negative. In fact when we say: "because it is the effect of some effort", we affirm just that propriety and *ipso facto* exclude other proprieties. On the other hand the negative example has a merely exclusive value, as it is meant to indicate the totality of things in which the propriety of being eternal is absent. P.S.V. a fol. 67 a. 13.

⁶⁸) For this passage cfr. note 52.

Now some may object: "why did you first say that the reason is followed by the *probandum*, and then, in the second place, that wherever the *probandum* is absent, the reason also is absent? Why did you not say [on the contrary] that wherever the reason is absent there is no *probandum*?" [I have expressed myself in that way because] with such a rule I can show that there is no contradiction with my previous statement, viz. that the reason must be resident in the positive instances, but absolutely non-resident in the negative instances⁶⁹). Again a *kārikā* says:

XII. If through [the mere similarity with "non-product" one could prove eternity, 'or through [the mere similarity

⁶⁹) P.S.V. a. fol. 67 a. l. 2.

gal . te . yañ . cig . bsgrub . bya
 . dañ . ldan . pai . gtan . ts'igs . gcig
 . brjod . pas . gñis . pa . bsgrub .
 bya . med . pa . la . gtan . ts'igs .
 med . par . rgyu . gañ . gis . na .
 yin . te /, gtan . ts'igs . med .
 par . bsgrub . bya . med . pa . ni .
 ma . yin . no . že . na / de . ltar
 . gtan . ts'igs . mt'un . pai . p'yogs
 . k'o . na . la . yod . pa . ni . bsgrub
 . bya . med . pa . la . med . par .
 bstan . par . nus . kyi . bzlog . pa .
 las . ni . ma . yin . no .

P.S.V. b. fol. 149 b. l. 6.

gal . te . gcig . la . ni . gtan
 . ts'igs . bsgrub . byai . rjes . su .
 hgro . bar . bśad . la / gñis . pa .
 la . ni . bsgrub . bya . med . na .
 gtan . ts'igs . med . pa . yin . gyi .
 gtan . ts'igs . med . na . bsgrub .
 bya . med . pa . ma . yin . no . žes
 bya . ba . la . rgyu . ci . žig . yod
 . ce . na / de . lta . na . gtan . ts'igs
 . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . ñid . la . yod
 . pa . dañ . bsgrub . bya . med . pa
 . la . med . pa . ñid . bstan . par .
 nus . pa . yin . gyi . bzlog . pas .
 ni . ma . yin . no .

The objection is evidently raised by the Naiyāyikas, who held the view that the positive instance shows the presence of the *probandum*, when the reason is present. And the negative instance indicates that wherever the reason is absent, the *probandum* also must be absent. (N.S., I, 36, 37). In the following scheme we give an example of the syllogism according to the Nyāyasūtras, and compare it with that of Dīnnāga.

Nyāya.

Sound is non-eternal,
 because a product;
 every product is non-eternal,
 as a pot;
 (or) whatever is
 not a product is eternal,
 as ether;
 sound is like that;
 (or sound is not like that.)
 therefore sound is non-
 eternal.

Dīnnāga.

Sound is non-eternal,
 because a product;
 every product is non-
 eternal, as a pot;
 the eternal is not a product, as
 ether.

with the] non-eternal one could prove [the propriety of being] a product, then the necessary consequence is that positive or negative applications like these will either demonstrate [a thesis which] is not [the thesis] enunciated or prove to be non-pervasive or [implicate the speaker in] undesired [fallacies]⁷⁰).

⁷⁰) PS. IV 4:

rjes · ḥgro · mñam · la · rtag · pa · ñid
 ma · byas · p'yir · dañ · ḥjig · pai · p'yir
 ḥdir · ni · ḥbras · ñid · ma · brjod · pa
 ḥjug · dañ · ma · k'yab · mi · ḥdod · ḥgyur.

Here Dinnāga points out two wrong formulations of *vyatireka* and *anvaya*, which are called by Dharmakīrti (NB. and NBT. 124 and 130). *viparītavyatireka* and *viparītānvaya*. The first consists in assuming that the mere absence of the reason is followed by the absence of the *probandum*, so that implicitly the presence of the given reason is sufficient to prove the presence of the *probandum*. E. g. "sound is non-eternal, because a product; whatever is not a product is eternal, as ether". The second consists in assuming that wherever the *probandum* is present the reason is also necessarily present. E. g.: "sound is non-eternal; whatever is non-eternal is a product, as the pot". The fact is that, in this way, the syllogism is based on the mere analogy, but that indissoluble connection which exists between the reason and the *probandum*, as shown by the example, and which gives validity to the conclusion, is not manifest at all in the syllogisms referred to. Therefore, if they can be valid in the *svārthānumāna* (inference for one's own self), they cannot be considered as valid in the *parārthānumāna*. Dinnāga shows in the *kārikā* and in the commentary on PS. that in formulating a syllogism in that way three mistakes cannot be avoided. These mistakes are 1. Assumption of a thing different from that enunciated in the thesis. Since we do not show the connection between the members of the syllogism, we prove in fact a notion quite different from that wanted to be proved; that is instead of proving that sound is non-eternal, we reach respectively the conclusion, eternal and product; 2. to express a reason which is not resident in all cases *avyāpaka*. In fact, if instead of the cause: "product" we take another reason, such as "consequence of some effort, *prayatnānantarīyūkatva*" we have respectively the two following examples:

Sound is non-eternal,	Sound is non-eternal
because the effect of some effort;	whatever is non-eternal
whatever is not the effect of some effort	is the effect of
is eternal, as ether.	some effort, as a pot.

In the first case the extension of the reason is larger than that of „eternal,“ since there are things that are not the effect of some effort, but are non-eternal, such as lightning which is not the effect of some effort, but is non-eternal. In the second case the non-eternal has a wider extension than that of the things which are the effect of some effort, as there are things non-eternal, though they are not the effect of some effort, as lightning.

Therefore I have explained the two examples, the affirmative and the negative, which consist in the affirmative and the negative application respectively of the two predicates⁷¹). All other kinds of example different from these two [must be considered as] fallacies of the example. Which are these other kinds of example, that we consider as fallacies? They happen to be when the major or the middle term or both are not in the analogous instances (*sapakṣa*), or when the affirmative or the negative application, although present, have been expressed in a contrary way, or wherever the *affirmative* or *negative application* is not made, but it is merely shown that the major and the minor terms coexist, but neither of them exists in the negative instances⁷²).

3. The third error is the consequence of these two and it consists in the fact that the reasons so formulated prove to be inconclusive, since the reason: "effect of some effort", "not-effect of some effort" can be found also in some negative instances, *vipakṣa* and this contradicts the definition of the valid reason. But cfr. Uddyotakara N.V. p. 133.

⁷¹) That is of M and P.

⁷²) P.S. IV. 8.

gtan · ts'igs · bsgrub · bya · gñis · ldan · min
rjes · hgro · bzlog · pa · gñis · dag · ste
de · yi · mi · mt'un · p'yogs · bsal · dañ
rjes · hgro · med · pa · der · snañ · ba'o.

Ten cases are possible:

Anvaya
erroneous

- a) sound is eternal, because immaterial, as the atoms. (M is absent). *sādhanaśiddha* of N.P.
- b) id · id · as *karman* (P is absent). *sādhyaśiddha* of N.P.
- c) id · id · as a pot; (P as well as M are absent). *ubhayaśiddha* of N.P.

Vyatireka
erroneous

- a) sound is eternal, because immaterial, as *karman*; viz. whatever is non-eternal is material, as *karman*; (M is present in *vipakṣa*) *sādhanaūvyāvṛtta* of N.P.
- b) id · id · as the atoms (whatever is non-eternal is material, as the atoms; P is present in the *vipakṣa*) *sādhyaūvyāvṛtta* of N.P.
- c) id · id · like ether; (whatever is non-eternal is material, as ether; M and P present in the *vipakṣa*) *ubhayaūvyāvṛtta* of N.P.

viparītānvaya

whatever is non-eternal is the effect of some effort, as a pot (in this case the lightning should be eternal because it is not the effect of some effort);

viparītavyatireka

whatever is not the effect of some effort is eternal, as ether (the lightning should be eternal, because it is not the effect of some effort).

Thus, either only one of these two predicates (M and P as resident in the example) is unproved [in the positive example] and non-excluded [by the negative example], or either of them is unproved and non-excluded⁷³). E. g. somebody wishing to prove that sound is eternal, because immaterial, gives these positive examples (*sādharmyeṇa*): “we see that whatever is immaterial is eternal, as *karman*, as the atoms, as a pot”; and these negative examples: (*vaidharmyeṇa*): “we see that whatever is non-eternal is material, as the atoms, as *karman*, as ether etc.” Therefore we have [implicitly] explained those cases in which the subject of the positive example is unproved e. g., when somebody is arguing against [an opponent who does] not admit the eternity of sound⁷⁴). [Now some ask]: is the formulation

<i>ananvaya</i>	whatever is the effect of some effort is non-eternal as a pot.
<i>avyatireka</i>	whatever is not the effect of some effort is eternal, as ether.

Same classification in Praśastapādabhāṣya plus *āśrayāsiddha* in both cases, positive and negative P.B. p. 344. In N.P. the fallacies of the example are still ten as in Dīnāga. But in Dharmakīrti there are also three *sandigdhas* viz.: *sādhya-sādhana-ubhaya-sandigdha*; and three *avyatirekin* more, viz.: *sādhya-sādhana-ubhaya-avyatirekin*. This classification is accepted by the Jaina Logicians. Cfr. *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* (by Hemacandra 82 fl.) *Pramāṇa-Nirṇaya* p. 63 etc.

It is evident that the first six cases only are absolutely wrong; while the other four are wrong so far as their formulation is concerned, but can be valid in the inference for one's own self (*yadī nāma na duṣṭam vastu tathāpi vaktrā duṣṭaṇ darśitam iti duṣṭam*. NBT pag. 124. Cfr. following note.

⁷³) That is Dīnāga refers to the *anyatarāsiddha*, *anyatarāvyāvṛtta*, *ubhayāsiddha*, *ubhayāvyāvṛtta* already quoted in the preceding note. The *anyatarāsiddha* comprehends the *sādhānāsiddha* and the *sādhyaśiddha*; the *anyatarāvyāvṛtta* must be understood in the same way. The *ubhayāsiddha* and *ubhayāvyāvṛtta* refer to the cases in which both the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* are respectively unproved in the positive example and non-excluded by the negative example.

⁷⁴) I think we must punctuate differently than in the text. (Cfr. the quotation of this same passage made by K'uei Chi.) The meaning of the passage is that if somebody, arguing against a philosopher who does not admit the eternity of sound, says: „sound is eternal, because immaterial; as ether,” in this case, the subject of the example is unproved for the opponent, and therefore the reason is inconclusive.

of both examples necessary, so that the syllogism may be valid, or is the formulation of one single example sufficient, just as that of the reason?⁷⁵⁾.

If one [wishes] to fulfill the rules of true logic, he must therefore use the two [examples] together. When both are present, they can perfectly show that the *probandum* is not contrary to the reason, since they indicate that the *pakṣadharmā* (M as resident in P) is certainly present in the positive instances, but absolutely absent in the negative instances. Therefore [in such a way] it is possible to oppose [the objection that a syllogism contains a fallacy; viz. that it is] either inconclusive or contradictory⁷⁶⁾. If the argument is partly proved, then the [syl-

⁷⁵⁾ That is: „because a product, as the pot“; „because the effect of an effort, as pot.“

⁷⁶⁾ This means that, except when we discuss about things well ascertained both examples are necessary. In fact the example gives an instance of the positive cases in which M as resident in P (*pakṣa-dharma*) is present. But we saw that, according to Dinnāga, the *pakṣadharmā* can be present in all as well as in some only of the positive instances, so that it is necessary to show that the second aspect of the *pakṣadharmā* is certainly present, I mean that it is absolutely absent in all negative instances. Were we to give an example only, we should commit two logical fallacies, that is either the *anaiikāntika*, inconclusive, or the *viruddha*, contradictory.

It is *viruddha*, because it is not in the *sapakṣa* but is present in the *vipakṣa*; it is *anaiikāntika*, since it is in either or in neither. But if it is in either, it is *sādhāraṇa* if it is in neither it is *asādhāraṇa*; thus, as we saw, in neither case a conclusion can be reached.

P.S.V. a. 68 a. 1. 5.

re . rer . brjod . pa . ni . ma . yin . no /
der . t'al . bar . ḡgyur . bas . so /
de . lta . na . ni . ḡjig . rten . pai
· sbyor . ba . rjes . su . gzuñ . nas .
b'ed . kyi / bsgrub . par . bya .
bai . c'os . ji . ltar . bai . gtan .
ts'igs . kyi . mts'an . ñid . ni . ma
· yin . te / ma . ñes . par . t'al .
bar . ḡgyur . bas . so / ci . yañ .
rnam . pa . gñis . kyis(?) . dpei .
ts'ig . tu(?) . sgrub . pa . yin . nam
· k'o . na . te . gzan . ñid . gcig .
yin . ze . na / gtan . ts'igs . yin . pai
· py'ir . rnam . pa . gñis . ñid .

P.S.V. b. fol. 151 b. 1. 5.

re . re . brjod . pas . t'al . ba .
der . mi . ḡgyur . bai . p'yir . ro .
ze . rfa / hdi . ni . ḡjig . rten . pai
· sbyor . ba . bzuñ . nas . brjod .
pa . yin . gyi / mts'an . ñid . pa . ni
· ma . yin . te /
dper . na . bsgrub . byai . c'os
· gtan . ts'igs . ñid . yin . na . ma
· ñes . par . t'al . ba . lta . bu'o / 'on
te . ci . dper . rnam . pa . gñis .
kyis . ts'ig . sgrub . byed . yin .
nam . ci . ste . gtan . ts'igs . gzan .
du . gañ . yañ . ruñ . ba . ñid . yin
· ze . na . rnam . pa . gñis . ka .

logism may be] valid by giving an example only⁷⁷). E. g. if the two proprieties of sound [viz. its non-eternity and its quality of being a product], are equally admitted [by either disputant], then it is not necessary to formulate both examples; and also [the same thing happens], when by the mere internal evidence of the ar-

do . žes . brjod . do . de . lta . ma .
yin . na //
t'un . moñ . dañ . ni . k'yad . par
 . ñid /
hgal . ba . 'ñ . sgrub . byed . ñid .
 . du . hgyur //
de . dañ . gñis . ka . ma . brjod . pa /
des . na . dper . hdi . na(?) .
brjod . gñis . su . bya . gal . te .
c'os . mt'un . pa . ñid . rjod . par .
byed . na . de . med . pa . la . 'ñ .
hgyur . ro . žes . t'un . moñ . pa .
ñid . gtan . ts'igs . su . dogs . pa .
bskyed . do / gal . te . c'os . mi .
mt'un . pa . ñid . rjod . par . byed
 . na . ni . bsgrub . par . bya . bai .
rigs . la . yañ . med . pas . t'un .
moñ . ma . yin . par . hgyur / ci . ste
 . gñis . ka . rjod . par . mi . byed .
na . ni . de . la . t'un . moñ . p'yogs
 . de . la . mi . hgyur . la / rigs .
mi . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . la . hgyur .
bai . p'yir . hgal . bar . hgyur .
ro / dei . p'yir . gdon . mi . za . bar .
 . gñen . poi . p'yogs . kyis . hgal .
ba . dañ . ma . nes . pa . gñis
ka . brjod . par . bya 'o / hga' .
žig . tu . cuñ . zad . grub . pa . ñid
 . du . hgyur . ba . yin . no / gañ .
yañ . ruñ . ba . gcig . brjod . pas
 . kyañ . sgrub . byed . du . hgyur .
te / sgra . bžin . du . don . gñis .
rtogs . pai . p'yir . gañ . yañ . ruñ
 . ba . gcig . gis . gñis . ka . bstan .
pai . p'yir . don . gyi . šugs . kyis
 . gñis . brjod . pa . yin . no /

yin . no . žes . brjod . do / gžan .
du . na . re . re 'm . gñi . ga . ma
 . brjod . pai /
t'un . moñ . pa . dañ . k'yad . par
 . can //
hgal . ba . ñid . kyañ . sgrub . byed
 . hgyur /
dei . p'yir . dpe . ni . gñis . yin . no //
 gal . te . c'os . mt'un . pa . k'o
 . nas . brjod . na . dei . p'yir .
bsgrub . bya . med . pa . la . yañ .
hgyur . bas . t'un . moñ . pa . ñid
 . gtan . ts'igs . su . dog . pa . yin .
no / ci . ste . c'os . mi . mt'un . pa .
ñid . kyis . brjod . na . dei . p'yir .
bsgrub . byai . rigs . la . yañ . med
 . pai . p'yir . t'un . moñ . ma . yin .
pa . ñid . hgyur . ro / gal . te . gñi
 . ga . ma . brjod . na . dei . p'yir .
rigs . mt'un . pa . la . med . par .
hgyur . la / med . pa . la . yod . par .
hgyur . bai . p'yir . hgal . ba . ñid
hgyur . ro / dei . p'yir . gdon . mi
 . za . bar . hgal . ba . dañ . ma .
nes . pai . gñen . po . gñi . ga .
yañ . brjod . par . bya 'o / gañ
žig . la . cuñ . zad . rab . tu . grub
 . pa . yin . pai . p'yir . gañ . yañ .
ruñ . ba . brjod . pa . yañ . sgrub
 . byed . yin . no / sgra . k'o . na .
la . don . gñis . rtogs . pai . p'yir
 . ram . gañ . yañ . ruñ . bas . šugs
 . kyis . gñi . ga . bstan . pai . p'yir
 . gñi . ga . brjod . par . mi . bya 'o .

⁷⁷) That is, when one of the two possible examples is implicitly accepted by the opponent, the simple formulation of the other is conclusive; e. g. if the positive instance is implicitly accepted by either disputant, then the mere enunciation of the negative is valid and vice-versa.

gument itself (*arthāpatti*) one single example is sufficient to declare both.

It is evident that in the inference the following rule only is valid, viz.: when the presence of this particular characteristic (*linga*) has been ascertained in the object of inference, and we remember that that same characteristic is certainly present in all the notions analogous to that to be inferred, but absolutely absent wherever that is absent, then the [notion] which results from this [process] is undoubtedly valid⁷⁸). Therefore a *kārikā* says:

XIII. We maintain that, just as an undoubtedly valid conclusion is reached by one's own self, [in the same manner] an undoubtedly valid conclusion is produced in the mind of another. [This process] expresses the connection with the *pakṣadharmā* (M as resident in P) and the exclusion of whatever is different from the *probandum*⁷⁹).

The reason is formulated in order to show that the *pakṣadharmā* is present in the notion to be inferred; the example is formulated in order to indicate that it is indissolubly connected with this; the proposition is formulated in order to show the notion to be proved⁸⁰).

⁷⁸) P.S.V. a, ibid.

don . rjes . su . dpog . pa . la .
yañ . rigs . pa . de . ñid . blta'o / gañ
· rjes . su . dpag . par . bya . ba . la
· rtags . ñdi . ñes . par . gzuñ . bar
· byas . nas . gžan . la . dei . rigs . yod
· pa . dran . par . bya . ste / med .
pa . la . med . pa . ñid . kyi . bdag
· ñid . kyi . ñes . pa . bskyed . par .
byed . do /

P.S.V. b, ibid.

rjes . su . dpag . pa . la . yañ .
ts'ul . ñdi . yin . par . mt'oñ . ste /
gal . te . rtags . ñdi . rjes . su . dpag
· par . bya . ba . la . ñes . par .
bzuñ . na . gžan . du . de . dañ . rigs .
mt'un . pa . la . yod . pa . ñid . dañ
· med . pa . la . med . pa . ñid .
dran . par . byed . pa . dei . p'yir .
ñdii . ñes . pa . bskyed . par . byed .
pa . yin . no /

⁷⁹) P.S. IV, 6

rañ . la . ñes . bžin . gžan . dag . la /
ñes . pa . bskyed . par . ñdod . pa . yis //
p'yogs . c'os . ñid . dañ . ñbrel . ba . dañ /
bsgrub . bya . brjod . bya . gžan . dag . spañ //

⁸⁰) ñdi . lta . p'yogs . kyi . c'os .
ñid . bstan . pai . don . du . gtan .
ts'igs . kyi . ts'ig . yin . no / de .
rjes . su . dpag . par . bya . ba . dañ
/ med . na . mi . ñbyuñ . ba .
ñid . du . bstan . pai . don . du . dpei

gañ . gi . p'yir . p'yogs . kyi .
c'os . ñid . bstan . pai . don . du .
gtan . ts'igs . brjod . pa . dañ . yañ
· dei . rjes . su . dpag . par . bya . ba
· dañ . med . na . mi . ñbyun . bai .
don . du . dpe . brjod . pa . dañ /

Therefore in the formulation of a syllogism no other members are required except those already referred to. Thus I refute the theory of those logicians who consider the desire of knowing (*jijñāsā*), the application, and the conclusion as members of the syllogism⁸¹). At this point some might object that, if it be so, then the formulation of the example does not represent a different member, as it merely declares the meaning of the reason⁸²). [I answer that] although the fact is substantially so,

· ts'ig · yin · no / rjes · su · dpag ·
par · bya · ba · bstan · pai · don ·
du · p'yogs · kyi · ts'ig · brjod · do /
ḥdi · rjes · su · dpog · par · byed ·
pai · yan · lag · gžan · ni · yod · pa
· ma · yin · no /

⁸¹) P.S.V. a, *ibid*.

des · na · gžan · gyi · šes · par ·
ḥdod · pa · la · sogs · pai · yañ · lag
· ḥie · bar · sbyar · ba · dañ · mjug
· bsdu · ba · dag · ni · ḥdir · bsal ·
ba · yin · no /

rjes · su · dpag · par · bya · ba · yin
· pai · don · du · p'yogs · brjod ·
pa · ste / rjes · su · dpag · pai · yan
· lag · gžan · yod · pa · ma · yin ·
no /

P.S.V. b, *ibid*.

dei · p'yir · gžan · dag · ni · šes
· pa · la · sogs · pa · rnams · dañ · ḥie
· bar · sbyor · ba · dañ · mjug · bsdu
· ba · dag · ḥdir · sblaṅ · pa · yin
· no · /

This refers to the syllogism of ten members quoted by Vātsyāyana pag. 137 (N. S. I, 1, 32) as well as to the syllogism of five members expounded by the Naiyāyikas.

⁸²) *Ibid*.

de · ltar · na · ni · dpei · ts'ig ·
kyañ · log · par · t'ab · pa · mi ·
ḥgyur · te / rtags · kyi · don · du ·
bstan · pa · yin · pai · p'yir · ḥdi
· yañ · ḥie · bar · sbyar · ba · bžin ·
du · mi · brjod · par · t'al · bar ·
ḥgyur · ro · že · na / de · ltar · yañ
· ma · yin · te ·
dpe · ni · rtags · la · sogs · par · du(?) /
brjod · par · bya · ba · ma · yin · te //
gtan · ts'igs · kyi · don · ston · pai
· p'yir /
ñer · ḥjal · bžin · du · don · med · min //
mts'an · ṇid · gsum · pai · rtags
· la · bsgrub · par · bya · ba · ṇid
· dañ / gtan · ts'igs · kyi · ts'ig · brjod
· pa · des · nā · gtan · ts'igs · kyi
· lhag · ma · bstan · par · bya · bai
· don · du · dpei · ts'ig · don · dañ
· bcas · pa · yin · no / de · lta · na ·
in /

Ibid.

'on · te · de · lta · na · dpei ·
ts'ig · kyañ · t'a · dad · par · mi ·
ḥgyur · te · gtan · ts'igs · kyi · don
· bstan · pai · p'yir · ro / des · na ·
ḥie · bar · sbyor · ba · bžin · du ·
brjod · par · bya · ba · ma · yin ·
par · t'al · bar · ḥgyur · ro · že ·
na / ḥdi · ni · yod · pa · ma · yin · te
gal · te · dpe · ni · gtan · ts'igs · las ·
t'a · dad · brjod · bya · ma · yin ·
yañ /
dam · brjod · rtags · don · bstan ·
pai · p'yir · ro //
ñer · ḥjal · bžin · du · don · med · min /
gtan · ts'igs · ni · mts'an · ṇid
· gsum · bcas · yin · la · bsgrub ·
byai · c'os · ṇid · ni · gtan · ts'igs ·
kyi · ts'ig · gis · bstan · pa · yin ·
no / de · las · gtan · ts'igs · lhag ·
ma · bstan · par · byai · don · du ·
dpe · brjod · pa · ni · don · dañ ·

yet the formulation of the reason is only meant to express that this has the nature of being a *pakṣadharmā*, but it cannot show that this is present in the positive instances, and absent in the negative ones. Therefore it is necessary to express separately the positive and the negative examples [in order to show that the reason possesses these two other essential aspects]. [Now the opponent asks: "if it be so] will there be any mistake in calling "*reason*" only the fundamental meaning expressed by the reason, [I mean its being a *pakṣadharmā*, and in considering its other two aspects as examples?]" "But what do you obtain in saying so?" "We obtain — you reply — that the example is formulated as a separate member". [My answer is:] Then the necessary conse-

rtags . kyi . ḥbrel . ba . sgrub . 'pai
 . p'yir /
 gal . te . dper . brjod . gñis . yin . na //
 dpe . ni . logs . gcig . ñid . du . gyis /
 gal . te . gtan . ts'igs . kyi . ts'ig
 . gi . p'yogs . ñid . tsam . brjod .
 nas . gtan . ts'igs . lhag . ma . grub
 . par . bya . bai . don . du .
 dpei . yan . lag . gis . šig / de
 ltar . yañ . ma . yin . te /
 logs . yin . ḥjig . rten . dañ . mts'uñs
 . ḥgyur /
 de . lta . na . ni . ḥjig . rten .
 pai . bžin . dpe . gtan . ts'igs . dañ .
 ma . ḥbrel . bar . gyur . ro .
 de . dag . gis . ni . dpe . brjod . la /
 c'os . mt'un . ḥba' . žig . rjod . par .
 byed //
 ḥjig . rten . pas . ni . sbyor .
 bai . dpe . brjod . la . c'os . mt'un .
 pa . ḥba' . žig . ston . par . byed .
 do . byas . pai . p'yir . žes . bya .
 bai . bžin . no / bsgrub . bya . sgrub
 . byed . ñid . blañs . nas / bsgrub .
 bya . sgrub . pai . gtan . ts'igs . so .
 žes . jl . skad . du . brjod . pa .
 de . sbyor . ba . la . med . do .

bcas . pa . yin . no / 'on . te . de .
 lta . na /
 gtan . ts'igs . ḥbrel . ba . bsgrub .
 don . du /
 gal . te . dpe . gñis . brjod . byed . na //
 dpe . ni . t'a . dad . ñid . yin . mod /
 gal . te . gtan . ts'igs . brjod .
 pas . p'yogs . c'os . ñid . tsam . brjod
 . pa . yin . la / de . las . gtan . ts'igs
 . lhag . ma . rab . tu . sgrub . pai
 . don . du . dpe . yan . lag . t'a .
 dad . pa . ñid . yin . du . za . dañ
 . mod . ce . na /
 ḥjig . rten . mts'uñs . p'yir . t'a .
 dad . min /
 de . lta . na . ni . ḥjig . rten .
 pai . sbyor . ba . bžin . du . gtan .
 ts'igs . dañ . dpe . ma . ḥbrel . bar
 . ḥgyur . ro .
 de . dag . gis . ni . dpe . brjod . dañ /
 c'os . mt'un . ḥba' . žig . ston . par .
 bye⁴ //
 ḥjig . rten . pai . sbyor . ba .
 la . ni . byas . bai . p'yir . žes . dpe .
 dañ . c'os . mt'un . pa . ḥba' . žig .
 rab . tu . ston . par . byed . kyi .
 sgrub . bya . sgrub . byed . ñid . ma .
 brjod /
 ci . ltar . yañ . bsgrub . bya .
 sgrub . par . byed . pai . gtan . ts'igs
 . yin . pa . de . dag . gi . sbyor .
 ba . la . yod . pa . ma . yin . te /

quence of this is that, just as in the syllogism commonly formulated by men, there would be no [indissoluble] connection between the example and the meaning expressed by the reason. [You may still insist on asking:] “If it be so, which is the mistake that we shall commit?” [But I reply:] In such a syllogism the example merely expresses a similarity with the notion to be proved, but it has not the power of proving; therefore it has not the meaning of a proof. According to that [rule], [such an] example merely expresses that the reason: “because it has the quality of being a product”, is analogous to objects belonging to the same class, but it does not indicate that it can prove the notion to be proved. Moreover were the reason and the example separated, then, the analogy or the dissimilarity that this may have with the *probandum* could not show that the reason is not in a contradictory relation with the *probandum* itself; therefore it could merely express that the reason has some analogy with the notion to be proved. So it is not sufficient to prove. [If you ask:] “How is it not sufficient?” [I reply]: Since the predicate of the subject is not necessarily present in any positive example: analogy of this with the meaning expressed by the proposition [viz.: non-eternal] must be proved by other examples and so we commit the logical fallacy of the *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*). Moreover, there is not necessarily an absolute similarity of the various notions [as supposed by the merely homogeneous example], nor can the [heterogeneous example] have [the function] of example, if it does not indicate the fact that must be specified, viz., that (the probandum as well as the pakṣadharmā) are absent in it⁸³).

XIV. If [the example merely expresses] that the reason has some analogy with the subject to be proved, or with its attributes, as regards the example, either we commit the logical fallacy of the *regressus ad infinitum*, or the exclusion of the negative instances would not be enunciated⁸⁴).

⁸³) That is the analogy, as expressed by the example, can refer, according to the cases, to the subject itself of the proposition (sound) or to its attribute (non-eternal). But in either cases it fails to prove, as stated in the following Kārikā and in the commentary thereon.

⁸⁴) P.S. IV, 10. gtan . ts'igs . bcas . pa . 'm . bsgrub . bya . tsam /
de . k'yad . par . kyi . dper . yin . ra //
dpe . 'ni . t'ug . pa . med . pa . dan /
mi . mt'un . p'yogs . las . ldog . med . hgyur //

But in the P.S.V. we have the following readings:

According to the common logic it is believed that the heterogeneous example is that in which the negative instances

P.S.V. a.

ldog . pa . rnam . par . brjod . pa . na /
bsgrub . bya . sgrub . pai . gtan .
ts'igs . sam //
de . yi . k'yad . par . yin . yañ . run /
mt'uñs . ston . t'ug . pa . med . par .
hgyur //
gal . te . de . ltar . ñe . bar . hjal
· bar . byed . na . ji . ltar . bum .
pa . byas . pai . p'yir . mi . rtag .
pa . de . bžin . du . sgra . yañ .
ño . žes . pa . bžin . yañ . bum .
pa . mi . rtag . pa . ñid . du . ston .
pa . yañ . brjod . pa . hgyur . fo /
sgrai . ñes . par . bstan . pa . ma .
grub . yañ . ño / ci . ste . bum . pa .
la . sogs . pa . bžin . mi . rtag . pa .
yin . gyi . nam . mk'a' . bžin . du .
rtag . pa'o . žes . pa . ni . ma . yin
· no . žes . bsgrub . par . bya . bcas
· ñe . bar . hjal . bar . byed . do /
des . na . nam . mk'a' . la . sogs .
pa . las . byas . pa . ñid . log . par .
ñe . bar . bstan . par . hgyur . ro
· že . na . ma . yin . te / ci . ste .
bsgrub . byai . bye . brag . ñe . bar
· hjal . bar . byed . pai . lta . na /
mi . rtag . ste . bum . pa . bžin . no
· žes . yin . gyi . mi . rtag . ste .
bum . pa . la . sogs . pa . bžin .
no . žes . ni . ma . yin . no / de .
lta . na . yañ . snam . bu . la . sogs
· pa . las . log . pai . byas . pa .
ñid . brjod . par . hgyur . ro / bsgrub .
· bya . rnam . pa . t'ams . cad . dañ
ldan . pa . ni . ma . yin . la . dam
· bcas . pai . don . hdi . yañ . hbrel
· ba . ma . yin . te / mi . rtag . pa .
ñid . tsam . dam . bca' . yin . pai .
p'yir . ro / de . ltar . ñe . bar . hjal
· bai . don . rnam . t'ams . cad .
du . mi . rigs . so .

gal . te . yañ . gtan . ts'igs . ni
· p'yogs . kyi . c'os . ñid . tsam .
yin . pai . p'yir . dpe . ni . gtan .

P.S.V. b.

gtan . ts'igs . bcas . pa . 'm . bsgrub
· bya . tsam /
de . k'yad . par . gyi . dpe . yin .
· na //
dpe . ni . t'ug . pa . med . pa . dañ /
mi . mt'un . p'yogs . las . ldog . med
hgyur //
dper . na . bum . pa . ni . byas
· pai . p'yir . rtag . ste / de . bžin .
du . sgra . yañ . yin . no . žes / gal .
te . de . ltar . dper . byed . na / bum
pa . mi . rtag . pa . ñid . la . yañ .
dper . brjod . par . bya . bai . p'yir
· t'ug . pa . med . par . hgyur . ba .
'm . sgra . la . yañ . dpe . med .
par . grub . par . hgyur . ro / ci .
ste . bum . pa . bžin . du . mi . rtag
· pa . yin . gyi / nam . mk'a' . bžin
· du . rtag . pa . ni . ma . yin . no .
žes . bsgrub . par . bya . ba . ts'am
· gyi . dper . byed . na / des . na .
nam . mk'a' . la . sogs . pa . las .
byas . pa . ñid . ldog . par . ñe .
bar . bstan . par . bya . ba . yin .
na . yod . pa . yañ . ma . yin . no /
ci . ste . yañ . mi . rtag . pa . ñid
· yod . na . bum . pa . bžin . du
· mi . rtag . pa . yi . yin . gyi / snam
· bu . bžin . du . ma . yin . no /
žes . bsgrub . pai . k'yad . par . gyi
· dper . byed . pa . de . lta . na .
yañ . snam . bu . la . sogs . par .
rnams . las . byas . pa . ldog . par .
brjod . par . bya . bar . hgyur . na
· ñid . p'yogs . kyi . c'os . tsam
· gtan . ts'igs . so . žes . bya . bar
· hgyur . te / de . ltar . yañ / p'yogs .
kyi . c'os . tsam . ñid . yin . na
· hk'rul . ba . yañ . ni . gtan . ts'igs
· ñid . gtan . ts'igs . ltar . snañ . ba
· gtan . ts'igs . su . hgyur . ro /
su . gñi . ga . brjod . na . mi .
hgyur . žes . gañ . gi . c'os . mt'un
· pa . ñid . kyis . dpe . brjod . pa .

of the notion to be proved and of the reason coexist. It is not defined as the non-existence of the reason, wherever the *probandum* is absent. Therefore there is no doubt that such an example cannot prove anything. If the *pakṣadharma* only (M as resident in P) were the reason, then the inconclusive reason would prove to be a valid reason. But how is this mistake possible, when both examples are present, [I mean] that which proves the *probandum*, and that which possesses the proprieties of the negative instances? But that fallacy (inconclusive) happens when the negative instances of the *probandum* are not of one and the same class, just as in the last examples of the first and the last triad [of the table of the reasons already referred to]. Therefore we must conclude that the coexistence of the three aspects declares [the validity of] the reason. According to this logical rule [as laid down by me], although all the various parts are the reason, in so far as they [equally] show [the validity] of the notion to be proved, still a part only is called the reason [viz. the *pakṣadharma*].

Thus I have briefly explained the proposition etc., and the

ts'igs . kyi . don . las . logs . šin .
par . ḡgyur . ro . že . na / de . lta .
na . yañ . p'yogs . kyi . c'os . ñid
tsam . gtan . ts'igs . yin . na .
ḡkr'ul . ba . can . yañ . ḡgyur .

gtan . ts'igs . ltar . snañ . ba .
yañ . gtan . ts'igs . su . ḡgyur . ro .
gñis . ka . brjod . la . mi . ḡgyur .
žes / ḡdi . sñam . du . gañ . c'os .
mt'un . ḡba' . žig . dpe . brjod . par
byed . pa . de . la . ḡkr'ul . ba .
can . gyis . go . skabs . yod . de .
mi . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . la . yañ
srid . pai . p'yir . ro / gañ . c'os .
mi . mt'un . pa . ḡba' . žig . rjod .
par . byed . pa . de . la . n? . t'un
moñ . ma . yin . pa . ñid . du .
ḡgyur . ro / gañ . žig . gñis . ka . brjod
par . de . la . ni . gañ . yañ . mi .
srid . do . že . na / de . la . yañ / dgui
nañ . nas . gñis . srid . do . p'yogs
kyi . c'os . dgu . la . dañ . po
dañ . t'a . ma . gsum . pa . gyas
p'yogs . na . moi . dpe . gñis . ka
brjod . kyañ . ḡkr'ul . ba . can .
du . yod . par . srid . pa . yin . no /

dei . mi . mt'un . p'yogs . la . yañ .
srid . pai . p'yir . ḡkr'ul . bai . go .
skabs . yod . pa . ma . yin . no / gañ .
gi . yañ . c'os . mi . mt'un . pa .
ñid . kyis . dpe . brjod . pa . dei .
t'un . moñ . ma . yin . pa . ñid .
ni . mi . mt'un . pai . p'yogs . la .
yañ . srid . pai . p'yir . ḡkr'ul . bai
go . skabs . yod . pa . yin . gyi /
gañ . gi . yañ . gñi . ga . brjod . par .
bya . ba . de . la . ak'ul . ba . srid . pa .
ma . yin . no . žes . bya . ba . ḡdir
ḡgyur . na / de . la . yañ . dgu
po . rnam . la . gñis . dag . srid /
p'yogs . kyi . c'os . rnam . dgu
po . rnam . kyi . gsum . la . dañ
po . dañ . t'a . mai . dpe . brjod .
pa . p'yi . ma . dag . la . dpe . gñis .
po . dag . brjod . kyañ . ak'ul . ba .
srid . pa . yod . pa . yin . no .

fallacies of these [members of the syllogism]. So the various sentences can be called either a valid proof or a fallacious proof.

According as it can [or cannot] be the cause of another's understanding, the proof is called a (valid) proof or a fallacious proof. As regards one's understanding there are only two *pramāṇas*, I mean: inference and direct perception (*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*) since [the other *pramāṇas* admitted by different schools] such as tradition (*śabda*), analogy (*upamāna*) etc. are included in these two. Thus there are only two *pramāṇas*, by which we can apprehend the thing in itself (*svalakṣaṇa*) and its generality (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). There is no other knowable besides these two, which can be apprehended by a *pramāṇa* different from those [already referred to]. A *kārikā* says:

XV. Direct perception must be devoid of every construction of thought (*kalpanāpodha*). The other [knowledge] is derived from the reason already explained.

[The expression used] here: "direct perception must be devoid etc." means this: direct perception is called that knowledge of the object itself as *rūpa* etc., which is devoid of every [determination] of class and name, and which presupposes that all *vikalpas* are not differentiated [from the thing itself]⁸⁵). Moreover [each direct perception] depends upon some conditions strictly peculiar to it, as its sphere is limited to each separate sense. Therefore it is called "*pratyakṣa*". Therefore a *kārikā* says:

XVI. All the dharmas which are existent do not possess one and a single characteristic. Each sense does not possess the function of all [the others also]. The inner consciousness (*saṃvedanā*) only is inexpressible and it corresponds to the sphere of the material senses.

These are also called direct perception: the sphere of mind (*manobhūmi*) which consists in the act of mere consciousness and which is devoid of every construction of thought, those elements in passions etc. which are self-conscious, and the intuitions of the

⁸⁵) This passage has been quoted by *Kamalaśīla* in his commentary on the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, pag. 372: *tatrāyaṃ Nyāyamukhagranthaḥ: yaj jñānam artharūpādaḥ viśeṣaṇābhidhāyakābhedopacāreṇāvikalpakam, tad akṣam akṣam prati varṇata iti pratyakṣam*. The *pratyakṣa* is therefore, for *Dinnāga*, pure sensation. On the *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* according to him, cfr. *Stcherbatsky Erkenntnistheorie und Logik*.

mystics (*yogin*) when they get rid of the dialectical constructions (*vikalpa*) [belonging to the particular] system [that they follow]⁸⁶).

Here (viz. in the fact of the direct perception) we do not distinguish the [perception as] means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) from the cognition which is the result of that: because its only essence resides in producing a representation of the object (*arthābhāsa*). As it looks as if it had some function, it is metaformally called a *pramāṇa*, viz. "means of knowledge". [Some ask:] „If self-consciousness which is felt in conditions such as those of passion etc. is considered to be direct perception, why, then, here [in the definition of this direct perception], you say that this is a knowledge devoid of the constructions of thought?" We do not exclude here self-experience; since [according to me] pure perception must be devoid of any construction of thought, when here [viz. in the process of perception] the notion of other objects arises, this notion is not called direct perception. Therefore in this way I [implicitly] assume that memory, induction, desire, doubt, confused knowledge etc. perception of water in a mirage etc. cannot be called direct perception, since those constructions of thought are present, which are the result of previous experiences⁸⁷). Thus as regards [the things generally

⁸⁶) P.S.V. a, fol. 14 b. 16.

yid . kyañ . don . dañ . c'ags . la .
sogs /

rañ . rig . rtog . pa . med . pa . yin //
Yid . kyañ . yul . gzugs . la .
sogs . pa . la . dmigs . šiñ . ñams .
su . myoñ . bai . rnam . pas . hjug .
pa . ste / rtog . pa . med . pa . hba' .
žig . go / hdod . c'ags . dañ . že .
sdañ . dañ . gti . mug . dañ . bde .

P.S.V. b, agrees with: a. For Dar-makirti also perception is fourfold.

⁸⁷) P.S.V. a, ibid.

re . žig . gal . te . hdod . c'ags .
la . sogs . pai . rañ . rig . pa . mñon
. sum . yin . na . rtog . pai . žes .
pa . yañ . mñon . sum . du . hgyur
. že . na / de . ni . bden . te /
rtog . pa . 'ñ . rañ . rig . ñid .
du . hdod / don . la . ma . yin . de
. rtog . p'yir // de . yul . la . ñi .
hdod . c'ags . la . sogs . pa . ñid .
du . mñon . sum . ma . yin . yañ .

ba . dañ . sdug . bsñal . la . sogs . pa .
ni . dbañ . po . la . mi . bltos . pai
. p'yir / rañ . rig . pai . mñon . sum
. mo / de . bžin . du . rnal . hbyor .
rnams . kyi . bla . ma . yis . bstan .
don . t'a . dad . tsam . žig . mt'oñ /
rñal . hbyor . pa . rnams . kyis . kyañ
. luñ . las . rnam . par . rtog . pa .
dañ . ma . hdres . pai . don . tsam
. mt'oñ . pa . ni . mñon . sum . mo /
rañ . rig . go . (But P.S.V. b: rañ .
rig . pa . la . ni . ma . yin . pai .
p'yir . skyon . med . do.) . žes .
bya . ba . skyon . med . do / de .
dag . ni . mñon . sum . mo /
hk'rul . dañ . kun . rdsob . yin . šes
. dañ /
rjes . dpag . rjes . su . dpag . las .
byuñ //
dran . dañ . mñon . hdod . ces . bya
. ba /

considered in this world as existent], such as the existence of pot etc., number etc., action of lifting etc., the notion of potness etc. is not direct perception, but a *pratyakṣābhāsa*⁸⁸).

In fact [in these cases] constructions of our thought are present, and therefore we attribute to the object, as it really is, other characteristics and assume that it is in relation with other things⁸⁹). Thus I have explained direct perception; now I shall explain inference.

In the sentence: "the other is derived from the reason already explained" it is necessary to understand: "knowledge". This [viz. direct perception] is the first knowledge. The other is derived from the reason which [is possessed with the force of being] a proof, as already explained, and is based upon the significance of that.

This [knowledge] can be of two kinds, that is the knowledge which consists in the apprehension of the object to be known is derived either from direct perception, or from inference and the recollection of the indissoluble connection between the reason and the thesis to be proved. Therefore one proves the force of the argument first assumed, because one remembers [those aspects which give validity to a reason, viz.] that the reason is certainly present in the positive instances etc. The one as well as the other [aspect] are called inference, since they represent the immediate and the mediate cause by which we attain the knowledge of the objects. They are so called because of their nature of being the efficient cause of knowledge.

mñon . sum . ltar . snañ . rab . rib .	ni . don . gžan . sgro . ḥdogs . pas .
bcas .	dei . ño . bor . brtags . nas . ḥjug .
(P.S.V. b. ces.)	pai . p'yir . mñon . sum . ltar . snañ
re žig . . ḥk'rul . pai . žes . pa .	. ba'o / rjes . su . dpag . pai . ḥbras
ni . smig . rgyu . la . sogs . pa . la .	. bu / la . sogs . pai . žes . pa . ni .
c'u . la . sogs . par . rtog . pai .	sñar . ñams . su . myoñ . ba . la .
p'yir . mñon . sum . ltar . snañ .	rtog . pai . p'yir . mñon . sum . ma
ba'o / kun . rdsob . tu . yod . pa .	. yin . no /

⁸⁸) Allusion to the categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. "Potness" refers to *sā-mānya*, "number" to *guṇa*, "action" of lifting (*utkṣepaṇa*) to *karman*. On this subject cfr. *Faddeson, Vaiśeṣika System* and *Ui, Vaiś. Philosophy*.

⁸⁹) That is, since, according to Dīnāga, the real perception is pure sensation, which immediately apprehends the thing in itself (*svalakṣaṇa*), the notion of a pot cannot be called *pratyakṣa*: the potness is superimposed by our mind while, in fact, the real object of sensation are the four material elements that constitute a pot.

We must therefore acknowledge that the inference for the sake of another also cannot have the validity of proof without assuming the validity of the process of this [inference for one's own sake].

Therefore a *kārikā* says:

XVII. One single object has many attributes (*dharmas*); and therefore a mark [used as a definition] (*nimitta*) can not be appropriate to all. Only when we exclude the other [cases] the expression [*abhidhāna*] follows [the object].

XVIII. Just in the same way the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) is also possessed of many attributes (*dharmas*). Only if it does not go beyond [the contents] of the notion to be characterized (*lakṣya*) it can express that but not another ^{89a}).

How, then, here [viz. concerning the inference], did we make a statement different from that previously expounded concerning the direct perception? In order to show the twofold process (**naya*).

Here, [as regards inference] the result of the inference must also be called inference, there [in the perception] the cause of the perception must also be called a perception. Either of them does not exclude [the possibility of the other].

So I have explained the proof and the fallacies of the proof. Now I shall speak of the refutation and of the fallacies of the refutation.

A *kārikā* says:

XIX. The refutation consists in showing that the formulation of a syllogism is defective (*nyūna*) etc. The fallacies of refutation are called "*jāti*s" ⁹⁰).

Here [in this *kārikā*] the sentence: "the refutation consists in showing that the formulation of a syllogism is defective etc." refers to the [logical errors such as] defective formulation etc. which have been already explained, that is to the errors of the various members of a syllogism. Each one of those expressions

^{89a}) On the *apoha* cfr. P.S.IV.

⁹⁰) The *dūṣaṇa* or refutation consists in showing that the syllogism stated by the disputant is inficiated by one of the logical errors already enunciated by Dīnāga. The fallacies of refutation *dūṣaṇa-ābhāsa* correspond to the *jāti*s of the Nyāyasūtras V, I, 1 ff.; and consist in pointing out the presence of an error where, in fact, there is no error. An improper refutation of a wrong statement is not a *jāti*, but a *nigrahasthāna*.

is called refutation, since each one of them can indicate that the previous thesis has not been exactly formulated.

The sentence: "the fallacies of refutation are called *jāti*s" means this: the *jāti*s such as "balancing the homogeneity" (*sādharmyasama*) etc. are called fallacies of refutation, since these [kinds of counter-syllogism] are generally imagined against a valid inference, in order to bewilder the mind of the opponent, but they cannot show that the previous thesis has not been exactly [formulated]. They are called *jāti*s because they refute without following the rules of logic and because, being falsely imagined as a [real] refutation, they [have the appearance of being] analogous to that. If such a kind [of argument] is imagined [in order to refute] an inference, which has been established without respecting the rules of logic, [then the cases are two]: either the opponent does not notice the mistake of the inference, or he shows the process of that mistake. Neither the one nor the other case are called *jāti*⁹¹).

XX. When, the negative instance having been indicated, one establishes a different thesis, on account of the [mere] analogy [with that same negative instance], [then we have the *jāti* called]: "balancing the homogeneity" (*sādharmyasama*); the other is based on the [mere] heterogeneity [*vaidharmyasama*]. The assumption

XXI. of a difference [as regards the proprieties of the example] is called *vikalpasama* "balancing the alternative"; [if one asserts that] identity [between the probandum and the example] is necessarily implied and [therefore] non-diversity [between the *probandum* and the example] is proved, [we have] the *jāti* called balancing the non-diversity (*aviśeṣasama*). To indicate that there is another reason [that can prove the *probandum*] [represents the *jāti*] called "balancing the perception" (*upalabdhisama*).

XXII. "Balancing the doubt" (*sāmsāyasama*) is called [that *jāti* in which one] argues that the reason is doubtful on account of the diversity of [its] meanings. "Balancing the evidence" (*arthāpattisama*) is called [that *jāti* in which one

⁹¹) In the first case there would be the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) called overlooking the censurable *paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇa*. As regards the second case there is *dūṣaṇa*.

says that the undesired [proposition is also demonstrated] on account of the meaning of the negative instance⁹²).

Here [in the first *kārikā*] in the sentence: "When, the negative instance having been indicated, one establishes a different [thesis] on account of the [mere] analogy [with the negative instance], there is the *sādharmyasama* "balancing the homogeneity"⁹³, [the expression]: "one establishes a different thesis" is meant to indicate that the [counter-]syllogism proves just the opposite [*viparītasādhana*]. This is said because it is the efficient cause⁹⁴. On account of its being analogous to the [mere] homogeneity it is called balancing the homogeneity, since all [these arguments] contain in their formulation the same kind of erroneous analogy⁹⁵. "*Sama*" is in the neuter form because it is referred to refutation (*dūṣaṇa*), which is neuter, or in order to follow the metre of the *kārikā*.

How is [such a sentence]: "the refutation consisting in the [jāti called]: 'balancing the homogeneity' (*sādharmyasamadūṣaṇa*)' [possible?]. It is so called because the agent is here expressed in the place of the effect, since he is the producer of the function [of the refutation]. Afterwards also [as regards the other *jāti*s] the same must be said, according to the cases. Now we have here a syllogism contrary to that established by the [other disputant] and based on the mere homogeneous example. Therefore it is called: "balancing the homogeneity". E.g. in the syllogism "sound is non-eternal, because the effect of some effort", ether is the heterogeneous example. Now [somebody] shows that ether is the homogeneous example, because it has the

⁹²) It is very difficult to find the exact English rendering of the various kinds of *jāti*; as a rule I have followed the terminology proposed by Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his H. I. L.

⁹³) The *sādharmyasama* and *vaidharmyasama* are so enunciated in P.S. VI, (cfr. N. S., V, 1, 2.)

dpe . dañ . mi . mt'un . p'yogs . dag . gi /
c'os . mt'un . mts'uñs . te . gžan . yañ . ni //
c'os . mt'un . pa . yis . gžan . sgrub . pa /
c'os . mi . mt'un . pas //

⁹⁴) P.S.V. a, 89. b. 6 viz. of the opposite thesis gžan . sgrub . ces . bya . ba . ni . bzlog . pa . sgrub . pa . ste . byed . pa . poi . rgyur . byas . nas . so . The whole passage concerning the *sādharmya* — and *vaidharmya-sama* is wanting in P.S.V.b.

⁹⁵) cfr. N.S.B. pag 828. which is slightly different from the interpretation given by Uddyotakara.

propriety of being immaterial [just as sound], and states therefore that sound is eternal [as ether]; then, if it be so, the homogeneous example of the reason already enunciated [“effect of some effort”] must be the pot, but [here] a negative instance such as ether has been taken as homogeneous example. Therefore this kind of argument is called “balancing the homogeneity”⁹⁶).

“The other is based upon the [mere] heterogeneity” that is [the *jāti*] balancing the heterogeneity. This is different from the [*jāti*] balancing the homogeneity previously [explained]; it indicates the negative instance; and proves just the contrary on the basis of the mere heterogeneous example e. g., when in the two examples already stated, one takes the pot as the heterogeneous example. Such an argument is called: “balancing the heterogeneity”⁹⁷).

“The assumption of a difference, is called balancing the alternative, *vikalpasama*”. Since it has been said before: “the negative instance having been shown etc.” and since now I say: “the assumption of a difference” we must understand that here there is the assumption of a difference in the homogeneous [example]. E. g. [in the example given] before, “pot” is the homogeneous example. Now since in that homogeneous [example] there are [many] peculiar aspects such as the propriety of being cooked etc., therefore the necessary consequence is that the pot must be non-eternal, but not sound. Sound [on the contrary] must be eternal, unburnable etc. on account of this difference [in the aspects of the example]. Because of this assumption a contrary probandum is stated and therefore this *jāti* is called: “balancing the alternative”⁹⁸).

“If identity is necessarily implied, non-diversity is proved”. This means that since the [example] indicating the homogeneity has been previously enunciated, the identity of this with that is necessarily proved. What is “that”? As no mention is heard here of any counter-example and on account of the proxi-

⁹⁶) Same example and same discussion in the P.S.V.

⁹⁷) N.S. V. 1. 2. P.S.V. a. pag. 90 a. 1. 1.

⁹⁸) N.S. V. 1. 4. P.S.V. a, 90 b. 1. 6. P.S.V. b, 173 b. 1. 6. It is so enunciated in P.S. VI, c’os · mt’un · la · yañ · k’yad · par · brjod / rnam · rtog · mts’uñs · yin ·

mity with that we must understand this [word] as referring to the *probandum* (*pakṣa*)⁹⁹).

[The sentence] “non-diversity is proved” means that the mistake [consisting] in the [assumption] of the non-diversity is the result. The meaning [of the sentence] can be understood through these words, and therefore I have not specified what is [“that”]. What is that which is non-different, and from what is it non-different? Since this has not been specified, we must understand: “this” all [is not different] from “that” all. E. g. when one says: “since it is evident that pot etc. have some proprieties analogous [to that of sound] then the other proprieties of the pot must also be non-different from those of sound; thus “all” the proprieties of the pot must be necessarily present in sound. Then, since they [viz. pot and sound] have a complete similarity of proprieties the necessary consequence is the identity [of both]. Or although here there is the error consisting in the [assumption of] non-diversity, it is also indicated that pot and sound are different; [thus] it [viz. the *aviśeṣasama*] is not very much different from the *vikalpasama* already explained, and therefore it must be separately enunciated. If [it is maintained that] non-eternity [of sound] can be proved by the reason that it is the effect of some effort, when one wants to show, that both [notions] are not of an absolute nature, then he proves the non-diversity of the probandum and of the reason. Or it is called “balancing the non-diversity”, also since it causes non-diversity to be proved. This means that this reason can prove the propriety to be proved, as well as the propriety opposite to it. Hence the non-diversity. Therefore [this *jāti*] is called: “balancing the non-diversity”¹⁰⁰).

⁹⁹) N.S. V. I. 23. P.S.V. a. 91 a. 1. 6. P.S.V. b. 174 a. 1. 5.

So enunciated in P.S.

. . . gcig · ñid · du /

t'al · p'yir · k'yad · par · du · ma · byas //

¹⁰⁰) This discussion implies that according to Dinnāga we have three kinds of *aviśeṣasama*. The first is like that expounded in the N.S., that is, it consists in assuming a complete similarity between the subject of the proposition and the example. If sound is non-eternal because it is the effect of some effort as the pot, then it must be burnable etc. as pot. The error of this kind of arguing is the *asiddha*. The second is based upon the assumption that there is a complete similarity between the probandum and the reason; „non eternal“ — „effect of effort“. (That is, the meaning of non-eternal is that something being previously non-

"To indicate that there is another reason" [represents the *jāti*] called: "balancing the perception, *upalabdhisama*". This means: when one indicates that the attribute of the subject which is to be proved can be perceived by other causes, then we have that *jāti* which is called "*upalabdhisama*"¹⁰¹).

E. g. concerning the syllogism before referred to, viz. "sound is non-eternal etc." somebody objects: "this reason is not valid, since as regards things such as lightning etc. non-eternity is proved as being obtained through other causes such as direct perception etc.

If then, without this [reason], it is possible to perceive that [propriety], this [reason] is not the [reason] of that [propriety]; there are in fact some other reasons different from that, which can be used in the syllogism; this means that this reason is not the valid reason of non-eternity, since it is not invariably concomitant with that; just as if one says that trees are possessed with mind-activity, since they sleep¹⁰¹).

"Balancing the doubt" is called [that *jāti* in which one] argues that the reason is doubtful on account of the diversity of [its] meanings". Since it must be referred to *jāti* [*samā*] the feminine form is [here] used. Here [this particular *jāti*], is called: "balancing the doubt," either because some diversity in the meaning

existent, comes into existence as the result of a creation; but, then, before the union with the reason, sound is not yet existent; how then is it possible to say that it is non-eternal, since it is as well non-existent as the reason? — But this is an assumption of the opponent, since the disputant does not wish to prove that sound, being before non-existent, comes afterwards into existence. Moreover it is based upon the false assumption that the reason is a *kāraṇa hetu* while it is *jñāpaka*. This same kind of *aviśeṣasama* is discussed at length in the *Tarkaśāstra*, which will shortly appear in Baroda S. S.

The third consists in assuming that two different and contradictory propositions are equally proved. Sound is similar to pot, since it is the effect of some effort, but unlike the pot it is unburnable. Therefore the same reason indifferently proves eternity as regards sound and non-eternity as regards pot. Thus the given argument would be contradictory.

¹⁰¹) P.N.S.VI. P.S. IIII. VI. bsgrub · bya · la · ni · gtan · ts'igs · gžan / bstan · pa · dmigs · pa · mts'uñs · pa · yin / Same discussion and same example in P.S.V. a, 92 a, 1. 7; P.S.V. b, 175 b, 1. 2. That is, there are two kinds of *upalabdhisama*; one consists in showing that the given reason is not conclusively present in the positive instances, since there are other reasons that can prove the probandum; the other consists in indicating that the reason is not necessarily concomitant with the subject, as in the second example given in the text (*pakṣaikaadeśāsiddha*, cfr. N. B. T. pag 31 where the same example is given).

of the proposition is assumed, and therefore the reason becomes inconclusive, or it is called "balancing the doubt", because some diversity in the meaning of the reason is assumed. E. g. when one states the syllogism referred to above: "sound is non-eternal, because the effect of some effort", the opponent objects: we see that whatever is the effect of some activity, is either produced or simply manifested; therefore this argument implies a doubt. Now so far as the probandum is concerned, this can be either produced or simply manifested. Therefore it is impossible to prove non-eternity by using this reason¹⁰²).

"'Balancing the evidence' is called [that *jāti* in which one] says that the undesired [proposition is also demonstrated] on account of the meaning of the negative instance"¹⁰³). This happens when somebody argues in the following way: "If you maintain that sound is non-eternal, because the effect of some effort, then from this argument the necessary consequence derives, that things such as lightning etc., must be eternal since they are not the effect of some effort". Such arguing is called '[the *jāti*] balancing the evidence'. Here [in the *kārikā*], because of the conciseness, I have left out the last word (*sama*) and therefore I have only said: doubt, and evidence. Now somebody might ask: "but why have these various *jātis* such as balancing the homogeneous example" etc. been enunciated in an order different from that followed by the other Masters of logic? My reply is: because they are similar to fallacies of refutation.

XXIII. Since there are many doubts [which derive from these

¹⁰²) P.S.VI don . t'a . dad . pas . gtan . ts'igs . la / t'e . ts'om . rtsod . pa . t'e . ts'om . bśad; same discussion as in P.S.V a 92. b. 1. 7 and P.S.V a 196 a, 1.3 cfr. N.S. V, I, 14. That is *saṃśayasama* is also twofold. The doubt can concern the mere probandum; e. g. the non-eternal is of two kinds; there is the non-eternal of the birth from of a previous non-existence and there is the non-eternal on account of the destruction that every object undergoes (*prāg-abhāva* *prāgutpatter abhāva*; and *pradhvaṃsa-abhāva*) cfr. N. S. II, II, 12. Then what kind of non-eternal can be proved by the reason: „effect of some effort“? In the second case the doubt concerns the reason; that is, that which is the effect of some effort can be either produced by that effort or simply manifested. In the first case we have non-eternity, but in the second eternity.

¹⁰³) N.S.V. V. I, 21, P.S. VI.

mi . mt'un . p'yogs . la . don . gyis . ni . mi . ḥdod . brjod . pa . don . rtogs ḥgyur.

cfr. P.S.V. a, 9. a, 1. 6. and P.S.V. b, 176 b. 1. 2.

arguments based upon] this homogeneity etc. [these *jāti*s] are fallacies of refutation.

The plural is used here in order to indicate that there are other refutations and also in order to indicate that there is the wrong assumption of mistakes such as the *asiddha*¹⁰⁴).

Here the first four cases are inadmissible with the formulation of the example, as it has been expounded by me; [but] they only follow the formulation of the example as made commonly in the world. Although the conclusive nature of the reason is not indicated, still, since their existence is accepted, they are expounded here¹⁰⁵).

If one proves his own proposition having recourse to a reason, [the necessary aspects of which such as] the homogeneous example etc. are not conclusive, the formulation [of a counter-syllogism] shows that the other [viz. *vipakṣa*] also has this [same] propriety, and therefore the result is the inconclusive reason called 'too general' (*sādhāraṇa*); or there is the other inconclusive called *viruddhāvyabhicārin*¹⁰⁶).

[Now some might object:] "if [its] formulation is only meant to prove one's own thesis, then how can the inconclusive be called a refutation"? But certainly [I do] not [mean] that the formulation of this [inconclusive reason] is to be considered as a refutation, I call the refutation of an inconclusive expression inconclusive; therefore there is not such a mistake [as pointed out by you], since in the 'name', (*abhidhāna*) the 'named' (*abhidheya*) is expressed.

¹⁰⁴) This means that since the *jāti* contains a wrong arguing it is possible to indicate by a counter-example either that it is not the right refutation, or that it is contaminated by the presence of logical mistakes.

¹⁰⁵) Litt.: I make this explanation; or: their explan.

¹⁰⁶) That is if one means to prove by the mere *sādharmya* or *vaidharmya* as supposed to be in the reason given by the disputant, that the argument of this is *asiddha*, then, the reply is: 'if by the mere homogeneity or by the mere heterogeneity my reason cannot prove, yours also cannot prove.'

This implies the presence of the mistake called 'too-general', since the reason resides in the positive as well as in the negative instances.

If on the other hand it is admitted that the given reason can prove the probandum of the disputant as well as the opposite thesis, then this implies the error *viruddha-vyabhicāri*. For the definition of these logical errors cfr. above. The substance of this discussion is to be found also in P.S.V. a, fol. 90.

As regards the other places also we must state the same. If the notion to be proved is erroneous, because inconclusive, or if the reason [the fundamental aspects of which, such as] homogeneity [with the positive instance] etc. must be [well] ascertained, is to be proved [in some of these aspects], then, [such a case] is called "refutation" on account of the refutation of these mistakes. Wherever there is the force of the evidence of direct perception, no inference can succeed in refuting the propriety that one wants to prove; e. g. if one establishes that sound is inaudible like a pot; since it is evident, by direct perception, that sound is audible, because of its audibility one cannot refute non-eternity. Not only because that which can refute is not seen. If it be not so, one must also refute in the same manner the eternity¹⁰⁷).

The second [example of the *jāti*] "balancing the non-diversity" is a wrong assumption (*ābhāsa*) of the logical error called *asiddhahetu*, unproved reason. It depends on the assumption (*adhyāropa*), made as regards the *probandum*, that, being originally non-existent, it is now existent, in order to prove the mistake consisting in the identity of the notion to be proved with the reason¹⁰⁸).

This well-ascertained (*prasiddha*) predicate of the reason: "originally non-existent, afterwards produced by a cause" proves [also] non-existence that follows destruction (*pradhvaṃsaabhāva*). But if one states that reason (viz. that of the *pradhvaṃsaabhāva*) the refutation is possible¹⁰⁹).

¹⁰⁷) Suppose that the syllogism: „sound is non-eternal etc.“ has been formulated. If the opponent, basing himself upon the mere analogy, wants to prove that the argument is not valid, because whatever is a product has also other proprieties, which are opposite to the alleged non-eternity, then he argues thus: "sound is non-audible, because a product, as a pot". In this way he thinks that he can show how an undesired implication follows from the argument of the disputant, aiming at proving that sound is eternal. But in this case "sound is non-audible" is contradicted by direct perception and therefore it represents the mistake called *viruddhapakṣābhāsa*. Moreover he does not express that he wants to oppose eternity to non-eternity. For the same argument cfr. P.S.V. a, 92 a, 1. 4. P.S.V. b, 175 a. 1. 4.

¹⁰⁸) Cfr. note 100.

¹⁰⁹) In the syllogism: "sound is non-eternal, because a product" the reason indicates the *prāg-abhāva* and this reason is valid and *prasiddha* in order to prove the other aspect of the non-eternal, viz. the *pradhvaṃsa-abhāva*, the destruction after having been existent. Then we can prove the *pradhvaṃsa-abhāva* by the *prāg-abhāva*, but we cannot prove the non-eternity by the *pradhvaṃsa-*

The third example of the [jāti] "balancing the non-diversity" is a refutation which proves (a statement) opposite to the probandum, and it is a fallacy of the proof, because "burnable etc." are not conclusive reasons. If they were conclusive, there would be the error called contradictory¹¹⁰).

The [first example of the jāti] "balancing the perception", since it is meant to prove the inconclusiveness of the reason, comes to be a wrong assumption of that¹¹¹).

But if the reason [of the given] *probandum* is valid also for proving the eternity, [only] then, it would be possible to have recourse to the refutation.

[As regards] the second [example of the jāti] "balancing the perception," [it states that the cause given by the disputant] is not pervading (*avyāpaka*), because it does not reside in other notions belonging to the same class; thus it consists in assuming [that the argument in question is inficiated by the] error of being unproved (*asiddhahetudoṣābhāsa*). Only if the reason be [really] non-existent in the *probandum*, then, it would be possible to call [this refutation a valid] refutation. But here it is not wanted to prove that everything is non-eternal¹¹²).

abhāva, which is not *prasiddha* (e. g. the Sāṅkhyas do not accept it). This same discussion is shortly referred to in P.S.V. a, 91 b, 1. 4 and P.S.V.b, 174 b, 1. 5, and also in the *Tarkaśāstra*.

¹¹⁰) Cfr. note 100. The argument of the opponent can be formulated in this way: "sound, which is the effect of some effort, is eternal; because it cannot be burnt, as ether". But here the reason: "because cannot be burnt" is inconclusive, since it is resident also in negative instances such as mental dharmas etc. If the counter-reason were really conclusive, then there would be the possibility of refuting the argument of the disputant as being contradictory.

¹¹¹) Litt. proves the appearance, *ābhāsa*, of that." In fact this *jāti* comes to prove that if a thing or a notion can exist or can be proved without having recourse to another thing or to another notion, these are not the cause of that, according to the well known nyāya rule that an effect is: *yaḥ, yasminn asati na bhavati, sati bhavati, tasya tat*. But, of course, if the efficient cause *kāraṇahetu* of an object must be only one, the same rule does not hold good for the *upalabdhi-hetu*, the cause or reason which proves the validity of a notion.

¹¹²) In fact the argument of the opponent comes to this: from the mere fact that this reason is non-resident in other non-eternals different from that one discussed here, it infers that the reason is not resident in sound also. But the disputant does not mean to say that whatever is non-eternal is the effect of some effort, but only that if a thing is the effect of some effort it is certainly non-eternal. The refutation would be valid only if the reason be not resident in the probandum, as in the example of the *śirīṣa*-tree given in the text.

[As regards the *jāti*] "balancing the doubt" this means that one wants to prove perishability¹¹³), by the fact that an object is the effect of some activity. If then one assumes in the probandum the propriety of being produced¹¹⁴) he commits the error called inconclusive. [And therefore this *jāti* corresponds to] the wrong assumption of the presence of the inconclusive reason [in the argument of the adversary]. If no alternative is advanced as regards the probandum, but [the opponent] only [objects], taking the reason in a particular sense and understanding it as meaning: "produced by etc." this corresponds to the wrong assumption that the argument is contaminated by the error of being unproved¹¹⁵); in fact, in this case, it is not wanted to state that only the [propriety of being] produced proves [the other propriety of being subject to] destruction. In fact, either if it is produced or if it is simply manifested [by some activity], it is equally subject to destruction, and therefore the reason is not inconclusive. [The *jāti*] "balancing the evidence" means that the objection is based upon a wrong assumption of the error called inconclusive¹¹⁶). But if one wants to prove eternity and non-eternity by the reason: "because not the effect of some effort", or if he means to prove non-eternity, only by the reason that it is the effect of some activity, then it is possible to have [a valid] refutation.

XXIV. [The *jāti*] called "balancing the co-presence" or "balancing the mutual absence" (*prāpti, aprāptisama*) [or the *jāti* called] "balancing the non-reason" (*ahetusama*) and which [respectively] consist [in affirming] that an undesired implication follows either if the reason reaches [the probandum] or if it does not reach [the probandum], [and in maintaining that the reason is impossible at] all the three times, are said to correspond to the wrong assumption of the defectiveness of the reason.

¹¹³) That is non-eternal, because subject to destruction. Cfr. N.S., II, II, 12 and N.V. ad loc.

¹¹⁴) That is of being non-eternal, because a product (which has previous non-existence, *prāg-abhāva*).

¹¹⁵) In fact the reason is: "effect of some effort", but the opponent gives to this the meaning of: "produced by an effort".

¹¹⁶) The disputant does not mean to say that the non-eternal is the effect of some effort only (*yad anityam tat prayatnenotpannam eva*), but he says that the fact of being the effect of some effort proves non-eternity (*yat prayatnenotpannam tad anityam eva*).

[*jāti*s] are said to be a wrong assumption of the defectiveness of the reason. Why? Because without logical arguments they criticise all the reasons. In fact what kind of logic is this, [viz.] to assert that a reason, although possessing the essential characteristics of a reason, cannot be called a reason by the mere fact that it seems not to be co-present [with the probandum etc.]? And also what kind of logic is it to maintain that a reason cannot prove, by the mere fact that being before the probandum, it cannot be called a reason? Moreover in such an argument there is the error of self-contradiction¹¹⁸), since the same refutation [is valid against it]. Thus also as regards the notion which is to be proved by the reason as it is formulated and the understanding there is the assumption of the error called defectiveness of the reason; while as regards [the notion] of cause there is the wrong assumption of the logical error called inconclusive, since without logical arguments the reason of all the possible dharmas is criticised¹¹⁹). Therefore reasons such as those two mentioned above, cannot be said to be valid reasons, since in neither case [we find] that relation of cause and effect which must intercede between them and the notion to be proved¹²⁰).

When one criticises according to logic, then, the refutation can really be called a refutation.

XXV. "Balancing the non-expressed" (*anukṭisama*) is called [that *jāti* which consists] in arguing that since the reason before

¹¹⁸) *svavighāta*.

¹¹⁹) In P.S.V. a, 88 b, 1. 3 we have: *de . ltar . na . re . žig . bloi . gtan . ts'igs . dag . la . sgrub . par . bya . bai . gtan . ts'igs . kyi . mts'an . ŋid . gsum . ma . ts'an . ba . ltar . snañ . ba . yin . no / don . rtogs . ma . grub . ltar . snañ . yin . gañ . gi . ts'e . don . gtan . ts'igs . yin . pa . dei . ts'e . ni . ts'igs . las . yin . pa . ma . bkag . pai . p'yir . de . don . la . ma . grub . pa . ltar . snañ . ba . ŋid /*

P.S.V. b, 172 b, 1. 1 *de . ltar . re . žig . ts'ig . gtan . ts'igs . yin . la . blo . bsgrub . par . bya . yin . na . ts'ul . gsum . pai . gtan . ts'igs . ma . ts'an . ltar . snañ . ba . ŋid . yin . no / don . rtags . yin . na . ma . grub . snañ . gañ . gi . yañ . don . gtan . ts'igs . yin . na . dei . ts'e . ts'ig . ma . bkag . pai . p'yir . dei . don . ni . ma . grub . par . snañ . ba . ŋid . yin . te /* That if this argument be true, then neither the logical reason in its threefold aspect, nor the material cause could be valid.

Cfr. N.V. 536 *iyam ca jūtiḥ sarvahetvapavādadvārikā yadi jñāpako hetur apadiśyate, tathāpi, yadi kāraṇas, tathāpīti*.

¹²⁰) P.S.V. a *ibid*. *gtan . ts'igs . gñis . kai . ltar . na . yañ . don . bsgrub . par . bya . ba . la . de . dag . rgyu . dañ . hbras . bui . dños . po . ma . yin . pai . p'yir . de . dag . ni . rigs . pa . ma . yin . no /*

[being expressed], is non-existent, the probandum also must necessarily be non-existent.

The same [must be understood] as regards [the other *jāti* called "balancing the] produced and the non-produced" (*utpatti-anutpattisama*).

XXVI. "Balancing the effect" is called [that *jāti* which consists] in showing that the probandum is not proved, on account of a small particular aspect of the effect.¹²¹⁾ All these *jāti*s are generally similar to indicating that there are fallacies of the proposition. "Balancing the non-expressed..... be non-existent", that is, as regards the thesis already stated, somebody says, if by this reason [viz. a product] we realize [the validity] of the non-eternity, then, before, when this reason has not yet been formulated, nothing exists, since the reason is not yet existent; therefore there is not non-eternity. This kind of arguing is called balancing the non-expressed¹²²⁾.

¹²¹⁾ P.S.V. I.
brjod . pa . las . snar . rtags . med
 . pas /
bsgrub . bya . med . par . t'al . ḡgyur
 . ba //
ma . brjod . mts'uñs . ḡgyur . sgro .
 btags . nas /

skye . ba . las . snar . rtags . min .
 p'yir //
ma . skyes . mts'uñs /
ḡbras . ñid . gzan . gyis . c'a . yis .
 ni //
de . ni . ḡbras . mts'uñs . ḡdi . yañ .
 ni /

This definition of the *kāryasama* is referred to by Vācaspatimiśra NVT. pag. 693.

kāryatvānyatvaleśena yat sādhyāsiddhir darsanam / tat kāryasamam.
Cfr. also *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* by Kamalaśīla pag 48.

¹²²⁾ P.S.V. a, 89 a, 1. 2; P.S.V. b, 72 b, 1. 6.

I do not think that this *jāti* corresponds to the *avarṇyasama* of NS. as suggested by Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL. pag. 289. Later on, at the end of this treatise, when Dinnāga quotes other varieties of *jāti* as contained in NS. we find the mention of the *varṇya* and *avarṇyasama*, where the proper character *hsien*, is used. But in this case we have the character 'shwo' which simply means: "to say" just as the Tib.: *brjod . pa*. The same *jāti* is discussed in the Tarkaśāstra and, as we can gather from the P.S.V., it was accepted also by Vasubandhu in his Vādaavidhi. If we compare the two texts we shall easily realize that the *varṇya* and *avarṇyasama* of the NS. are different from this *jāti*, which on the analogy with the following *anutpattisama*, we may call *anukti* or *anuktasama*. While here the *jāti* consists in assuming that before the enunciation of the reason there is no *probandum*, in NS. and NSB. (pag 837) *varṇya* is *sthāpanīya* that is *sādhyā*, while *avarṇya* is *siddha*.

“The same must be..... *anutpattisama*”. If somebody argues that, before the production [of sound], the probandum also must be non-existent, since the reason is non-existent, this [kind of arguing] is called “balancing the non-produced”. The word: “the same” (*vat*) is a word expressing similarity. When the reason is not yet existent, the probandum also must necessarily be non-existent; now ‘here’ as the probandum is non-existent, we must also recognize that there is the opposite of the probandum¹²³). E. g. somebody says as regards the thesis already stated: “Before, when this sound is not yet produced, there [is no place for such a reason as stated by you, viz.] that it is the effect of some effort, and therefore it must necessarily be not non-eternal.” And also: “since it is not the effect of some effort, it must necessarily be eternal”. This kind of arguing is called balancing the non-product¹²⁴).

“Balancing the effect aspect of the effect”, e. g. if the thesis to be proved [is the following]: “sound is non-eternal, because a product, as the pot” and the opponent objects to the non-eternity of sound saying: if the pot can be non-eternal because its nature of being a product is different [from that of sound], how cannot the same thing hold good so far as sound is concerned?” This kind of arguing is called balancing the effect¹²⁵).

“All these *jāti*s are generally similar to indicating that there is a fallacy of the proposition”, this means that *jāti*s such as balancing the non-expressed etc. are in general similar to indicating that there is a fallacy in the thing to be proved; that is similar [to the fallacy] consisting in an unproved reason (*asiddha*). The plural is used in order to show that it is similar also to other

¹²³) That is if there is not yet the non-eternal, there must be the eternal. Cfr. the theory of the *vipakṣa* referred to above.

¹²⁴) P.S.V.a and b . NS. V, I, 12 *ibid*. There are therefore two kinds of *anutpattisama* . The first can be formulated thus: “Sound ,before being born, is eternal, because not the effect of some effort, as ether“. The second: “if we know that sound is non-eternal, because the effect of some effort, then, when it is not yet derived from that effort, it must be eternal“.

¹²⁵) P.S.V. a, 89 b. P.S.V.b. 1. NS. V, I, 38. There is in fact some difference between the nature of being an effect as predicated of sound and that predicated of a pot. The sound is the effect of the vocal organs, while the pot is the effect of the rope, the stick, the clay etc.

[fallacies.] Now here (viz. in the examples given before), the *jāti* "balancing the non-expressed" is a false assumption of the inference¹²⁶); that is, if, as regards the sentence formulated by the disputant, viz. that sound has the nature of being non-eternal, the opponent objects that, before, when the reason has not yet been expounded, the probandum is non-existent, this corresponds to a wrong assumption of the logical error called inconclusive; or also it is a wrong assumption of the defectiveness of the reason, since it assumes that the reason can prove before being formulated. But if here [in this refutation] one indicates that the argument [given by the disputant] does not exist, or, when the inference is stated, if [the reason] is not formulated, then it is possible to call [such a refutation] a valid refutation. So far as the *jāti* "balancing the non-product" is concerned, it is called a fallacy of the refutation, because it assumes [wrongly the existence of the] probandum when sound is not yet produced and argues that the reason does not yet exist. But it can prove to be a real refutation, if, when the proof is established, one shows that [in fact] this is not-existent. If, on the ground of mere evidence, one objects that [sound] must be eternal, because when it is not yet produced, [there is no place for such a cause as that enunciated, viz.] that it is the effect of some effort, this argument is a false assumption of the error called inconclusive¹²⁷). The *jāti* "balancing the effect" is of three kinds¹²⁸). a) If one objects

¹²⁶) We have seen that the validity of the argument given by the disputant as a proof of his proposition depends on the fact that it is well ascertained, *prasiddha*; its formulation is only meant to remind the opponent of the indissoluble connection between the proof and the probandum. But in this case the refutation of the opponent is based on the assumption that the *probandum* depends on the mere formulation of the reason.

¹²⁷) On the two *anutpattisama* cfr. note 124. -P.S.V. a, 89 a, 1. 6.; P.S.V. b, 173. 1. 15. In the first case we have a wrong assumption of the *asiddha*; but the opinion of the disputant is not that, when sound is not yet produced, it is non-eternal. P.S.V. ad loc.; de · la · brjod · pa · las · śnar · sgrub · byed · du 'sgro · btags · pa · las · ma · grub · pa · ltar · śna · ba · 'o / In the second case the reason would be inconclusive, because *avyāpaka*.

¹²⁸) There are three kinds of *kāryasama*. Suppose that a disputant formulates this syllogism: "Sound is non-eternal; because a product, as a pot. We can have a threefold *kāryasama*:"

a) Sound is produced by the vocal organs; the pot is produced by the rope etc. (cfr. note 125); therefore the nature of being a product as resident in the pot is different from that resident in sound. How, then, is it possible to adduce

that the nature of being a product [as belonging] to the pot etc. cannot be considered as resident in sound, this [kind of arguing is in fact nothing else but a] wrong assumption of the error called *asiddha*. b) If one objects that the nature of being a product as inherent in sound, is not resident in objects like the pot etc., [this kind of arguing is nothing else but] a wrong assumption of the error called contradictory. c) If one objects that this reason is also non-resident in the eternal, because it is too-restricted, then this [kind of arguing is nothing else but] a wrong assumption of the error called inconclusive. Or [this *jāti* consists] in a wrong assumption of the error of the example as it depends on the [mere] adducing of the homogeneity¹²⁹). Why? Because the inference is established by taking into consideration the mere general aspect, and not by taking into consideration the particular ones. If one takes only a particular aspect, since difference must then certainly exist, the necessary implication would be that no inference is possible.

XXVII. The *jāti* "balancing the infinite regression" (*prasaṅgasama*) is called that one in which one searches for a reason, when the example is already accepted by either disputant; this [*jāti*] comes to raising an objection as regards the example and therefore it is said to be similar to a wrong assumption of the error of the example.

the example of the pot as *sapakṣa*, positive instance, in order to prove non-eternity of sound?

b) If one argues that the nature of being a product, as resident in sound is different from that resident in the pot, then, the *pakṣadharmā* is not resident in the positive instances.

c) This nature of being a product, as resident in sound, is neither resident in the positive instances such as the pot, nor in the negative instances, such as ether; therefore this reason is too restricted (*asādhāraṇa*).

If we remember what Dinnāga has already said about the nature of the various logical errors it will be easy to recognize that in the first case the opponent wrongly assumes the presence, in the argument of the disputant, of the error called *asiddha*, since he thinks that P as resident in M (*pakṣadharmā*) is not present in S. In the second case he points out the presence of the error called *dharmaśvarūpaviparītasādhana*. In the third he objects that the argument is inflected by the error called *asādhāraṇa*, a variety of the inconclusive.

¹²⁹) That is the opponent assumes that the example expresses a complete similarity, but, as Dinnāga says, this is wrong, since in the process of the inference, we take into consideration the general analogies, but not the particular aspects of the various notions. If this were the case, the inference would be impossible, since all notions, although analogous, have peculiarities of their own.

“The *jāti* balancing..... either disputant”¹³⁰), that is: as regards the thesis already enunciated, [sound is non-eternal], one raises the following objection: “by what reason do we prove the non-eternity of the pot etc.?” “Since this [*jāti*]..... of the example”, that is: the non-eternity of pot etc. is already accepted as proved by either disputant; if, therefore, one says that this is not proved, since it is a refutation of [a supposed] fallacy of the example, it is similar to the wrong assumption of an error in the example.

XXVIII. *Jāti* “balancing the eternal“ (*nityasama*) is that in which one says that the propriety of being non-eternal always follows the subject. This is like the assumption that there is a mistake in the enunciation of the proposition¹³¹).

That is, if the thesis already referred to: “sound is non-eternal”, has been enunciated, and somebody objects: then, this [sound must necessarily be always joined with this propriety of being non-eternal, since all the dharmas are never deprived of their own characteristic essence and therefore it must be eternal”. This kind of arguing is called the *jāti* “balancing the eternal“. But this comes to the assumption of a mistake in the proposition (*pakṣa*), because of the wrong assumption, concerning the propriety “non-eternal” which represents the *probandum*. In fact there is not a separate substance such as the propriety of being non-eternal which is possessed with this eternal function. But an object is called non-eternal because its nature, being originally non-existent, has now become existent and will gradually be no longer existent; this condition (*avasthā*) is called non-eternity with the suffix indicating existence, just as the nature of being an effect etc.¹³²)

¹³⁰) PS. VI. ḥdod . pa . la . yañ . gñis . dag . la / gtan ts'igs . len . pa . t'al . ba . mt'uñs . dpe . ltar . sñan . ba . bžin . ḥdi . yin / NS. V, I, 9.

S.P.V. a, 93 b, 1. 2; P.S.V. b, 176 b, 6?

¹³¹) P.S.VI.

mi . rtag . ḥbrel . p'yir . rtag . pa . brjod / rtag . ñid . t'al . te . ḥdi . la . yañ / p'yogs . kyi . ston . ltar . sñan . ba /

P.S.V. a, 88 b, 1. 6; P.S.V. b, 172 b, 1. 4, NS. V, I, 35.

¹³²) P.S.V. a ad loc.: de . la . mi . rtag . pa . las . gžan . gañ . rtag . pai . ḥjug . pa . yañ . pa . ma . yin . ño / dños . po . de . ñid . ma . byuñ . ba . las . byuñ . bar . ḥgyur . ba . ni . mi . rtag . pa'o . žes . brjod . par . bya 'o / gñas . skabs . de . yañ . mi . rtag . pa . ñid . do . žes . dños . poi . rkyen . gyis . brjod . par . bya . ba . ste / ḥbras . bu . ñid . do . žes . bya . ba . la sogs . pa . bžin . no /

P.S.V. b, ad loc.: gañ . mi . rtag . pa . ḥjug . par . ḥgyur . ba . de . la .

Jātis such as those [already enunciated] and which have been expounded by Akṣapāda are said to have in general the nature of fallacies of the refutation, since they are commonly accepted as such (*suprasiddha*).

The [jātis] that are expounded by other systems (*śāstras*) must also be stated in the same way, since the formulation of these [jātis] differs only a little from that of the others already referred to. An infinite variety of *jātis* can be established; therefore I do not enunciate them [all].

Therefore [the other kinds of jātis] expounded there, such as balancing an excess, (*utkarṣasama*), balancing the deficit (*apakarṣasama*), balancing the questionable (*varṇyasama*), balancing the unquestionable (*avarṇyasama*), balancing the demonstration (*upapattiśama*), balancing the counter-example (*pratiḍṣṭānta*), balancing the point at issue (*prakaraṇasama*)¹³³ must be all examined according to this point (*diṇmātra*).

And also one must refute [according to this same rule] all the formulations of a wrong inference. When [in fact] one expresses himself in that way¹³⁴, [the result is mere] confusion (*samplava*) as regards human activity (*pravṛtti*).

Moreover as regards that which has been said by the ancient masters of logic, concerning the points of defeat (*nigrahassthānas*) [these are arguments, that] fall into [the number of] [inferences] included among [the cases in which] a refutation [must be formulated], or that are rough, or illogical; since these arguments are analogous to quibble (*chala*) they are not mentioned here. As regards the other categories maintained by other masters such

mi . rtag . pa . ñid . dañ . ldan . pa . gžan . ni . yod . pa . ma . yin . no /
 dños . po . de . de . ñid . ma . byuñ . ba . las . byuñ . ba . dañ . byuñ . nas .
 med . par . ḡgyur . ba . la . mi . rtag . pa . žes . brjod . pa . yin . te / ḡbras
 bu . ñid . la . sogs . pa . bžin . du . gnas . skabs . de . med . par . rtogs .
 pa . ni . mi . rtag . pa . ñid . yin . no . (which is defective); this passage
 has been preserved in its sanscrit original by Uddyokatara N.V. 283: Ye *punar*
varṇayanti: sa eva bhāvo abhūtvā bhavan bhūtvā cābhavann anitya ity ucyate,
sā cāvasthā bhāvapratiyayenānityatety abhidhīyate.

¹³³) I think that there is no doubt as regards the restoration into sanscrit of *utkarṣasama*, *apakarṣasama*, *varṇya*, *avarṇyasama*, *pratiḍṣṭānta*: *Upapattisama* and *prakaraṇasama* are not so certain, but the Chinese rendering seems to refer to the characteristics of these two *jātis* as defined in the Nyāyasūtras.

¹³⁴) Litt. "one makes such speech."

as tenet (*siddhānta*) etc.,¹³⁵) the same rules must be stated [as those expounded here]. Thus those particular [notions] which are apprehended by mere imagination (*parikalpagrāhya*) etc. must not be considered as belonging to correct logic. Every notion in fact which is devoid of those characteristics [mentioned above] is said to be a non-knowledge (*ajñāna*) since it is deprived of correct logic.

Moreover this erroneous formulation of the *jāti*s has been already settled in the main by myself in my commentary¹³⁶) upon the *Vādavidhi* etc. And this point also I have investigated together [with other topics] in my book meant to refute the theories of ancient logic.

Therefore [without insisting any longer on this subject] I must say this concluding *kārikā*.

XXIX. In order to let the mind of the intelligent man get rid of the poisonous herbs [of a wrong logic], and to open that door of logic of an agreeable meaning, which has been obstructed by the *pramāṇas* of the heretics, I make them overstep wrong path and be in accordance with the real meaning (of logic).

¹³⁵) The *siddhānta* is one of the categories of the N.S., but it can be found also in *Caraka Saṃhitā* and in *Upāyahrdaya* attributed to Nāgārjuna.

¹³⁶) Translation doubtful.

THE MAN AND THE WORD

by Mrs. Rhys Davids, D. Litt., M.A.

Value in the word will be due to access of value in the thing named in the word. Greater value in the thing will be due to some greater benefit which men see in the thing. And that greater benefit will find utterance in the new *way* the thing is worded. This may be by just change of emphasis: — emphasis by repetition, by position, by association. Or the way may be in a new meaning attached to a term. Or the way may be a difference in wording. And with these new values there will also take place corresponding devaluations.

A fertile source of such changing values is the transference of a religious world mandate to a new soil. It is therein (albeit not therein only) that we may look to see new developments. And as such they are full of interest. For the new is never to be despised as new. Always it is significant of movement in some way. Nothing is so fatal to man as not-movement; nothing is so unnatural. But the new is not ever the better, though the better will ever be the new. When the new is also the better, it is when the man (discounting body and mind), when the very man — may we say the 'man-in-man' — is, in the new, lifted on to a nobler plane, lifted to a 'more-worth'. It is when the 'man' is valued as being, or as capable to be, of a higher worth than that at which he was valued before. Thus a 'new', which, because of certain conditions evoking it, declares that the very man is but a name for that which 'is not got at'¹⁾, and then: 'does not exist'²⁾ is not at once a new and a better; it is a devaluing, an unworthing of the man. The new in Sakyan (*i. e.* early Buddhist) thought *did* put forward this more and more unworthing of the man. The conditions determining it I have inquired into elsewhere.

But, and on the other hand, other new valuations gave the lie to this unworthing. I would suggest that we may find instances

¹⁾ 'Puggalo n'upalabbhati. *Majjhima-Nikāya*, 1, 138; *Kathāvatthu*, 1.

²⁾ *Milindapañho* and Buddhaghosa, *passim*.

of this in term and meaning, such as the transference of the Buddhist worldmandate helped to make emerge.

In the term *gotrabhu*: 'become-of-the-family', we have a word emphasizing a man's quitting the *maṇḍala* or 'world' of the many-folk, or 'average sensual man' (to quote a noted French writer's famous phrase), for the *maṇḍala* of them who minded the things that really mattered, things not of this world only: *lokuttara*. He has just quitted, no more; he is ranked at the bottom of the ladder of aspiring effort. Now the word emerges at a late stage in Pali literature. This may be seen at a glance in the useful article s. v. in the Davids-Stede Pali Dictionary; better seen if the references be consulted. The *Milindapañho* of North India shows no interest in the term. But in writers who came under Singhalese influence we witness a certain promotion undergone by the concept. The *gotrabhu* namely is the *jhāyin* in the topmost stage of Jhāna but one, that of *appanā* or ecstasy. The writers are Buddhagatta, Buddhaghosa and Anuruddha¹, to mention no others. I am not here going into this change of emphasis in Jhāna; I only suggest, that when Buddhism ceased to be provincial only, when the one 'mondial' link between followers was no longer "of Jambudīpa", but was the one faith, dhamma, or sāsana, the need for such a word as "one of the family", (tribe, or clan or gens, if you will) would emerge. A corresponding development was worded in the mandate of Jesus, both in his own mission-experience, and again later in Paul's epistles. It would be strange did we not find it also in Buddhism.

But let not this be overlooked: the "greater benefit", felt after in such a community-term as *gotrabhu*, is a valuation of the "believer" as a man among fellowmen, not isolated or self-seeking in his wayfaring, but as one of a family, and his welfare in consequence as bound up with theirs. It is thus a worthier valuation of the man in the Sāsana than those which had preceded it, even in the case of the saint. I say: "felt after"; that it was more than this, that it was clearly and fitly conceived, I doubt. It needed a later time, a fuller call to bring out such a phrase as *pāsa patria en ouranois kai epi gês*²; and we have not even yet risen to such a valuation.

¹) Abhidhammatthā-sangaho.

²) Paul to Ephesians, iii,15.

There is another term emergent yet later with new meaning, new emphasis. I am thinking of *śakti*, Pali: *satti*. An ancient word, it is in early Pali rare and insignificant: *yathā-sattiṃ yathā-balam*¹): "according to ability and strength". I have not met with the word in the *Milindapañho*, but again, it is in the Commentators that we meet with the term invested with new emphasis. Whether we should ascribe this to the Coñjevaram world, or to that of Ceylon I cannot say. But Dhammapāla, on the Udāna, equates *tejo* with *satti*, and Buddhaghosa, on the Seven Treasures (*Digha* Atth. 252) distinguishes a *satti* of energy (*usāha*), a *satti* of the mantra, a *satti* of ownership (*pabhu*), and a *satti* of fruition. The rising vogue of Saktism in India may be responsible for this strengthened usage, reaching at that time no further. Later yet we meet with the term in Burmese Buddhism in such compounds as *janakasatti*, *paccayasatti*, the latter in the writings of Ariyavaṃsa: a forced value by which the cause (*paccaya*) is, in transferring itself to the effect, given a fictitious will-value, a value belonging rightly only to the man. *Satti* in fact is not an unworthy equivalent for that fundamental factor in the man, the will, so poorly worded in India, because so squeezed aside by over-attention to the man-as-contemplator; the man-as-recipient. And had Buddhism grasped the kernel of its Founder's mandate, and seen in the Way (*magga*) a figure of man as willer, as chooser, this emergence of *satti* might have been earlier, and have been more worthily exploited. As it was, the Founder had only such words as *virīya*, *vāyāma*, modes of the man in willing. As it is, *satti*, as used by the Commentators, that is, applied to the man, is a new and ampler valuing of the man, and an attempt to word the same.

Let us next consider not only a word, but what may be called a discipline of high importance in Sakya from the first, and which when transplanted underwent a very interesting renaissance. I refer to Jhāna: brooding or musing with a set purpose. The purpose which Jhāna was found to serve among the co-founders of Sakya, notably by the Founder himself, I have discussed elsewhere²). This is, that the purpose was not that of Yoga-dhyāna, nor the merely negative discipline, the merely

¹) *Dīgha-Nikāya* 1, 102.

²) *Indian Historical Quarterly*. 1927.

preparatory exercise which is all that survives in the Pali formulas; it was access, under conditions deemed especially favourable, to converse with men of another and worthier world. This view is carefully based on Piṭaka evidence, and as such merits critical attention.

But here I would bring out what I also noticed on that occasion: the transformation undergone in the concept of Jhāna when it took root in more Eastern soil, the soil namely of Japan. In Zen culture, I read, and, have said, that Jhāna regains that central wellspring of "the man", his nature, his objective, which was in Yoga-dhyāna, but which became blurred and lost in Buddhism. Not that Zen is a replica of Yoga. It is more positive, more self-concentrated, less religious, less superpersonal than Yoga. It is still Buddhist, in that it seeks the divine *in* man, rather than to develop man into, or raise man to the divine. It bids the man look within, not beyond himself.

So much by way of general comment. But in detail also we may note an interesting advance on Jhāna-stages as defined in Abhidhamma. In these definitions, the first factor which, in the formulas, is to be eliminated (*pahātabbo*) is attention-in-thought (*vitakko*). This older term, which in the Suttas stands for just "thought" (Gedanke), is, in Abhidhamma, more specifically defined as "the adjusting, fixing, focussing, superposing of the mind". Mental discursiveness in the attending subject (*vicāro*) has to go also. After that there would appear to be left only emotional or hedonic factors, which also have to be eliminated, leaving only hedonic neutrality and purged introspective awareness (*sati*). But in the account given by Dr. Suzuki¹) of *zazen* (*dhyāna*) practice, *vitakko*, in the sense just cited, is declared in that "to aim at keeping the mind well poised and directing attention on any point one wills". It would be difficult better to word the exact opposite of the aim of First Jhāna in the Pali Abhidhamma. In the original Sakyan purpose of Jhāna, for which a development of what I must call psychic sense was the desideratum, it was necessary to cut off the usual this-world channels of attention; bare *sati* was the best vantage-point: the attitude of the boy Samuel "Speak, lord (or let us say: *mārīsa*!) for thy servant heareth!" But in the diverted distorted Jhāna of the

¹) The Zen Sect of Buddhism; JPTS, 1906—7, pp 9ff.

Piṭaka formulas, the blotting out of the attentive will, the contemplative discursiveness prescribed compare unfavourably with the details of Zen Dhyāna in the article I quote.

It may not, in my judgment, be claimed for Zen dhyāna that, in aim, it is absolutely worthier than the musing or Jhāna of the first Sakyans. In this we see the man seeking wisdom, knowledge, information from the man living (as *deva*) under other conditions. In this aim Zen dhyāna shows that lack of interest which is evident in the Jhāna formulas of the Buddhist Sangha. But as compared with the last named, Zen dhyāna, as representing this in a new soil, a different environment, is a renaissance, and is in its specific aim, worthy to stand beside the best of Indian Yoga and Sāṅkhyā. In this aim the "man" is not waved aside as in the Pali Jhāna. In the latter the Commentator has to admit, as it were apologetically, that where there is a process (*paṭipadā*), there must be a proceeder (*paṭipannako*)! In Zen dhyāna the object, I gather, is to make wisdom (*prajñā*) grow out of one's selfessence by quiet concentration on the worthiest concepts of the man as the "more in the self". In other words it is not just negative elimination and preparation (e. g. to the six so-called ultra-knowings, or *abhiññās*); it was complete in itself. I do not wish to press too much the *rapprochement* to Sāṅkhyā-Yoga. The Zen form is, as compared with that, relatively impersonal. In Yoga the man is in full view from first to last. It is the man, and not his mind only that is before us, seeking vision of, and oneness with the Ātman in himself, who he himself also is: Man transcendent, akin to the man-under-earth-conditions, but above and beyond the best, the finest he has yet realized. To realize, not as yet That, but the dawning of its truth brings him release (*mokṣa*) from subjection to body and mind as being in any essential way himself. "This here is my true Kinsman; I can no other than be with him; won to evenness and unity with him, then only become I really he-who-I-am" (Mbhār.).

The man as more-man: we come here finally on the most interesting form of growth undergone by Buddhism in new soil.

In the Sangha's or monk's theory of the Arahan, we see an attempt to transform the saintly aspirant into such a superman, that he was not only more than other good men, but actually a "most-man", a consummation of humanity, one in whom there was nothing left to do. This was an inevitable result

of monastic Buddhism extending its world-lorn theory of Ill (*dukkha*) to life in other worlds, ceasing to regard these with any earnestness as so many opportunities for further "Werden" (*bhava*), and losing all vital interest in intercourse with other worlds, an intercourse to profit by which so many are said to have sought interviews with the Founder¹). It was a worthy thing to have a present ideal of the man; and conceived *as he was*, always as a very real individual, and not merely as a bundle of *skandhas*, it may have checked the harm those results might have worked. I think, however, that it was a theory tending to stunt the idealizing imagination of a humanity developing, under other conditions, to a more-human excellence, and ultimately to a more-than-human realization.

And there was this present defect in the present ideal: the Arahan concept, unlike the Buddha-concept, was chiefly concern with his own salvation. The three Arahan-formulas²), not to mention many other passages in the Piṭakas leave this in no doubt. There is but one passage known to me in which the worthy disciple professes, on holy days, to copy the arahans, in compassion for the welfare of all breathing things. This is in probably a quasi-original Sutta, the talk to Visākhā³), and I know of no repetition of it.

I am not wishing to do monastic Buddhism the injustice of calling the preoccupation with one's own salvation a Buddhistic divergence from a worthier, a more ethical ideal of the saint. It were truer, I believe, to call it an Indian — I will not say perversion, but — peculiarity in ideal. The Indian, speaking in a vague generalization, did and does favour such preoccupation, as desirable not only, in the man, or woman so preoccupied, for him or her, but also by a reflex effect, for the less "holy" ones who are either their kindred, or votaries in this way or that. To give but one instance: a very well known traveller and publicist has told me of how, in Mid-India, he, as one of a queue, saluted a seated sanniyasi, and expressed appreciation of the holy man's absorption in high matters — this (said in the vernacular) met with an accepting grunt — and also with the furthering the welfare of others. Whereupon the sanniyasin broke into a laugh and said: "What

¹) *Dīgha-Nikāya*, 11, 200 & c.

²) Ch. *Pali-English Dicty.* P.T.S. s. v. Arahant.

³) *Anguttara-Nikāya*, 1,211 (Nip. III. 10).

have I to do with the welfare of others? It takes me all my time to mind my own welfare!" When we realize such an ideal as sanctioned in India, we cease to wonder she has produced only one missionary religion within our ken. We appreciate the more the distinction due to Buddhism in breaking away from this and its own arahan ideal, in its missionary departures, to what extent these *were genuinely so*, and not merely so called.

But in its transference to new conditions, where such an ideal of self-holiness had no stranglehold, we witness the arahan theory transformed into the *bodhisattva* ideal. Here is the arahan "more-man" become the "more than man" in the *bodhisattva*; and in him the leading preoccupation is just this: the welfare of others. Still a person, still "the man", he reveals the true more-than-man in the man. He is the man-idea at its highest power. Here too we see the ancient Sakya ideal more truly "coming out" in this daughter in the far east than in the arahan theory. For the tradition of the Bodhisat, however the Founder actually did or did not word it, took shape in this form: "What if I were now to make resolve: — Having attained supreme enlightenment, launching the dhamma-ship and having brought the multitude across the ocean of wayfaring, I should after that pass utterly on?"¹⁾)

It is a vindication, a victory — this bodhisattva development — of surpassing interest. In it there is the resurrection of him who, in the long lasting process of Piṭaka-accretion and Piṭaka-redacting down to the further step in the Milindapañho and the final ban in the Commentaries, "was rejected of men": the man-in-man, the *sattva* or *satta*, the *puggala*, the *attan*. There was, it is true, lip-acquiescence in *nirātman*; this was tradition; this was the old framework. But in *bodhisattva* the *satta*, the man, came again into his own, and that in a way worthy of Gotama Sakyamuni, the much maligned. Here, more worthily than in the word "worthyman" (*arahan*) has the "man", experiencer (*vedaka*) and agent (*kāraka*), willer, chooser, valuer, found the word, found it because he set value on what he sought to word.

¹⁾ *Nīdānakathā* (Fausböll ed). p. 14.

Books reviewed.

Cūlavamsa, being the more recent part of the Mahāvamsa. Part I. Translated by W. Geiger, and from German into English by Mrs. C. M. Rickmers. Under the patronage of the Government of Ceylon. Pali Text Society (H. Milford, Oxford University Press), 1929.

This is a splendid work of our protagonist in Pali Studies, in which he sums up for the first time the historical and archaeological informations he has drawn from his last stay at Ceylon for which an opportunity was given him by the Government of the Island. He says himself that without the journey which took him into all parts of the Island, he would have been without that vivid idea of the country and the people which is necessary for the understanding of their history. The translation itself is done with all that care and stupendous amount of sound scholarship by which the scientific work of Prof. Geiger is distinguished. Of a special interest are the Genealogical Tables, drawn chiefly from the text itself, and which will probably enable the future historian of early Ceylon to draw a chronologically exact and — in every case — sufficient sketch of its ruling dynasties from Sirimeghavanna to Vijayabāhu. M. W.

The Path of Purity, being a translation of Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga. By Pe Maung Tin. Part II. Of Concentration. London. Pali Text Society 1929.

The present part of this most renowned handbook of early Buddhist ethics and psychology begins with the third Chapter (p. 84 of the P. T. S. edition) and ends with the thirteenth (p. 435 of the same). So it contains about a third of the whole work and only one more volume will have to follow in order to complete it. The translation itself is distinguished by the merits known already from the rather slender vol. I: an exhaustive knowledge of all the subtleties in reasoning and dialectical acuteness generally familiar to Burmese Buddhist scholars, trained from boyhood in the intricacies of the equipment which is thought necessary for mastering the complicity of tradition. May we hope that this translation which is really indispensable — be it only for the numerous references to other Pali texts — for every one engaged in this field of research, will be completed in as short a time as elapsed since the appearing of its first part. M. W.

Gotama the Man, by Mrs. Rhys Davids, D. Litt., M. A., London, Luzac & Co. 1928.

A little book about which a big one ought to be written! It is, so to say, a revelation of Buddha given by himself, viewed by the spiritual eyes of one who, endowed with rare clair-voyance, has spent her life with searching out the psychic depths of that now enigmatical leader of mankind. Was Buddha really a denier of soul, *attā*, (which is the general opinion of all of us), or was he not rather the promulgator of even this notion, raised to a pitch not to be reached by the merely scrutinising mind? The book leaves a riddle which, I readily confess, it is not possible for me to solve. M. W.

AKṢARA-ÇATAKAM

The
Hundred Letters

A MADHYAMAKA TEXT BY ĀRYADEVA

AFTER CHINESE AND TIBETAN MATERIALS

translated by

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INTRODUCTION.

The present study consists of a translation of the Chinese version of the Aksara-çatakam (Nanjio No. 1254), translated into Chinese by Bodhiruci (betw. 508 - 535 A.D.). The results of a comparison with its Tibetan version (Tanjur Mdo Tsa) have been put down in supplementary notes which eventually lead to the conclusion that the original Sanskrit text adopted for the Tib. version was in some respects a slightly enlarged and an improved text in comparison with the original used for the Chin. translation. It is, however, a little puzzling to note that the Chin. version attributes the authorship of the work to Aryadeva whereas the later Tib. version attributes it to Nāgārjuna. To add to it, the first salutation-verse in the Chin. version, which is absent in Tib., clearly indicates that the author of the commentary—the main text appears in Chin. at the end of the commentary instead of at the beginning of it as in Tib. — is one of Aryadeva's pupils „seeking refuge“ in his „Master who is named ,Deva‘“. (See : *Ui — Vaiçesika Philosophy* , p. 54 n.3) .

It is, in this connection, worthwhile observing that the subjects of the chapters II — IX in the „Hundred Verses“ (Çataka) of Aryadeva (*Le Cento Strofe* —translated by G. Tucci, Rome—1925) are treated exactly in the same order in the present text in the arguments IX — XVII, which fact seems strongly to lead to the presumption that the latter text is to be considered as a product of the systematising epoch of the Mādhyamika philosophy, ushered in by Aryadeva. The Tib. version, which omits the two paragraphs occurring at the outset of the Chin. version and begins, instead, directly with the assertion of the non-Buddhist (Sāṅkhya), marks a more developed sense for logical consequence; for a Mādhyamika ought not to assert anything : his business is

only to detect and exhibit the logical antinomies and relativity involved in every possible assertion made by others. The very last argument of the Tib. version (See : App. Note 58) which in its turn, is absent in the Chin. version, seems to be again a later improvement made in order to reconcile the attitude of silence to which a Mādhyamika is pledged, with the possible existence of a discussion between two parties. Further, a direct enumeration of the six categories of the Vaiśeṣikas (See: App. Note 34) in the Tib. version is probably a later innovation, inasmuch as Harivarman was, according to Ui's researches (ibid. p. 56), the first to make a direct mention of these categories, although both Nāgārjuna and Aryadeva seem to have known about them. Facts such as these, do not appear to be in strict consonance with the attribution of the text, represented by the Tib. version — which is moreover, a „revised“ version (See App. Note 60) — to Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika philosophy. There is, on the other hand, hardly any reason to discredit the older Chinese tradition, which clearly indicates that the main part of the work i. e. the commentary, is the composition of one of Aryadeva's pupils, which in fine facilitates an explanation of the fact that the present work contains traces of thought which already foreshadow the philosophic attitude of the Yogācāras (See App. Note 50), who, assuming the non-essentiality of all dharmas as the ultimate philosophic background¹, develop a theory of knowledge by analysing into various grades consciousness, through which all reality is explained. As regards the short basic text — the Aksaraṇātaka proper —, it is by no means improbable that Aryadeva was the author of it : the title in itself is so typical of an Aryadevic production that one might easily be tempted to suggest a chronological sequence among the works *Catuhṣataka*², *Ṣataka* and *Aksaraṇātaka*, where beginning

¹) Cf. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Vimṣatikā* 10, *Trimṣikā* 18, 25 etc. (Paris 1925); *Tattvasaṃgraha* 3442 ... 3, 3488 etc. (Baroda 1926).

² See Haraprasāda Ṣāstrī in *Memoirs of the As. Soc. of Bengal* III, Calcutta 1914; Vaidya : *Études sur Aryadeva et son Catuhṣataka*, Chap. VIII - XVI, Paris 1923 (In his Introduction to this work on p. 66, Vaidya remarks that the authorship of the present work is falsely attributed to Aryadeva by the Chin. translators, - probably because he believes the Tib. translators to be in general more trustworthy than the Chin. ones (p. 64). The remark scarcely deserves serious consideration.), G. Tucci: *La versione cinese del Catuhṣataka* (*Studi Mahayanici* 1, Rome 1925).

from the *Catuḥçataka* the logical arguments become more and more systematic and pointed till in the present text they develop into a short and neat refutation solely directed against the *San-
khyas* and the *Vaiṣeṣikas*, who probably formed in *Aryadeva's* time³ the most powerful opponents of Buddhism in the field of scientific thought.

The *Hastabālaprakaraṇa* (J. R. A. S. 1918 p. 267 ff.) might then be, if possible, regarded as another epitomisation of his teachings. The *Cittaviṣuddhiprakaraṇa* (J. R. A. S. 1898 p. 175 ff.) offers curious instances of a degenerated mode of interpreting transcendental states of consciousness. The correctness of its attribution to the present *Aryadeva* has already been doubted⁴: the present text bears testimony to the soundness of this attitude (cf. App Note 59).⁵

In translating the text, literalness has not been, it is hoped, anywhere preserved at the cost of lucidity.

In conclusion, I may be allowed to record my deep sense of gratitude to Prof. Max Walleser and Prof. G. Tucci for various kinds of assistance and encouragement they gave me in my attempt to present the study in its present form. I am under similar obligations to the authorities of the *Viṇvabharatī* (*Santi-niketan*) in India.

Heidelberg, Nov. 1928.

Vasudev V. Gokhale.

³ Cf. Walleser: *The Life of Nāgārjuna* from Tibetan and Chinese sources (Asia Major, Hirth Anniversary Volume 1924), p. 423 ff., Foreword to *„Tattvasamgraha“* (Baroda 1926). For the different names of *Aryadeva* see Grünwedel, *Mythologie des Buddhismus in Tibet und der Mongolei* (Leipzig 1908) p. 34 ff.

⁴ L. de la Vallée Poussin, *„Le Muséon“*, 1900, p. 240 ff.; Vaidya, *ibid.* p. 64. Besides cf. *Cittaviṣ.* 27, with the argument of the „heretic“ in *Çataçāstra* p. 31 (at the bottom).

⁵ For *Aryadeva's* treatises on the heretical schools mentioned in the *Lankāvatāra*, existing in Chinese, see Tucci's article in *T'oung Pao* XXV. Cf. Stcherbatsky, *Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (Leningrad 1927), p. 31 n. 2.

AKSARAÇATAKAM

(Treatise in Hundred Letters)¹

— compiled by Deva Bodhisattva², — translated by Bodhiruci —

I now, seeking refuge in the intelligent and perceiving Master, who is called Deva possessing great wisdom, am able, by means of the Hundred Letters, to expound the true doctrine (dharma), removing all false views and prone towards the nature of Truth.

(If) it is said : „Why is (this) Çastra composed ? “, (the answer is, that it is composed) in order to annihilate the view about the soul (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*) etc.³ Each of all the dharmas (i. e. bearers or vehicles)⁴ is characterised by itself (*svalaksana*).

⁵The *Saṅkhya*⁶ says : All dharmas are characterised as (belonging to a) unity. This I affirm (*pratijñā*) and explain. On what ground ? — That all dharmas have the characteristic of (belonging to a) unity is established on the ground that, being entirely the same, they are altogether one; as for example, a jar, a garment and so on, where the essence of the object in each is one. On account of this reason, it is always recognised, that all dharmas are to be called as having the characteristic of a unity. Thus, the sense (*artha*) of unity is proved.

(I) Insider says : There is no unity. And why ? — (Because, when) you affirm and say that the sense of the characteristic of unity is proved, it is (on account of either there being) one or (there being) two. If „(there being) one“, merely an affirmation is there; (if on the other hand) it be not necessarily one, (then) on that account, the sense of what you establish as unity is (itself) annihilated.⁷

The *Vaiśeṣika* says⁸ : You say unity is annihilated. I now establish diversity,⁸ because (thus) the error in (the theory of) unity is renounced.

(II) Insider says : If you establish diversity, I in return establish unity. And why ?—(Because) if you without a ground establish diversity, I too without a ground establish unity.

The Vaiçesika⁸ says : I will establish diversity and the wherefore of it is that all dharmas are distinct, as each is differently characterised; as for instance, an elephant, a camel,⁹ a deer,⁹ a horse. As the characteristic of each of these and other species is different, therefore the characteristics of all dharmas are different. All dharmas (thus) are different. Therefore the sense of diversity is proved.

Insider says : (If) you (say ¹⁰) that because the characteristics of „this“ and „that“ are not similar the sense of diversity is proved, (then) inasmuch as the characteristics are particular, each dharma is (by itself) one. (Thus) the statement with which you establish diversity is impaired. Because the statement is impaired, it is to be understood that the characteristic of diversity is not thus established.¹¹

Outsider says : As (both) the characteristics—unity and diversity—are not proved, now establish (first) the characteristic of existence. Inasmuch as each dharma is characterised by existence, it will be understood that the sense of the characteristic of existence is proved. As the characteristic of existence is proved, it will be known that unity and diversity also are proved.

(III) Insider says : You now establish existence, (but) there ought to be a cause (for it). If there is no cause, (and yet) you establish existence, I too,¹² there being no cause, establish non-existence.¹³

Outsider says : My assertion establishes the existence of all dharmas. And how ? Because they are directly perceived as each having the characteristic of existence. As for (a negative — vai-dharmya—) instance, a sky-flower. As it is not characterised by the quality of an essence, it cannot be obtained; while a jar, cloth and other objects are perceived to have function. Therefore it should be known that all dharmas are characterised by existence. It is owing to this cause that the sense of existence is accepted as proved.¹⁴

Insider says : (When) you establish existence, the cause of (that) existence is the characteristic of existence, or the cause of (that) existence is the characteristic of non-existence. Both these (positions) are faulty. ¹⁵If it is on account of the characteristic of be-

ing directly perceived, that the sense of existence is proved, then the characteristic of perception (itself) is existent and the existence too is existent. This argument (yukti) of two existences is mutually unproved. If (on the other hand) it is explained (through) non-existence as the cause, then the assertion is impaired. (Thus,) inasmuch as neither existence nor non-existence is the cause, the sense of existence is refuted.

Outsider says : If you refute my „existence“ (it means that) you then establish non-existence. The sense of non-existence being obtained as established, existence becomes re-established. For example,¹⁶ when a man of the world eats and drinks, the previous coarseness (of the food) is the reason of its being (at a particular time mentioned as) delicious. Therefore, (when) you refute „existence“, you ought to be knowing that there is non-existence.

(III a) Insider says: You establish non-existence. (But,) through which cause is it proved? If you prove non-existence in the absence of cause, I too in the absence of cause prove existence.

Outsider says : How to know it ? (Well, it is known) on account of the characteristic of its essence of non-being. For example, the blazing at the time of heat (i. e. mirage—*marīcika*—). (Where) the characteristic of essence itself fails, how much less is there the possibility of (even) a little quantity of water being obtainable?¹⁷ On account of this reason, all dharmas can be obtained as being characterised by the non-existence of any (the smallest) entity. Thus, I establish the sense of non-existence as proved.

Insider says : (When) you cause non-existence to be established, (it is done either) through existence as the cause or non-existence¹⁸ as the cause. If it is said that non-existence is the cause, merely an assertion is there.¹⁹ If it be said that existence is the cause, then the assertion is undermined. (Thus,) if (according to) you there is non-existence, non-existence too is not proved.

Outsider says : All dharmas have a cause. (When) you refute (thus both) existence and non-existence, the sense is then not right. Wherefore ? — Because (things) like mud, thread, fine reed etc. exist. (Thus, it is) known that the dharmas all of them have a cause.²⁰

(IV) Insider says : Cause does not exist. You say that

because the cause exists, they exist. (But,) what is cause is then non-existent. If in the mud there are previously the jar (etc.), the mud, grass, thread etc. are all not the causes. And why?—Because in the (so-called) causes they exist previously. If they do not exist previously in the causes, there is still no cause. As for instance, in the sand there being no oil, sand is not the cause of oil.²¹ If it is said that they also exist and also do not exist, the sense is still not proved. Wherefore?—Because of a double error.²² And again, neither the existent is born nor the non-existent is born. If without cause there is birth, what at all is the function of a cause? (On the other hand,) if there is a cause for birth, then the assertion is undermined. You said before, that the dharmas are all born of a cause: there the thing is not right.

Outsider says: Because the existence of a jar, cloth and so on, having function, is evident, therefore it is known, that all dharmas are born of a cause. (This) is proved because of non-relativity (*anapeksaṃ*) (between cause and effect).²³

(V) Insider says: You say, there is effect, therefore there is cause. The sense of it (however) is not proved. And why?—Because there is relativity (or „mutual form“). If you say, there is cause because the effect is seen to have function, the effect is (then, itself) the cause. If the effect is the cause,²⁴ then there is no effect. And because there is no effect, therefore there is no cause. Thus, cause and effect are both annihilated. If it is said that it is born from causes²⁵ like mind (*buddhi*), God (*īṣvara*) time, space and so on, then these (too) are relative causes. And then, these are dharmas, subjected to existence (*samskṛta*) and, being *samskṛta*, non-eternal. (Thus,) if God, time, space exist through relativity, then no cause is proved.

Outsider says: What I say is the real truth, construed and thus explained by all former sages. This doctrine is certain and absolutely invariable.²⁶

(VI) You say that the doctrine is such. This is no right explanation. What I teach is different from your doctrine. What in your doctrine is, (that) then in my doctrine is not; and what in my doctrine is, in your doctrine is not. And why?—Because, you say „my doctrine is such“. If your doctrine is such, then it remains only by itself. (When it is) explained as „being by itself“, there is no logic. If there is no logic, then there is nothing to be known. If there is anything to be known, then explain the

distinctive cause. If, there being no distinctive cause, it is said that the doctrine is such, then, it is without method.

Outsider says : It is our family-doctrine (kuladharmā).

(VII) You say „our family-doctrine”. (But then,) the doctrine is not proved. Your doctrine is not by itself proved (svataḥ siddha). Now, how is it possible to prove a doctrine? There is absolutely nothing that can be proved, when a cause is wanting. If the doctrine is to subsist by itself, then there is no proper logic.²⁸

Outsider says : The non-existing dharmas are not born from a cause : as the horn of a hare, the hair of a tortoise, the son of a barren woman, a sky-flower and other non-existing dharmas like these can be absolutely not obtained as being born through a cause. As it is seen that for pressing out oil sesamum is sought for, it is not that one dharma, as the cause, can give birth to many dharmas. Thus, each thing has its cause. — As mud can make a pot, and is not the cause of a cloth; and thread can make a cloth, and is not the cause of a pot. Sought in this manner, the remaining dharmas too are such.²⁹

(VIII) Insider says : You say, cause can give birth. (But) cause cannot give birth. This causality has either to be proved or has to be refuted. If cause is proved, it is proved for you as well as for me; if cause is refuted, it is refuted for me as well as for you. And which is the example for it? It is like fire which can burn things. It burns you as well as it burns me. If in this place it is hot, in that place also it is equally so. And again, to make the meaning clear : „If you say there is cause, and prove it, it is proved for you, as well as it is proved for me”, — even if cause has something to give birth to, the causality is not proved for both; (e. g.) you establish that the sound-dharma is eternal and, making a statement, explain it. Through which cause? — That it has no body (amūrtatva) is the cause. And using which instance? — The sky is the instance. The sky having no body, is eternal. Thus the so-called sound is made eternal. Now, there is a different teaching calling sound eternal. Why? — Because sound is an artificial thing (kṛtakadharmā): therefore not eternal. According to which example? — The example of a pot. A pot is constructed out of causes like mud, wheel, rope, human endeavour, water etc. Inasmuch as an instrumental cause (kāraṇahetu) gives birth, the pot is not eternal. Similarly, sound, inasmuch as it is born of a number of causes — lips, teeth, throat, tongue,³⁰ — is also not eternal.

(Thus,) it is not that both the causes can have anything to prove. You say, it is the real truth and that its meaning is proved. A reasoning does not become established, when an empty cause is non-sensically explained. ³¹You explain a „yao-shih“ (pratiṇa — assertion). (But now,) when there is „yao“, there is no „shih“, and at the time there is „shih“, there is no „yao“. As both letters are not together, the „yao-shih“ is frustrated. Thus, when the cause-dharma is not yet born, it does not act as a cause; and when there is extinction (nirodha), there also is no cause. As, when a son is not yet born, he is not called „being born“; and when there is cessation (nirodha of the process of birth, then), too, there is no birth. Hence, there is no cause.

Outsider says : Although you have refuted cause and effect, inasmuch as I explain that there is a soul (atma-dharma), cause and effect are again proved.

(IX) Insider says : You say there is an atma-dharma. What is its nature ? If it is considered that knowing consciousness is the atman, then the knowing consciousness is not eternal. It is known that knowledge of pot begins to arise, when there is known to be a cessation of the knowledge of cloth. If (on the other hand) the knowing consciousness is not the atman, then the atman is without knowledge. If the atman is without knowledge, then there is no misery and happiness³². As the atman is such, there is then no characteristic of an essence. If it is said that, because the atman is united with knowledge, the atman has knowledge (then, in that case), because knowledge is united with the atman, knowledge, too, is not knowledge.

Outsider says : There is an atman. And why ? — Because, things like pot, cloth etc. are what belongs to the atman. It should be recognised that there is an atman.

(X) Insider says : (Not so,) because of the error in unity. As a pot is not different from its existence and oneness, there is a unity. (Now,) if a pot be not „pot“, then, inasmuch as the existence and the oneness must also be that pot, there are many pots. If (on the other hand) the existence and the oneness are not the pot, then there is no pot³³.

Outsider says : There is an error because of (maintaining) the unity of existence, pot, and oneness. I now establish diversity, because it avoids the error in unity.³⁴

(XI) Insider says : You teach diversity : then there is non-

existence. Because the pot is without existence, there is no pot. As for instance, a Bhiksu³⁵ is different and a Brahmana is different and it is known that a Bhiksu-Brahmana is non-existent. ³⁶If the pot is different from its existence, then it does not exist. As the sword and the sheath can be seen existing separately, pot, existence and oneness ought also to be seen separately. (But) now, as the difference between the existence and the oneness is not possible to be seen, the sense of diversity is not proved.

Outsider says : Although unity and diversity are (both) overthrown, through direct perception it is seen that there is a pot; for example, a sky-flower, because it does not exist, cannot be seen. A pot is seen through direct perception, therefore it should be known that the pot exists.

(XII) Insider says : (No! It is) not seen³⁷. And why is it not seen?—(Because,) when you say it is seen through direct perception, it is seen either by the eye or by consciousness (*viññāna*). If it is seen by the eye, a dead man, having eyes, ought to be able to see too. If consciousness sees, a blind man, having consciousness, would see too. If eye³⁷ and consciousness each separately does not see, being united together also they do not see; for example, one blind man cannot see and a number of blind men also cannot see.

Outsider says : There is the pot, and the pot is there because the visual appearance (*rūpa*) is there.

(XIII) Insider says : When you say „Because *rūpa* is there therefore the pot is there“, the *rūpa* and the pot are either one or different. If the pot and *rūpa* are one, when the other *rūpas* are seen, the pot also ought to be seen. If *rūpa* be different from the pot, the pot cannot be visible³⁸. then there is no pot. If because of its being seen it is (considered) to be a pot, (then,) when the pot stays in a place obstructed (from vision) and the eye does not see it, the pot would be no pot. If *rūpa* and pot are one, when the pot is destroyed, (all) the remaining *rūpas* too would get destroyed.

Outsider says : (According) to me, dharmas are neither born nor destroyed; hence neither vision nor non-vision is destroyed. Why?— Because, according to me, dharmas exist eternally. The effect exists (already), extremely subtle and imperceptible, in the cause. Because of its previous existence it afterwards attains grossness; ³⁹therefore it is known that there is cause and effect.

(XIV) Insider says : If it exists previously, no agency is necessary; thus, if the clod of earth is (already) the pot, no potter is necessary; or if the thread is already cloth, no weaver is necessary. Inasmuch as a pot and cloth wait for their being accomplished through able workmen, it is known that in the cause there is no effect. If in the cause there be already the effect, then no future dharma exists. If there is no future dharma, then there is no birth and destruction. ⁴⁰There being no birth and destruction, there is also no good and evil. There being no good and evil, there is also no agency, action, sin, merit, fruit-(and)-retribution. In this way, then, all dharmas become non-existent. And again, if in the cause there exists previously the effect extremely subtle, there being no grossness, then this grossness, being previously non-existent, becomes afterwards existent. There is then birth and destruction in contradiction to your previous explanation. Again, if the extremely subtle exists previously, then there is no birth-(*jati*)-dharma. Inasmuch as there is no *jati*-dharma, the three times⁴¹ are annihilated. The three times being non-existent, it would be known that all dharmas too are non-existent. If in the cause there is previously the effect, in the milk there should already be cream. If it is said that being previously non-existent it exists afterwards, it would be understood that there is an effected (*kṛtaka*) dharma. Therefore, if all dharmas exist previously in the cause, no agency becomes needed.⁴²

Outsider says : If it is a mistake (to hold) that in the cause the effect previously exists, it is now to be explained that, being previously non-existent in the cause, the effect is born afterwards. The non-existence of birth and destruction being thus avoided, there is no error. As there is birth and destruction, it is also existent and also non-existent.

(XV) Insider says : As the non-existence of birth and the existence of birth are not at the same time, if the pot is already existent in the clod of earth, it ought to be accomplished without the need of a wheel, rope and human endeavour etc.; if it is not existent, it is like the hair of a tortoise which is impossible to be spun and woven and made to have function. Therefore, neither as existent nor as non-existent has it birth. Again, you accept a body either as being born by itself or born from something else. Both (positions, however,) are erroneous. If it is born by itself,

what is the use of a birth in that case ? Thus, as being born by itself there exists no body. If now it is not born by itself, how can it be born from something else ? If it is said that it is born by itself as well as from something else, (thus put) together too it is erroneous. Thus all dharmas are without birth.

Outsider says : If there is no body, there should not be the existence of birth, duration and destruction, the three characteristics of what is subjected to existence (*samskrta*). If there is a *samskrta*, then there is an *asamskrta* (i. e. what is not subjected to existence). Inasmuch as the *samskrta* and the *asamskrta* are proved, all dharmas too are proved.

(XVI) Insider says : The *samskrta*-dharmas do not exist. (As regards what) you say about the three characteristics, they are either born in a series or born contemporaneously. If they are born in a series, there is an error; if contemporaneously, there too is an error. If born in a series, at the time of birth there is neither duration nor destruction; at the time of duration there is neither birth nor destruction; at the time of destruction there is neither birth nor duration. Therefore, their origination in a series cannot be obtained. And moreover, if birth has duration, birth as itself would have no essential existence. (Then) what is it that stays on in duration ? If the essence of birth itself is non-existent, how could duration be existent ? (Thus) if there is no birth, there is no duration : it is a non-existing dharma like the son of a barren woman. If birth and duration as existent are what is suppressed by duration, since birth and duration are non-existent, what is it that destruction can suppress ? It is like destroying the horn of a hair (where) „destroying“ is an empty name.

⁴³Outsider (agreeing) says : As you say, birth, duration and destruction (*utpadasthitibhanga*) in a series are inexplicable.⁴⁴A characteristic of the *samskrta* is like a second head and a third hand which is impossible to be obtained : the three characteristics too cannot be obtained (in a series).

⁴⁵(Insider proceeding says :) If the three characteristics are said to be there contemporaneously, still they are not obtainable. And why ? — (Because) if in birth there is destruction, then birth is no birth. If in destruction there is birth, then destruction is no destruction. There is a similar refutation if in duration there is birth and destruction. The characteristics of birth and destruction being mutually contradictory, how can they be

contemporaneous? Therefore, origination of the three characteristics in a series cannot be obtained, nor can it be obtained as contemporaneous. Again, when you speak of the three characteristics, are they so on account of being *samskṛta* or on account of being *asamskṛta*? If being *samskṛta*, then birth is *samskṛta* and ought to have the three characteristics. The same (applies) to duration and destruction. Of such characteristics then there is a regressus ad infinitum (*anavastha*). If there is *anavastha* of the characteristics, you ought not to say that the *samskṛta*-dharma alone have the three characteristics. Your assertion is thus impaired. If, on the other hand, they are characterised by the *asamskṛta*, (then) how can a *samskṛta*-characteristic be characterised by the *asamskṛta*?¹⁵

Outsider says: If you do not wish to have it characterised as *samskṛta*, then it must be made to be characterised as *asamskṛta*. Why? — Because the *asamskṛta* pervades all places and is non-spatial. Therefore it ought to be made to be characterised by the *asamskṛta*.¹⁶

(XVII) Insider says: (Your) *asamskṛta* is spatial. Now I ask you: the ether (*ākāśa*) — do you consider it to be spatial or do you consider it to be non-spatial? If ether be spatial, it must stay within the limits of your body, and it must stay also within the limits of that (other) body. If it is so, then it has parts, and having parts it has limits. If (on the other hand) you say (that) ether is non-spatial, either your body permeates the ether or the ether permeates your body. If (now) the ether permeates your body, your body (too) permeates the ether: thus it has limits. As a pot, cloth, blanket (*kambala*) etc. — because of their having limits — are non-eternal, ether, too, being such, is non-eternal. Moreover, an eternal cause can produce an eternal effect. If the cause is non-eternal, how can the effect be eternal? For instance, through the clod of earth is produced the pot. Because the clod of earth is not eternal, the pot also is not eternal — it is called non-eternal, because it is spatial. Again, when you call something eternal, it is eternal either because it has a cause or because it has no cause. Both these (positions, however) are erroneous. If (you) say that being born from a cause it is eternal, then (there are) objects like a pot, cloth etc. which, although born from a cause are still all non-eternal. If (you say that) dhar-

mas born without any cause are eternal, I too (can say that) dhar-
mas born without any cause are non-eternal. If (according to you)
the dharmas being born without cause must be eternal, it may be
either for the sake of logical reasoning or for the sake of a teaching
through party-prejudice. Thus, it is now necessary to distinctly
clarify and explain the cause of it.

Outsider says: Cause is of two kinds : (viz.) instrumental
cause (*karana-hetu*) and manifesting cause (*vyavajaka-hetu*). What
is born through an instrumental cause is not eternal; as for
example, pot, cloth and other things. They are non-eternal be-
cause they are born from instrumental causes. Dharmas born
through a manifesting cause (on the other hand) are eternal. For
example, a lamp can illuminate objects⁴⁸ lying in darkness, where
the objects are seen when darkness is dispelled. They are
not artificial things (*kr̥taka-dharma*), therefore they are eternal.
Thus, what is born from instrumental cause is not eternal, and
what is born through manifesting cause is eternal.

Insider says: (But, now) objects like pot etc. are directly
perceived, therefore they are existent; the *asamskṛta* is not direct-
ly perceived, therefore it is non-existent. Why? — It is a non-
existent dharma, because the *asamskṛta* is characterised by non-
essence. (Therefore) renouncing existence and renouncing non-
existence — when both are renounced — it is possible to cut
(at the root of) the soul-theory (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*) and then to obtain⁴⁹
the *Nirvāṇa*. As it is said in the *Sāra*: „Thus the knower of ob-
jects sees that all dharmas are void. Because consciousness (*vi-
jñāna*) is without (anything that can be) grasped, the thought-
consciousness (*citta-vijñāna*) is suppressed. Thus the seed (*bīja*)
is suppressed.”⁵⁰

Outsider says: If *samskṛta*-dharmas are characterised by
non-essence, how is there the reality?⁵¹

(XVIII) Insider says: It is like a dream. All dharmas as
wordly reality (*laukika-satya*) are like a dream, (which is) neither
really existent nor non-existent, nor without a cause. Similarly, the
dharmas of the worldly reality have neither the characteristic of
existence, nor of non-existence, nor are they without cause. A house,
for instance, if it be characterised by any essence, would be visi-
ble (even) when it is not yet built. If (it is) said that it is non-exis-
tent, it should not be seen as made.⁵² It is fancied (conventionally)
that owing to beams, rafters and foundation-walls there is the

accomplishment of a function. (Thus) it is not that it is without a cause. Therefore, all dharmas are neither existent, nor non-existent, nor without cause. Thus, (it is) like a dream.

Outsider says: If all dharmas are like a dream,⁵³ when one (whether) in old, young or middle age, has to take a pot, why does one not take a cloth etc.? — and also at the time of taking a cloth why does one not take a pot etc.? Now, it is seen that one takes the pot and not the remaining objects. (Thus) in as much as the names are fixed, it should be known that all dharmas are not like a dream.

(XIX) Insider says: The name is not the essence. If name be the essence, when there is the name of a pot, there ought to be its function of containing milk, cream etc.⁵⁴ When a wise man of the world says only „pot“ and the mere name have already function, then no work on the part of the potter should be necessary, nor buying off of the pot for a price. As the body has three (kinds of) names: either masculine, feminine or neuter (lit. neither masc. nor fem.), if body is a name, (it would) then be a bundle of all the three.⁵⁵ If a name is sought for (the purpose of) denomination, then all three must not be so included. Therefore name and essence are different. And again, as „pot“ is a sound which can be heard, and has a form (*rūpa*) which can be seen — and the smell and the touch of the pot are similarly obtained — there are, thus, many pots. Moreover, a pot has a mouth, a throat, a bottom and a belly — this means that it is not one: so again, there would be many pots. Thus, according to this investigation (*parikṣa*), name (*nāma*) and letter (*akṣara*) are conventional. It should be known that they are not real. As the verse spoken by Buddha: „The world (*laukika*) is of conventional (*parikalpita*) names, the characteristic of which is like a mirage. The sound of speech is just like a reverberation.⁵⁶ Thus, the characteristics of the world are like a dream“.

Outsider says: Although you refute in various ways that dharmas are existent, when you speak of existent dharmas, you undermine your own statement. (On the other hand) if it is said that they are non-existent, how can non-existence be refuted? ⁵⁷

Insider says: „Your dharmas have the characteristic of an essence. According to me, then, this is to be refuted. If from the first, there is no essence existing, then I have nothing to refute. (Thus) it is said:“⁵⁸

⁵⁹ 1) Great men are characterised by equanimity. (Their) heart is without having love and attachment (*ragabhiniveça*) and also without not-love (*viraga*), because it is absolutely without any resort. When all becomes characterised by an essence, then there is both desire and destruction of desire. -

2) By achieving an indestructible faith, one relinquishes all false doctrines (*dṛṣṭi*). Having dispelled the net of false doctrines, the mass of weeds is absolutely extirpated and it is possible to avoid the three poisonous thorns (*visa-kantaka*) and to exert oneself in the cultivation of the right path.

3) When one examines well a doctrine like this, a feeling of faith and reverence is profoundly originated. The faithful heart seeks for the true dharma, without any intention towards the three existences and not taking (either) to non-existence (or) existence, the way to calm extinction (*çanta-nirodha*) is realised.

(TEXT)⁶⁰

1. All dharmas are not a unity. 2. Similarly is dharmia not diverse. 3. How is there the characteristic of existence? 4. Causality, then, is without essence. 5. It is not so. (They) exist through relativity. 6. (That) by themselves the dharmas are there is not right. 7. Your doctrine is not proved. 8. Like this, there is no functioning cause. 9. You ought to explain the nature of the essence. 10. (If it is) unity, then there is error. 11. If diversity,⁶¹ then there is no essence. 12. The five affections (of the senses) do not receive the objects. 13. The visible (*rūpa-dharma*) being simply word and letter, what is seen also has no essence. 14. Because of (previous) existence, an agency (would) not be necessary. 15. Those dharmas do not have birth. 16. The *samskṛta*-dharmas are essenceless. 17. Like this, also spatial. 18. All is not different from being like a dream. 19. Characterisation also is without having distinction.

This is the Aksaraçataka spoken by Deva.

ABBREVIATIONS.

The following resources have been availed of in preparing the present translation.

- Sh,E Shanghai edition of the Chinese *Tripiṭaka* (from the Library of the *Viṇvabhāratī*, Santiniketan).
- TE. Tokio ed. of the same (in the possession of Prof. Walleser).
- NE. Narthang Xylograph of the Tanjur, vol. XVII tsa, at Berlin (f.147 b - 156 b).
- PE. A photographic reproduction of the Peking xylograph (ibid. p.147 b - 165 b), belonging to Prof. Walleser.

APPENDIX I - NOTES.

1) This is the title of the work in Sanskrit according to the Tibetan transliteration of it given in the headline of that version. In B. Nanjio's Catalogue (No. 1254) it is given as *Çataksaraçāstra*. Even a tentative reconstruction in Sanskrit of the main text, which in Tib. precedes and in Chin. follows the commentary upon it, will suffice to show the appropriateness of the title (See Note 60 below).

2) The Tib. attributes the authorship of both the main text and the commentary to some *Nagarjuna*. See Introduction p. 2 above.

3) The doctrines mainly of the *Sāṅkhyas* and the *Vaiçesikas* are here referred to, a refutation of which follows hereafter.

4) On modern interpretations of terms like „dharma“, „samskṛta“ etc. consult O. Rosenberg : *Problems of Buddhist Philosophy* (German translation, Heidelberg 1924) Chap. VI, XIV.

5) The foregoing two paragraphs (the first of which consists of a verse of four feet of seven characters each in Chinese) do not occur in the Tibetan version which, instead, begins thus : „ „Everything has the essentiality of everything (else) (*sarvaṃ sarvatmakam*)“ — of those who, either one or two or many, make such an assertion, even though it is not proved through a cause, it is proved in the absence of causality. In this case, „that the assertion „Everything has the essentiality of everything“ is through a cause because it is as good as existing“ is the cause. Where is the example ? — (The answer is,) it is like a pot, cloth etc. As a pot, cloth etc. are themselves the means of arriving at similarity with the existence of all dharmas, there is the desired proof for the unity of all dharmas.“

6) The names of the opponents : the *Sāṅkhyas* and the *Vaiçesikas* do not occur in the Tibetan version.

7) Tib. „In both cases there is an error. If the character of unity is (already) there, that cannot serve as a cause to this, inasmuch as it is not different from the assertion (*pratijñā*). If, on the other hand, there is (first) diversity, then the assertion itself is damaged, because it is contradictory to the (said) cause“.

8) Cf. *Vaiçesika-Sūtras* VII 2, 1 ff. See note 6 above.

9) These examples are absent in the Tibetan version.

10) T.E. reads *shih*, „are“, instead of Sh.E. *yen*, „say“.

11) Tib. presents here, as in the foregoing argument against unity (see note 7 above) a twofold refutation, based on the two fallacies of *Sadhyasama* and *Pratijnahani*; thus: — „there, too, if the difference of characteristics be the cause (of diversity), then the cause becomes similar to the conclusion. What is similar to the conclusion does not serve as a cause, because it is not different from the assertion. On the other hand, if a diversity of characteristics is there, then the assertion is impaired.“

12) Sh.E. erroneously „*fei wo*“ instead of T.E. „*yu wo*“.

13) Tib. adds: „Or, if the assertion of the existence of dharmas is owing to a cause, then it is necessary to express it.“ Cf. *Catuhçataka*, ed. Vaidya, verse 391.

14) The Tib. version according to N.E. and P.E. reads „*dehi phyir dnos po rnam yod pa ma yin no*“ where the negative „*ma*“ is evidently a mistake.

15) Tib. after this more briefly thus: „If the characteristic of existence (be the cause), it would be *sadhyasama*; if, on the other hand, it be other than the characteristic of existence, then there would be *pratijnahani*. Therefore the characteristic of existence is not proved.“

16) The following example appears in Tib. more explicitly thus: „As for example, when a speaker says „I have to-day enjoyed a nice meal“ there is an evident presumption of „not-nice“ in virtue of connotation of sense (*arthasamarthyat*).“

17) Tib. adds: „Similarly, in cloth etc. the existence of whatever is seen outside of the parts like thread etc. is not to be obtained.“

18) Tib. has „characteristic of non-existence.“ Cf. note 15 above.

19) Tib. says: „it is *sadhyasama*.“

20) Tib. concisely thus: „Here a cause of *bhavas* like mud, thread, fine rope etc. is not barred out, therefore *bhavas* are not (scil. without a cause).“

21) The Tib. version drops this example of sand and oil.

22) Tib. after this: „Because in that case that which exists, and that which is not does not exist; also because the possible existence of both in one is contradictory. What is existent — its characteristic being upheld — cannot be non-existent. Even therefore they have no cause. Of those, too, which are through causelessness, there is no cause [a negative *ma* is missing in all xylographs], because they are proved through causelessness. As soon as it is said that they are proved through causelessness, the assertion of them becomes annihilated; there is no difference between the meaning of a cause [P.E. adds here „an instrumental cause“], and evidence. Thus, what has been said to the effect that „the dharmas exist because of the existence of a cause“ does not hold good.“

23) Tib. „However, the cause — on the strength of the refutation of an effect, (offered) in refuting cause — and the effect, both are to be accepted. Dharmas are all proved because they are well established.“

24) The preceding part of the argument in Tib.: „You say both are proved. It is not so. Why? Because of relativity (*apeksanat*). The cause-ness of the cause and the effectness of the effect are circumstanced (*pari-upacar-*) through their relativity to the effect and the cause respectively

foregoing argument cf. *Madhy. kar.*, ed. Bibl. Buddh., VII 1, 3, 31, 33 etc.

46) This argument of the Outsider appears in Tib. thus : „Inasmuch as the *samskṛta* is refuted, when the *asamskṛta* becomes asserted, then through that assertion the *samskṛta* becomes established. All is seen to exist in pairs : pain and happiness, dharma and adharma, cold and hot. Similarly there are *samskṛta* and *asamskṛta*. Therefore when the *asamskṛta* is proved, both are proved. The *asamskṛta* is all-pervading, eternal and spaceless.“

47) Tib. begins the explanation thus : „Now if the *ātman*, atom, *ākāṣa*, time, space etc. have all-pervasiveness, then the question is, whether your *ātman*“ etc. And instead of *ākāṣa* it takes *ātman* as the subject of the following argument. Towards the end of the argument the answer to the second alternative appears in Tib. thus : „In that case, too, indeterminateness would result, because the causeless things: *deṣa*, *kāla* or *svabhava* are indeterminate. There would also be a non-existence of all dharmas as in the case of a son of a barren woman.“ etc.

48) For „*vyanjaka-hetu*“ see L. de La Vallée Poussin : *Théorie des douze causes*, p. 55 ; *Çatyastra*, trans. Tucci, chap. IX p. 77.

49) For the *Madhyamika* conception of *Nirvāṇa* see Stcherbatsky : *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad 1917, p. 48, p. 183 ff.

50) Cf. *Catuhṣṭaka*, trans. Vaidya, v. 350. See n. 32 above. Tib. quotes in verse : „Knowledge without the basis (of its contents) cannot act. *Vijñāna* being suppressed, the seed of existence becomes suppressed, while no *samskṛta* dharmas exist.“

51) Tib. „Then the *bhavas* have *bhavatva*.“

52) Tib. adds : „If it has the characteristic of both, then the perception of both being destroyed, both would be unperceived.“

53) Tib. adds : „Then it could never be instructed through dharmas by indicating their names.“

54) Tib. thus : „If name be the thing itself, then if one utters „pot“, one would take and drink the honey and water out of the two syllables [aksara, scil. *ghaṭa*, „pot“] themselves. This however does not occur. Therefore the name is different and the thing in itself is different.“

55) Tib. after this : „— Why ? Because of the teaching that when it is said „*dehaḥ*“ it is masculine, when „*tanuḥ*“ it is feminine, and when „*ṣarīram*“ it is neuter. Having three genders it becomes applicable to everything animate and inanimate. Thus if name be the essence, there would be three in one. Therefore in one person there are the male, the female and the neuter, which too is undesirable. Therefore name is not the essence, inasmuch as the name is received by the ear, the pot by the eye and so on. Again, if name be the pot, then because of the many names „*ghaṭa*“, „*kumbha*“, „*kaṣa*“ etc. there would be a multitude of dharmas. Thus in every way corrected, the name is not the thing itself. It is said by the *Bhagavat* : . . . “

56) A verse of four feet in Tib. seems to correspond with the first three feet of the Chinese version.

57) Tib. : „That which is refuted — is it without its specific nature or not ? If it has its own nature, the assertion is falsified. If it has none, it cannot be refuted because of the absence of a specific nature.“

58) Cf. *Catuhṣṭaka*, trans. Vaidya, v. 400 ; „*Die Mittleren Lehre*“, nach

der tib. Version ubertragen, by M. Walleser, IV 8-9, p. 27. Tib. offers a corresponding thesis in the main text and explains that the existence of the refuter, the refutation and the refutable, either contemporaneous or in a series, is impossible. Their origination is like that of the horns of a cattle.

59) In the Chinese version there are eighteen feet of verse as a prelude to the main text which follows upon it. They have been here translated in three paragraphs under the presumption that they represent three verses in the original. The Tib. version gives only one verse of four feet corresponding closely to the first six feet in the Chinese one. Cf. *Madh. vṛtti*, *Bibl. Buddh.*, p. 48.5; 143.10 ff. The rest of the prelude is absent in Tib. which finishes the commentary with „Thus it is said“. Cf. also *Hastabala*, *JRAS.* 1918, p. 285 f.

60) The main text on which the foregoing is a commentary is translated in Chinese in twenty feet of verse (each containing five ideographs) and includes nineteen themes for argument. Theme No. XIII is translated in two feet, the rest in one foot each. In the Tib. version the text appears thus: I. Things do not exist as a unity. II. Similar is (the case with) diversity. III. Existence is to be proved. IIIa. Non-existence, too, is to be proved. (A corresponding separate thesis fails in the Chin. version). IV. There is no causation. V. Not so, because of relativity. VI. It does not exist when but desired. VII. (As) a key-word it is unproved. VIII. „gtan“ and „tshigs“ (corresponding to the two aksaras of the word „hetu“ — cause) are meaningless. IX. The nature of it ought to be explained. X. In unity there is an error. XI. In diversity things would be non-existent. XII. It cannot be grasped (by the senses). XIII. A bhāva is not seen. XIV. There is no existence as result (satkārya). XV. There is no birth in both (i.e. existence and non-existence of the effect). XVI. There is nothing constructed (samskṛta). XVII. It is merely spatial. XVIII. It is like a dream. XIX. Name is not essence. XX. It is like what is to be proved. (This last thesis fails in Chinese. See note 58 above).*

The Chin. colophon given in the last line consists of two feet in verse. The Tib. version attributes the authorship of both text and commentary to Nagarjuna (see Introduction p. 1 ff. above). The Tib. translation is made by Bande-kumāra of the city of Kashmir and afterwards revised by Pandit Ananta and Lo-tsha-ba Grags-kbyor. Cf. Sarat Chandra Das, *Indian Pandits in Tibet*, where Ananta, the Kashmirian Pandit, is spoken of as an interpreter of „*Acārya Bodhisattva*“ or *Āntiraksita*, 705-762 A.D. See *Foreword to Tatvasamgraha*, Baroda, 1926.

61) The character „êrh“ is evidently a misprint for „i“ — diversity.

*The Tib. version of the twenty theses may be tentatively reconstructed in Sanskrit in the following three verses in *Arya-metre*:

1. Bhāva naikatvam¹ bhinnatvam² api tathai³ sādhyam astītvam⁴ |
Sādhyo 'bhāvo 'pi⁵ na hetutvan⁶ nāpekṣaṇ⁷ estam⁸ ||
2. Samketo 'siddho⁹ 'nartho he-tū¹⁰ prakṛtir [atra] vaktavyā¹¹ |
Ekatve doṣo¹² 'nyatve 'bhāvo¹³ dhāraṇam aṇakam¹⁴ ||
3. Bhāvo rūpan-na¹⁵ na satkāryam¹⁶ ajātiś tayo¹⁷ na kṛtakatvam¹⁸ |
Digmātram¹⁹ svapnasamam²⁰ na nāma bhāva-²¹ [ca] sādhyasamam²² ||

APPENDIX II. - INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS.

The numbers refer to pages.

aksara 15	pratijñā 4, 9
anapeksaṇāt 7	bija 14
anavasthā 13	buddh i 7
abhiniveṣa 16	brāhmaṇa 1
amūrtatva 8	bhanga 12
artha 4	bhikṣu 10
asamskrta 12, 13, 14	mañcikā 6
ākāṣa 13	yukti 6
ātman 9	rāga 16
ātma-dṛṣṭi 4, 14	rūpa 10, 15, 16
ātma-dharma 9	laukika 14, 15
iṣvara 7	laukika-satya 14
utpāda 12	viññāna, 10, 14
kambala 13	virāga 16
kāraṇa-hetu 8, 14	visa-kāṇṭaka 16
kuladharmā 8	vaidharṇya 5
kṛtaka-dharma 8, 11, 14	Vaiṣeṣika 4, 5
citta-viññāna 14	vyāñjaka-hetu 14
jāti-dharma 11	çānta-nirodha 16
dṛṣṭi 16	çāstra 4
dharma 4ff.	samskrta 7, 12 ff., 61
nāma 15	Sāṃkhya 4
nirodha 9	sūtra 14
nirvāna 14	stṛiti 12
parikalpita 15	svataḥ siddha 8
parīkṣā 15	svalakṣaṇa 4

CORRECTIONS.

P.3, l.10 *read* J.R.A.S.B. — P.3, l.22 *r.* Viçābhārati. — P.5, l.5 *r.* — P.5, l.20 *r.* I now. — P.8, l.4 Put ²⁷ on the last word of the line. — P.10, l.20 Delete ²⁷. — P.13, l.20 Put ²⁷ on the word „spatial“. — P.14, l.34 *r.* laukika. — P.16, l.18ff. for 1 to 19 *r.* 1 — XIX.

ZUR ERRICHTUNG EINES INSTITUTS FÜR BUDDHISMUS - FORSCHUNG.

Die wissenschaftliche Erforschung des Buddhismus ist verhältnismäßig jungen Datums. Es bedurfte langwieriger Vorarbeiten auf den einzelnen Gebieten der buddhistischen Überlieferung — es seien nur Wassiljew, Burnouf, Schiefner genannt — um auch nur einmal die hervorragende Bedeutung der Pali-Literatur für das Verständnis des ältesten Buddhismus zu würdigen, eine Einsicht, die sich seit den achtziger Jahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts immer entscheidender durchsetzte und heutzutage wohl als allgemein anerkannt betrachtet werden kann. Dieser unbestrittenen historischen Vorrangstellung des Pali gegenüber macht sich mehr und mehr die Anerkennung der weltanschaulichen Bedeutung des späteren, sogen. Mahayana-Buddhismus geltend, die sich zunächst in ihrer entscheidenden Beeinflussung der philosophischen Entwicklung in Indien, späterhin auch in den von Indien abhängigen Kulturgebieten auswirkte. Der primitive Buddhismus, wenn auch in seinen Prinzipien durchaus noch nicht erschöpfend gedeutet, bietet sich heute als ein Konglomerat sehr verschiedenartiger Elemente dar, die zum Teil wenig zu einander passen und die zu einem System vereinigt zu haben eine hervorragende Gestaltungskraft voraussetzt, die man den ursprünglichen Schöpfern des Buddhismus sicher nicht versagen wird. Rationalisiert wurde dieses System aber eigentlich erst durch den Vorläufer oder, wohl besser, Begründer des Mahayana, Nagarjuna, der in seinen negativistischen Werken den Gedanken der allgemeinen Leerheit (*śūnyatā*) entwickelte, welcher in mannigfacher Abwandlung und Schattierung die Grundlage für die etwa von Christi Geburt ab maßgebende „nord“-buddhistische negativistische oder nihilistische Geisteshaltung abgeben sollte, die bis auf ihre gegenwärtig noch lebenskräftigen letzten Ausläufer in Japan und Tibet für die Welt- und Lebensanschauung von Millionen im östlichen und centralen Asien maßgebend geworden ist.

Daß diese kulturgeschichtliche und wissenschaftliche Bedeutung des Mahayana-Buddhismus eine besondere Beachtung verdient und Gegenstand eines intensiveren Studiums sein sollte, ist denn auch in den letzten Jahren nicht nur von japanischer, direkt beteiligter Seite zum Ausdruck gebracht worden. Es sei hier nur an die Darlegungen erinnert, die der deutsche Botschafter in Japan Dr. W. Solf dieser Frage in einem in Tokio gehaltenen Vortrag gewidmet hat (Young East I. p. 334). Wenn aber diese Forderung in so nachdrücklicher Weise geltend gemacht wird, so geschieht dies nicht immer ausschließlich von dem Gesichtspunkt der reinen Wissenschaftlichkeit aus. Vielmehr rechnen gerade solche, welche den Mahayana-Buddhismus aus eigener Anschauung und Erfahrung in Japan kennen gelernt haben, gerne mit der Möglichkeit einer gewissen Befruchtung unserer eigenen Kultur, und diese Möglichkeit wäre natürlich auch sofort gegeben, wenn sich bei einer genaueren Kenntnis desselben herausstellen sollte, daß er wirklich Momente in sich enthält, die in dem occidentalischen Denken und Fühlen entweder überhaupt nicht, oder doch nur verhältnismäßig schwach entwickelt sind, sodaß aus der intensiveren Pflege gerade solcher, uns selbst von Hause aus mehr oder weniger fernliegender Geistesrichtungen in einer uns ganz neu- und fremdartig anmutenden Kultur wie etwa der japanischen sich vielleicht eine ähnliche geistige Anregung ergeben könnte, wie sie sich schon seit längerer Zeit in künstlerischer Hinsicht geltend gemacht hat.

Man braucht also noch lange nicht Anhänger oder Liebhaber irgendwelcher exotischer Kulturmomente zu sein, um deren genauere Erforschung für wünschenswert zu halten: man könnte vielmehr geradezu umgekehrt meinen, daß der Schutz der eigenen Kultur vor Überfremdung eine genaue Kenntnis etwaiger für sie bestehender Gefahren geboten erscheinen läßt. Letzten Endes müßte aber jedes andere, als eben das rein wissenschaftliche Interesse ausscheiden, und diese Notwendigkeit einer rein wissenschaftlichen, d. h. zunächst konstatierenden Beschäftigung mit dem gegebenen Objekt — im vorliegenden Falle mit der buddhistischen Geisteskultur in ihrem ganzen räumlichen und zeitlichen Umfange — legt es nahe, diejenige Form für die gestellte Aufgabe zu wählen, die ihr allein angemessen ist, und diese ist die des Forschungsinstituts. Sammlung und Rohverarbeitung des Materials ist der unmittelbare Zweck, auf dem sich dann eine weitere

Auseinandersetzung aufbauen kann und wird. Man wird aber gerade diese zwei grundlegenden Aufgaben nicht dem Zufall oder der Laune überlassen wollen, wenn man bedenkt, daß das Material, wenn auch dem Ursprung und Geiste nach durchaus einheitlich, in die verschiedenartigsten Sprachen und Literaturen zersplittert ist, indem abgesehen von den ursprünglichen indischen Bestandteilen zum mindesten noch die chinesische und tibetische Übersetzungsliteratur in vollem Umfange herangezogen werden muß. Die Aufgabe ist eben einmal derartig kompliziert, daß sie schon aus physischen Gründen von einem einzelnen Arbeiter überhaupt nicht bewältigt werden kann. Setzt doch schon die wissenschaftlich exakte Beschäftigung mit einer einzelnen der in Betracht kommenden Literaturen abgesehen von der Sprachbeherrschung schon eine erhebliche Vertrautheit mit dem Geiste des Buddhismus voraus, wie er in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung entgegentritt. Also nur einheitliche Zusammenarbeit von Spezialisten läßt eine befriedigende Erfüllung oder doch Annäherung an das Ideal einer adäquaten Forschungsarbeit erwarten, und so bietet sich denn als natürlichstes Organ von selbst ein Institut dar, in welchem die einschlägige Literatur in ihren verschiedenen Verzweigungen von Fachleuten in einer gemeinsamen Organisation und unter einer gemeinsamen, wenn auch weitzügigen Direktive nach philologischen Methoden bearbeitet wird.

Dieses Bedürfnis hat denn auch schon in den letzten Jahren sich an disparaten Punkten geltend gemacht und hat zu einer Reihe von Institutionen geführt, die der skizzierten Aufgabe zu entsprechen bestimmt ist, so in Tokio (Prof. S. Lévy), Peking (Prof. v. Staël-Holstein), Leningrad (Prof. Stcherbatsky). Das sollte nun aber doch nicht abhalten, dieser brennenden und hochaktuellen Frage der Errichtung eines buddhologischen Forschungsinstitutes auch in Deutschland näher zu treten. Es ist eine alte Tradition der deutschen Wissenschaft, Führerin auf allen Gebieten zu sein, und wenn diese Führerschaft auch nicht mehr mit derselben Selbstverständlichkeit gesichert erscheint, wie es in finanziell günstigeren Zeiten der Fall war, so bringt doch auch das heutige verarmte Deutschland für die Wissenschaft enorme Opfer, vor allem durch die großzügige Unterstützung der „Notgemeinschaft für deutsche Wissenschaft“ und der „Kaiser-Wilhelms-Gesellschaft für Forschungsinstitute“, sodaß man sich wohl fragen darf, ob es nicht an der Zeit ist, die maßgebenden Instanzen auf eine wissenschaftliche

Aufgabe hinzuweisen, der man auch eine weltpolitische und für das kulturelle Ansehen Deutschlands belangreiche Bedeutung nicht wohl absprechen kann — eben die Auseinandersetzung mit den geistigen Faktoren, welche für das Leben der asiatischen Völker auch heute noch maßgebend sind. Wenn so aber eine völlig befriedigende Lösung des hier gestellten Problems wohl nur durch ein mit liberalen Mitteln ausgestattetes Forschungsinstitut in größerem Ausmaße zu erhoffen ist, so darf doch die am 15. März 1928 in Heidelberg begründete „Gesellschaft für Buddhismus-Kunde“ darauf hinweisen, daß sie die Förderung der buddhologischen Forschung nicht nur als eine wesentliche Aufgabe in ihr Programm aufgenommen hat, sondern die Errichtung eines Instituts, das diesem Ziele zu dienen in der Lage ist, unter Heranziehung der Fachbibliothek ihres Vorsitzenden eigentlich schon vollzogen hat. Da schon seit Jahren das Studium des *Mahayana*-Buddhismus unter Benützung der indischen, chinesischen und tibetischen Quellen sich in Heidelberg einer besonderen Pflege erfreut, war es ja schließlich bei dem Mangel jeder staatlichen Unterstützung nur ein Gebot der Selbsthilfe, wenn für die von dem normalen Universitätsstudium etwas abliegenden Disziplinen eine besondere Heimstätte in dem Institut geschaffen wurde. —

Die Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft faßte am 25. Aug. d.J. folgende Resolution :

„Anläßlich ihrer Jahresversammlung in Bonn 1928 weist
 „die D.M.G. auf die Bedeutung des *Mahayana*-Buddhismus für
 „das Verständnis der indischen Kultur und hiermit der von Indien abhängigen Kulturen hin und hält die Errichtung eines
 „entsprechenden Forschungsinstituts für dringend wünschenswert. Sie nimmt davon Kenntnis, daß in Heidelberg eine Gesellschaft für Buddhismus-Kunde begründet worden ist, welche die gleichen Ziele verfolgt und glaubt, eine finanzielle
 „Unterstützung der von ihr beabsichtigten Publikationen
 „prinzipiell befürworten zu sollen.“

Nach dieser Anerkennung ihrer Ziele und Aufgaben glaubt die G.f.B.K. auch in weiteren Kreisen, vor allem bei den für die Organisation der wissenschaftlichen Forschung maßgebenden Instanzen Unterstützung zu finden, indem sie auf ihre positiven Vorschläge zur Errichtung eines buddhologischen Instituts in Heidelberg hinweist.

Heidelberg, Dec. 1928.

M. Walleser.